With continuing emphasis on building partner capacity to deal with internal and external security threats, the United States (US) Department of State and Department of Defense continue to increase partner nation security force capacity within Security Sector Reform (SSR). This monograph assesses whether US SSR programs, in concert with other contributor nations, fulfill US foreign policy better when implemented by US government agencies rather than by contractors. The intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct were identified to help illustrate examples where policy outcomes are predictable based on the given method of SSR support. Several case studies test the theory and link the independent and dependent variables. Within six selected case studies, the analysis shows how the intervening variables of transparency, effective oversight, and contractor misconduct effect the outcome of the SSR effort. These case studies provide a qualitative comparison to test the theory by reviewing SSR performed by predominantly contracted, mixed, and predominantly military sources. The case studies include six countries with various types of support as well as policy intents. An examination of support to Ukraine in 2009, Georgia in 2008, and Senegal in 2009 provide examples of SSR programs utilizing a mix of contracted and US government support. A second examination of support to Croatia in 1995, Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009 and South Sudan in 2009 provide examples of predominantly contracted support to the SSR programs. Examining the case studies with the three variables identified within the literature review resulted in an unclear connection between a specific policy and the overall outcome. US policy aims for SSR programs may result in unintended consequences, regardless of the type of support and overall unity of effort of the SSR program.