Drawing on primary sources from both sides of the Atlantic, "Britain and the Bomb" explores how economic, political, and strategic considerations have shaped British nuclear diplomacy. The book concentrates on Prime Minister Harold Wilson's first two terms of office, 1964-1970, which represent a critical period in international nuclear history. Wilson's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and his support for continued investment in the British nuclear weapons program, despite serious economic and political challenges, established precedents that still influence policymakers today. The continued independence of Britain's nuclear force, and the enduring absence of a German or European deterrent, certainly owes a debt to Wilson's handling of nuclear diplomacy more than four decades ago. Beyond highlighting the importance of this period, the book explains how and why British nuclear diplomacy evolved during Wilson's leadership. Cabinet discussions, financial crises, and international tensions encouraged a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of strategic independence and the creation of a non-proliferation treaty. Gill shows us that British nuclear diplomacy was a series of compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations.

Rethinking the causes and consequences of Britain's default on its First World War debts to the United States of America The Long Shadow of Default focuses on an important but neglected example of sovereign default between two of the wealthiest and most powerful democracies in modern history. The United Kingdom accrued considerable financial debts to the United States during and immediately after the First World War. In 1934, the British government unilaterally suspended payment on these debts. This book examines why the United Kingdom was one of the last major powers to default on its war debts to the United States and how these outstanding obligations affected political and economic relations between both governments. The British government's unpaid debts cast a surprisingly long shadow over policymaking on both sides of the Atlantic. Memories of British default would limit transatlantic cooperation before and after the Second World War, inform Congressional debates about the economic difficulties of the 1970s, and generate legal challenges for both governments up until the 1990s. More than a century later, the United Kingdom's war debts to the United States remain unpaid and outstanding. David James Gill provides one of the most detailed historical analyses of any sovereign default. He brings attention to an often-neglected episode in international history to inform, refine, and sometimes challenge the wider study of sovereign default.

By directly challenging existing accounts of post-World War II relations among the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, Divided Allies is a significant contribution to transnational and diplomatic history. At its heart, Divided Allies examines why strategic cooperation among these closely allied Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region was limited during the early Cold War. Thomas K. Robb and David James Gill probe the difficulties of security cooperation as the leadership of these four states balanced intramural competition with the need to develop a common strategy against the Soviet Union and the new communist power, the People's Republic of China. Robb and Gill expose contention and disorganization among non-communist allies in the early phase of containment strategy in Asia-Pacific. In particular, the authors note the significance of economic, racial, and cultural elements to planning for regional security and they highlight how these domestic matters resulted in international disorganization. Divided Allies shows that, amidst these contentious relations, the antipodean powers Australia and New Zealand occupied an important role in the region and successfully utilized quadrilateral diplomacy to advance their own national interests, such as the crafting of the 1951 ANZUS collective security treaty. As fractious as were allied relations in the early days of NATO, Robb and Gill demonstrate that the post-World War II Asia-Pacific was as contentious, and that Britain and the commonwealth nations were necessary partners in the development of early global Cold War strategy.