|
Showing 1 - 4 of
4 matches in All Departments
The topic of introspection stands at the interface between
questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and
questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of
consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it
provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own
conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness
such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by
introspection? How should we understand the relationship between
consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain
consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice
versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy
of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This
volume aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing
together fourteen new essays and one reprinted essay on the
relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and
consciousness.
Attention has been studied in cognitive psychology for more than
half a century, but until recently it was largely neglected in
philosophy. Now, philosophers of mind increasingly recognize that
attention has an important role to play in our theories of
consciousness and of cognition. At the same time, several recent
developments in psychology have led psychologists to foundational
questions about the nature of attention and its implementation in
the brain. As a result there has been a convergence of interest in
fundamental questions about attention. This volume presents the
latest thinking from the philosophers and psychologists who are
working at the interface between these two disciplines. Its
fourteen chapters contain detailed philosophical and scientific
arguments about the nature and mechanisms of attention; the
relationship between attention and consciousness; the role of
attention in explaining reference, rational thought, and the
control of action; the fundamental metaphysical status of
attention, and the details of its implementation in the brain.
These contributions combine ideas from phenomenology, neuroscience,
cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind to further our
understanding of this centrally important mental phenomenon, and to
bring to light the foundational questions that any satisfactory
theory of attention will need to address.
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan
Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining
how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves
and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot
form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all.
Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic
justification. Smithies builds a sustained argument for the
epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness which draws on a range
of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His
position combines two key claims. The first is phenomenal
mentalism, which says that epistemic justification is determined by
the phenomenally individuated facts about your mental states. The
second is accessibilism, which says that epistemic justification is
luminously accessible in the sense that you're always in a position
to know which beliefs you have epistemic justification to hold.
Smithies integrates these two claims into a unified theory of
epistemic justification, which he calls phenomenal accessibilism.
The book is divided into two parts, which converge on this theory
of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part 1 argues
from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy
of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation,
perception, cognition, and introspection. Part 2 argues from the
top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about
the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing
arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role
of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between
epistemology and philosophy of mind.
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan
Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining
how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves
and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot
form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all.
Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic
justification. Smithies builds a sustained argument for the
epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness which draws on a range
of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. His
position combines two key claims. The first is phenomenal
mentalism, which says that epistemic justification is determined by
the phenomenally individuated facts about your mental states. The
second is accessibilism, which says that epistemic justification is
luminously accessible in the sense that you're always in a position
to know which beliefs you have epistemic justification to hold.
Smithies integrates these two claims into a unified theory of
epistemic justification, which he calls phenomenal accessibilism.
The book is divided into two parts, which converge on this theory
of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part 1 argues
from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy
of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation,
perception, cognition, and introspection. Part 2 argues from the
top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about
the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing
arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role
of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between
epistemology and philosophy of mind.
|
You may like...
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R398
R330
Discovery Miles 3 300
|