Profits in the Long Run asks two questions: Are there persistent differences in profitability across firms? If so, what accounts for them? This book answers these questions using data for the 1000 largest US manufacturing firms in 1950 and 1972. It finds that there are persistent differences in profitability and market power across large US companies. Companies with persistently high profits are found to have high market shares and sell differentiated products. Mergers do not result in synergistic increases in profitability, but they do have an averaging effect. Companies with above normal profits have their profits lowered by mergers. Companies with initially below normal profits have them raised. In addition, the influence of other variables on long-run profitability, including risk, sales, diversification, growth and managerial control, is explored. The implications of antitrust policy are likewise addressed.

Competition, Efficiency and Welfare contains a collection of papers in honor of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar, whose accomplishments have enriched various fields of economics. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann's work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nurnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nurnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays. The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann's primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.

The financial crisis that began in 2008 and its lingering aftermath have caused many intellectuals and politicians to question the virtues of capitalist systems. The 19 original essays in this Handbook, written by leading scholars from Asia, North America, and Europe, analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist systems. The volume opens with essays on the historical and legal origins of capitalism. These are followed by chapters describing the nature, institutions, and advantages of capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation, property rights, contracts, capital markets, and the modern corporation. The next set of chapters discusses the problems that can arise in capitalist systems including monopoly, principal agent problems, financial bubbles, excessive managerial compensation, and empire building through wealth-destroying mergers. Two subsequent essays examine in detail the properties of the "Asian model" of capitalism as exemplified by Japan and South Korea, and capitalist systems where ownership and control are largely separated as in the United States and United Kingdom. The handbook concludes with an essay on capitalism in the 21st century by Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps.

Joseph Schumpeter oscillated in his view about the type of economic system that was most conducive to growth. In his 1911 treatise, Schumpeter argued that a more decentralized and turbulent industry structure where the pro cess of creative destruction was triggered by vigorous entrepreneurial ac tivity was the engine of economic growth. But by 1942 Schumpeter had modified his theory, arguing instead that a more centralized and stable industry structure was more conducive to growth. According to Schum peter (1942, p. 132), under the managed economy there was little room for entrepreneurship because, "Innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is required to make it work in pre dictable ways" (p. 132). Schumpeter (1942) reversed his earlier view by arguing that the integration of knowledge creation and appropriation be stowed an inherent innovative advantage upon giant corporations, "Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous - to break to pieces under the pressure of its own success."

Public choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. Part I discusses the nature and justification for the existence of government and various forms it can take, including mixed, private, and public institutions, international organizations, federalisms, and constitutional governments. Part II examines the properties of different voting rules and preference aggregation procedures. Part III explores multiparty systems, interest groups, logrolling and political business cycles. The individual decisionmaker is the focus of Part IV, with surveys of the experimental literature on individual behavior, and why people vote as they do. The final section applies public-choice reasoning to bureaucracy, taxation, and the size of government.

This two-volume anthology contains many of the classic articles from the public choice/rational politics field and includes a new introduction prepared by the editor. Volume I is divided into four parts: The Nature of Democratic Government, Majority Rule, Other Voting Rules and Clubs and Local Politics. Volume II is divided into the following four parts: Representative Democracy, Bureaucracy, Political Business Cycles, and Democratic Dilemmas. Included are excerpts from such classic pieces as Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus of Consent, Downs's Economic Theory of Democracy, Olson's Logic of Collective Action and Niskanen's Bureaucracy and Representative Government, as well as articles by Coase, May, Black, McKelvey, Groves, Ledyard, Vernon Smith, Tiebout, Breton, Stigler, Romer, Rosenthal, Arrow, Sen, Satterthwaite, Gibbard and many more.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

This book explores the revolutionary development of the theory of the firm over the past 35 years. Despite rapid progress in the field, new developments in the microeconomic and industrial organization literature have been relatively scant. This book attempts to redress the balance by providing a comprehensive overview of the theory of the firm before moving on to explore firms and the organization of their economic activities. The contributors investigate the impact of ownership structure and board composition on firm performance, and examine how the institutional framework of an economy affects investment decisions. More specifically, detailed studies of topics including contracts, authority, competence blocs, institutional impacts and corporate governance mechanisms are presented. This unique blend of financial economics and industrial organization perspectives on the corporate firm will prove a stimulating read for scholars and researchers of economics, business administration and law.

Dennis C. Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between American and foreign government systems. The questions examined are not what constitutions have been written, but rather what constitution should be written to advance a community's interests. The book explores the major issues a polity faces when drafting a constitution: Is a two-party or a multi-party system better? Should it adopt federalism? Bicameralism? Should the executive and legislative functions be combined? What role should the judiciary play? How should citizenship be defined? Addressing these questions and much more, Constitutional Democracy is a comprehensive and up-to-date normative analysis of these issues. Provocative and intriguing, this work will be of great interest to scholars and students of political science, economics and law.

