Although all are agreed that current commercial realities dramatically affect the duties owed by directors to their companies, there is as yet no consensus on what, if anything, should be done about it. Some urge reform, or at least modification, while others insist that the traditional standard which may be expressed generally as "such care as is reasonably expected, having regard to the director's knowledge and experience" - has the great merit of flexibility. In an initiative aimed at clearing this impasse, the English and Scottish Law Commissions have proposed a statutory formulation, on the grounds that this would at least bring more certainty and clarity to the applicable standards. This book delves into the issues surrounding this debate, presenting the arguments for and against a statutory statement, with in-depth analysis of the various degrees of reform that could be brought to bear on the issue.

There are many deep-seated reasons for the current financial turmoil but a key factor has undoubtedly been the serious failings within the corporate governance practices of financial institutions. There have been shortcomings in the risk management and incentive structures; the boards' supervision was at times weak; disclosure and accounting standards were in some cases inadequate; the institutional investors' engagement with management was at times insufficient and, last but not least, the remuneration policies of many large institutions appeared inappropriate. This book will provide a critical overview and analysis of key corporate governance weaknesses, focusing primarily on three main areas: directors' failure to understand complex company transactions; the poor remuneration practices of financial institutions; and, finally, the failure of institutional investors to sufficiently engage with management. The book, while largely focused on the UK, will also consider EU and Australian developments as well as offering a comparative angle looking at the corporate governance of financial institutions in the US.

There are many deep-seated reasons for the current financial turmoil but a key factor has undoubtedly been the serious failings within the corporate governance practices of financial institutions. There have been shortcomings in the risk management and incentive structures; the boards' supervision was at times weak; disclosure and accounting standards were in some cases inadequate; the institutional investors' engagement with management was at times insufficient and, last but not least, the remuneration policies of many large institutions appeared inappropriate. This book will provide a critical overview and analysis of key corporate governance weaknesses, focusing primarily on three main areas: directors' failure to understand complex company transactions; the poor remuneration practices of financial institutions; and, finally, the failure of institutional investors to sufficiently engage with management. The book, while largely focused on the UK, will also consider EU and Australian developments as well as offering a comparative angle looking at the corporate governance of financial institutions in the US.