By 1944, the evolution of armoured doctrine had produced very different outcomes in Britain and Germany. Offering a good balance of speed, protection and firepower, the British Cromwell tank was much faster than its German opponent, but the Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyer had a high-velocity main gun and a lower profile that made it formidable on the defensive, especially in ambush situations. The two types would fight in a series of bloody encounters, from the initial days of the struggle for Normandy through to its climax as the Allies sought to trap their opponents in the Falaise Pocket.

Using archive photographs, specially commissioned artwork and battle reports, this fascinating study expertly assesses the realities of tactical armoured combat during the desperate battles after D-Day.

The Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939 saw mostly untested German troops face equally inexperienced Polish forces. With the Polish senior leadership endeavouring to hold the country's industrialized east, Hitler's forces unleashed what was essentially a large pincer operation intended to encircle and eliminate much of Poland's military strength. Harnessing this initial operational advantage, the Germans were able to attack Polish logistics, communications and command centres, thereby gaining and maintaining battlefield momentum. With the average infantry soldier on both sides comparatively well-led, equipped and transported, vital differences in battlefield support (especially air power and artillery), tactics, organization and technology would make all the difference in combat. Featuring specially commissioned artwork, archive photography and battle maps, this study focuses upon three actions that reveal the evolving nature of the 1939 campaign. The battle of Tuchola Forest (1-5 September) pitted fast -moving German forces against uncoordinated Polish resistance, while the battle of Wizna (7-10 September) saw outnumbered Polish forces impede the German push north-east of Warsaw. Finally, the battle of Bzura (9-19 September) demonstrated the Polish forces' ability to surprise the Germans operationally during a spirited counter-attack against the invaders. All three battles featured in this book cast light on the motivation, training, tactics and combat performance of the fighting men of both sides in the 1939 struggle for Poland.

As a prelude to the post-war concept of a single "main battle tank" design, vehicles during World War II tended to be categorized as light, medium, and heavy, depending on their use. In this last category, tanks had grown in size, weight, and firepower to counter ever-improving anti-tank weapon systems. This resulted in changes in tactics and doctrine to better integrate heavy armor into a combined arms system. This was especially true on the Eastern Front, where the open terrain promoted armor action and a rapid cycle of improvements. The Soviets were quick to develop vehicles that were able to fight the Tiger I on an equal footing by late 1943, such as the up-gunned T-34/85 and the self-propelled ISU-152s. Because the American T-26/M-26 Pershing arrived late in the war, and the British Centurion not at all, only the Soviet IS-2 serves as an example of a heavy design that was fielded in large battlefield numbers. The Soviet drive to cut off enemy forces in East Prussia during Operation Solstice (February 1945) is a prime example of this conflict. The Germans, had limited resources, and were strategically on the defensive, but enjoyed ever-shorter logistic distances as they retreated, and fought in an environment and terrain that played to the strengths of the technically-superior King Tiger. The IS-2 was lighter, more maneuverable, and far more numerous, and used these assets to its advantage. This battle, fought in the closing months of the war, depicts the classic late-war contrast between the military doctrines of Germany and the Soviet Union.

In 1967-68, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) was on the front line of the defence of South Vietnam's Quang Tri province, which was at the very heart of the Vietnam conflict. Facing them were the soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), men whose organization and equipment made them a very different opponent from the famous, irregular Viet Cong forces. From the 'Hill Battles' in April 1967 to the struggle for the city of Hue (January-March 1968) this bloody campaign forced the two sides into a gruelling trial of strength. The USMC held a general technological and logistical advantage - including close air support and airborne transport, technology, and supplies - but could not always utilize these resources effectively in mountainous, jungle, or urban environments better known by their Vietnamese opponents. In this arresting account of small-unit combat, David R. Higgins steps into the tropical terrain of Vietnam to assess the performance and experience of USMC and NVA forces in three savage battles that stretched both sides to the limit.

As World War II in Europe reached its end, armour development and doctrine had experienced several years of massively accelerated change, especially within the crucible of the Eastern Front. The German Jagdpanther and Soviet SU-100, both turretless tank-destroyer designs based on a 'traditional' turret-tank chassis, were the culminating examples of how the progression of experience, resources and time constraints produced vehicles that were well suited for roles of defence and offence, respectively. The Jagdpanther represented a well-balanced solution and an excellent use of limited resources, while the SU-100 was a natural progression of the SU-85, where numbers produced compensated for rudimentary construction, poor crew comfort and limited optics.