Competition, Efficiency and Welfare contains a collection of papers in honor of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar, whose accomplishments have enriched various fields of economics. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann's work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nurnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nurnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays. The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann's primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.

Joseph Schumpeter oscillated in his view about the type of economic system that was most conducive to growth. In his 1911 treatise, Schumpeter argued that a more decentralized and turbulent industry structure where the pro cess of creative destruction was triggered by vigorous entrepreneurial ac tivity was the engine of economic growth. But by 1942 Schumpeter had modified his theory, arguing instead that a more centralized and stable industry structure was more conducive to growth. According to Schum peter (1942, p. 132), under the managed economy there was little room for entrepreneurship because, "Innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is required to make it work in pre dictable ways" (p. 132). Schumpeter (1942) reversed his earlier view by arguing that the integration of knowledge creation and appropriation be stowed an inherent innovative advantage upon giant corporations, "Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous - to break to pieces under the pressure of its own success."

The rise of religious fundamentalism in different parts of the world in recent years and its association with terrorism has led to renewed interest in the nature of religion and its compatibility with Western institutions. Much of the focus of this new interest has contrasted religion and science as systems of knowledge. This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses much more heavily on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. The treatment contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to establish a link between modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare, and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration and education policies and the definition of citizenship.

Profits in the Long Run asks two questions: Are there persistent differences in profitability across firms? If so, what accounts for them? This book answers these questions using data for the 1000 largest US manufacturing firms in 1950 and 1972. It finds that there are persistent differences in profitability and market power across large US companies. Companies with persistently high profits are found to have high market shares and sell differentiated products. Mergers do not result in synergistic increases in profitability, but they do have an averaging effect. Companies with above normal profits have their profits lowered by mergers. Companies with initially below normal profits have them raised. In addition, the influence of other variables on long-run profitability, including risk, sales, diversification, growth and managerial control, is explored. The implications of antitrust policy are likewise addressed.

Constitutional Democracy examines how the basic constitutional structure of government affects what they can accomplish. It also examines the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and the other government systems around the world. The book analyzes the function and impact on government outcomes of each of the central institutions and features of democratic systems.

Do company profits eventually converge on a common, competitive level? How long does the convergence process take? This book seeks to answer these questions through a comparison of company profitability using time-series data compiled at the firm level and at the industry level in Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The emphasis is on long-run, dynamic processes, and the perspective is that of Joseph Schumpeter, with profits converging, if at all, to competitive levels only in the long run. The basic methodology of the book is presented in one chapter, with the subsequent chapters focusing on results for individual countries. A summary chapter presenting major resolutions and their implications concludes the book.

Do company profits eventually converge on a common, competitive level? How long does the convergence process take? This book seeks to answer these questions through a comparison of company profitability using time-series data compiled at the firm level and at the industry level in Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The emphasis is on long-run, dynamic processes, and the perspective is that of Joseph Schumpeter, with profits converging, if at all, to competitive levels only in the long run. The basic methodology of the book is presented in one chapter, with the subsequent chapters focusing on results for individual countries. A summary chapter presenting major resolutions and their implications concludes the book.

The Public Choice Approach to Politics presents some of Dennis Mueller's most important contributions to public choice and public economics. Employing the contractarian-constitutional methodology of public choice, Professor Mueller examines the properties of several voting methods and representation systems as well as questions of equity and justice. Constitutional issues, such as the nature of constitutional rights and the elements for an ideal constitution, are also addressed. The essays in this collection include discussions of Pareto optimal redistribution, the redistribution over time of the benefits from collective action, Rawls's social contract, the social discount rate, and the relationship between contractarianism and different concepts of morality. The volume also includes chapters on the methodology of public choice, the work of James Buchanan and the Virginia School and a survey of the public choice literature. This book brings together in one place Dennis Mueller's key articles and papers on public choice, making it of interest to all economists and political scientists working in this area, as well as to sociologists, philosophers and lawyers.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined. The book is suitable for upper level courses in economics dealing with politics, and political science courses emphasizing rational actor models.

Public choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. The contributors cover topics such as the nature and justification for the existence of government, the properties of different voting rules, and electoral politics in two-party governments.

The rise of religious fundamentalism in different parts of the world in recent years and its association with terrorism has led to renewed interest in the nature of religion and its compatibility with Western institutions. Much of the focus of this new interest has contrasted religion and science as systems of knowledge. This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses much more heavily on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. The treatment contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to establish a link between modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare, and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration and education policies and the definition of citizenship.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.