This Element documents the diversity and dissensus of scholarship on the political resource curse, diagnoses its sources, and directs scholarly attention towards what the authors believe will be more fruitful avenues of future research. In the scholarship to date, there is substantial regional heterogeneity and substantial evidence denying the existence of a political resource curse. This dissensus is located in theory, measure, and research design, especially regarding measurement error and endogenous selection. The work then turns to strategies for reconnecting research on resource politics to the broader literature on democratic development. Finally, the results of the authors' own research is presented, showing that a set of historically contingent events in the Middle East and North Africa are at the root of what has been mistaken for a global political resource curse.

Why does state building sometimes promote economic growth and in other cases impede it? Through an analysis of political and economic development in four countries, this book explores the origins of political-economic institutions and the mechanisms connecting them to economic outcomes. The author seeks to extend understanding of the political underpinnings of economic development by examining the origins of political coalitions on which states and their institutions depend. He first provides a political model of institutional change to analyze how elites build either cross-class or narrow coalitions, and he examines how these arrangements shape specific institutions: state-society relations, the nature of bureaucracy, fiscal structures and patterns of economic intervention. He then links these institutions to economic outcomes through a bargaining model to explain why countries such as Korea and Taiwan have more effectively overcome the collective dilemmas that plague economic development than have others such as Turkey and Syria. The latter countries, he shows, lack institutional solutions to the problems that surround productivity growth.

Why does state building sometimes promote economic growth and in other cases impede it? Through an analysis of political and economic development in four countries Turkey, Syria, Korea, and Taiwan this book explores the origins of political-economic institutions and the mechanisms connecting them to economic outcomes. David Waldner extends our understanding of the political underpinnings of economic development by examining the origins of political coalitions on which states and their institutions depend. He first provides a political model of institutional change to analyze how elites build either cross-class or narrow coalitions, and he examines how these arrangements shape specific institutions: state-society relations, the nature of bureaucracy, fiscal structures, and patterns of economic intervention. He then links these institutions to economic outcomes through a bargaining model to explain why countries such as Korea and Taiwan have more effectively overcome the collective dilemmas that plague economic development than have others such as Turkey and Syria. The latter countries, he shows, lack institutional solutions to the problems that surround productivity growth.

The first book to compare political and economic development in these two regions, State Building and Late Development draws on, and contributes to, arguments from political sociology and political economy. Based on a rigorous research design, the work offers both a finely drawn comparison of development and a compellingly argued analysis of the character and consequences of "precocious Keynesianism," the implementation of Keynesian demand-stimulus policies in largely pre-industrial economies."