Command and Control (C2) is the set of organizational and technical attributes and processes by which an enterprise marshals and employs human, physical, and information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions.C2 Re-envisioned: The Future of the Enterprise identifies four interrelated megatrends that are individually and collectively shaping the state of the art and practice of C2 as well as the mission challenges we face. These megatrends the book examines are: Big Problems -manifested in part as increasing complexity of both endeavors and enterprises, as military establishments form coalitions with each other, and partnerships with various civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations Robustly Networked Environments-enabled by the extremely broad availability of advanced information and communications technologies (ICT) that place unprecedented powers of information creation, processing, and distribution in the hands of almost anyone who wants them-friend and foe alike Ubiquitous Data-the unprecedented volumes of raw and processed information with which human actors and C2 systems must contend Organizational alternatives-as decentralized, net-enabled approaches to C2 have been made more feasible by technology. The book analyzes historical examples and experimental evidence to determine the critical factors that make C2 go wrong and how to get it right. Successful enterprises in the future will be those that can reconfigure their approaches in an agile manner. Offering fresh perspectives on this subject of critical importance, this book provides the understanding you will need to choose your organizational approaches to suit the mission and the conditions at hand.

With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended, and the half-century-old bipolar international system disappeared. These were earthshaking events that rightly received and are receiving extensive study and analysis. They occurred for a host of reasons, many of which were related to the internal political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics of communist states. Several of the more important reasons were the resentment of citizens of communist states toward the institutions and individuals that governed them; a resurgence of nationalism within multinational states; the inability of communist states to transition successfully from centralized political, economic, and administrative structures to more decentralized structures; inadequate economic growth rates and declining standards of living; the inability of communist states to diffuse technical advances throughout productive sectors of society; and over-emphasis on defense spending.

Military organizations are, by their very nature, resistant to change. This is, in no small part, due to the fact that the cost of error is exceedingly high. Change, particularly change that may affect the relationships among organizations and between commanders and their subordinates presents significant risks and generates considerable concern.The explosion of information technologies has set in motion a virtual tidal wave of change that is in the process of profoundly affecting organizations and individuals in multiple dimensions. The military is no exception. The military is now on the road to becoming an information age organization. The transformation involved is fraught with both risks and opportunities because it will affect the nature of the information provided as well as the manner in which it is provided.Dr. David S. Alberts is currently Director of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He has held senior positions in government, industry, and academia over a twenty-five-year career and has been a leader in helping organizations take advantage of the opportunities offered by technology.

SETTING THE SCENE The Simple and the Complex (Murray Gell-Mann) America in the World Today (Zbigniew Brzezinski) COMPLEXITY THEORY and NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions (Robert Jervis) Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs (James N. Rosenau) Complexity, Chaos, and National SecurityPolicy: Metaphors or Tools? (Alvin M. Saperstein) The Reaction to Chaos (Steven R. Mann) COMPLEXITY THEORY, STRATEGY, and OPERATIONS Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery (Alan D. Beyerchen) Complexity and Organization Management. (Robert R. Maxfield) Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory (John F. Schmitt) Complexity Theory and Air Power (Steven M. Rinaldi) Chaos Theory and U. S. Military Strategy: A "Leapfrog" Strategy for U.S. Defense Policy (Michael J. Mazarr)