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Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular
methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the
point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue
epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this
purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the
point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully
constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for
epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume
explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it.
Others focus on advancing some application of the methodology
rather than on theorizing about it. The papers go on to explore the
idea that purposes allow one to understand the conceptual demands
on knowing, examine how purposeful epistemology might shed light on
the debate between internalist and externalist epistemologies, and
further develop the idea of purposeful epistemology.
David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to
epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a
priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori
reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their
revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a
subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a
dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology,
respecting the important differences between epistemic processes
that are consciously accessible and those that are not. Reflecting
on epistemic justification, they introduce the notion of
transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that
are suitable for humans. Which cognitive processes these are
depends on contingent facts about human cognitive capacities, and
these cannot be known a priori.
David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to
epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a
priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori
reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their
revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a
subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a
dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology,
respecting the important differences between epistemic processes
that are consciously accessible and those that are not. Reflecting
on epistemic justification, they introduce the notion of
transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that
are suitable for humans. Which cognitive processes these are
depends on contingent facts about human cognitive capacities, and
these cannot be known a priori.
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