This title was first published in 2000: This third volume of proceedings of the European Network for Biomedical Ethics focuses on the ethical issues surrounding the debates on reproductive medicine and genetics in human procreation. Central issues include procreation and parenthood, moral protection of the human embryo and foetus, autonomy and recognition, social implications, moral reasoning in applied ethics, legal regulations of assisted procreation, genetic diagnosis and gene therapy. The legal regulation paper evaluates the central laws and guidelines of European countries.

This title was first published in 2000: This third volume of proceedings of the European Network for Biomedical Ethics focuses on the ethical issues surrounding the debates on reproductive medicine and genetics in human procreation. Central issues include procreation and parenthood, moral protection of the human embryo and foetus, autonomy and recognition, social implications, moral reasoning in applied ethics, legal regulations of assisted procreation, genetic diagnosis and gene therapy. The legal regulation paper evaluates the central laws and guidelines of European countries.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant's justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant's views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant's argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents a logical construction of Kant's argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant's argument.

As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date.

Alan Gewirth's "Reason and Morality," in which he set forth the Principle of Generic Consistency, is a major work of modern ethical theory that, though much debated and highly respected, has yet to gain full acceptance. Deryck Beyleveld contends that this resistance stems from misunderstanding of the method and logical operations of Gewirth's central argument. In this book Beyleveld seeks to remedy this deficiency. His rigorous reconstruction of Gewirth's argument gives its various parts their most compelling formulation and clarifies its essential logical structure.
Beyleveld then classifies all the criticisms that Gewirth's argument has received and measures them against his reconstruction of the argument. The overall result is an immensely rich picture of the argument, in which all of its complex issues and key moves are clearly displayed and its validity can finally be discerned.
The comprehensiveness of Beyleveld's treatment provides ready access to the entire debate surrounding the foundational argument of "Reason and Morality," It will be required reading for all who are interested in Gewirth's theory and deontological ethics and will be of central importance to moral and legal theorists.

In a community that takes rights seriously, consent features pervasively in both moral and legal discourse as a justifying reason: stated simply, where there is consent, there can be no complaint. However, without a clear appreciation of the nature of a consent-based justification, its integrity, both in principle and in practice, is liable to be compromised. This book examines the role of consent as a procedural justification, discussing the prerequisites for an adequate consent -- in particular, that an agent with the relevant capacity has made an unforced and informed choice, that the consent has been clearly signalled, and that the scope of the authorisation covers the act in question. It goes on to highlight both the Fallacy of Necessity (where there is no consent, there must be a wrong) and the Fallacy of Sufficiency (where there is consent, there cannot be a wrong). Finally, the extent to which the authority of law itself rests on consent is considered. If the familiarity of consent-based justification engenders confusion and contempt, the analysis in this book acts as a corrective, identifying a range of abusive or misguided practices that variously under-value or over-value consent, that fictionalise it or that are fixated by it, and that treat it too casually or too cautiously. In short, the analysis in Consent in the Law points the way towards recognising an important procedural justification for precisely what it is as well as giving it a more coherent application.

This book is the result of a long-term comparative research project on intellectual property, with topics ranging from patents to copyright, examined across 16 jurisdictions. It does not aim at commenting on current policy issues. The country reports unearth the culturally, morally and historically imprinted thought patterns across Europe which underpin current discussions on the appropriation of information, and which do not change quickly. The research results question the common narratives of the distinctiveness of private and public law, of contracts and property, and of morality and the law. The point of departure is the public good character of information, with the focus being on public interests pursued when assigning information as property. The 14 selected cases, based on recent, and in some cases futuristic when the project began in 2001, scenarios, aim to identify how boundaries to information property emerge, the areas of law that are applied and the principles that are followed in order to balance the conflicting interests at stake. The issues discussed revolve around well-known interfaces such as IP and competition law, monetary interests versus personal interests in human genome data, individual freedoms-to-operate versus collective action models as found in basic research or ‘creative commons’. The book shows how some national discussions appear similar on the surface, in terms of resorting to parallel principles, but subsequent domestic policy answers vary greatly. Even legislation which aims at harmonisation may result into more diversity. Inversely, we found legal institutions applied which install contrasting legal rules which however aim at exactly the same behavioural change. The national reports in Part III are complemented by comparative analyses by the editors, whilst the chapters in Part II are dedicated to an analysis of the submissions from a theoretical point of view, departing from the editors’ own research interests. The chapter in Part I describes the overall ‘Common Core’ research method, which splits the national reports into operative, descriptive and metalegal formants. Boundaries of Information Property is aimed at researchers in IP and practitioners interested in the foundational theory of their subject. It is an inspiring read for those interested in the deeper structures of regulating information. With a foreword by Sjef van Erp (em. University of Maastricht) and contributions by Christine Godt (Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg), Geertrui Van Overwalle (University of Leuven), Lucie Guibault (Dalhousie University), Deryck Beyleveld (University of Durham), Mike Adcock (University of Durham), Ramūnas Birštonas (Vilnius University), Maja Bogataj Jan�i� (Intellectual Property Institute, Ljubljana), Konstantinos Christodoulou (University of Athens), Teresa Franquet Sugrañes (University Rovira i Virgili), Pablo Garrido Pérez (University of Barcelona), Christophe Geiger (Luiss Guido Carli University), Silvia Gómez Trinidad (University of Barcelona), Mariona Gual Dalmau (University of Barcelona), Aleksei Kelli (University of Tartu), Tomaž Keresteš (University of Maribor), Maja Lubarda (Lawyer, Ljubljana), Thomas Margoni (University of Leuven), Jan Mates (Attorney-at-Law, Prague), Maureen O’Sullivan (NUI Galway), Andrea Pradi (University of Trento), Martina Repas (University of Maribor), Giorgio Resta (University of Rome 3), Ole-Andreas Rognstad (University of Oslo), Cristina Roy Pérez (University of Barcelona), Jens Schovsbo (University of Copenhagen), Agnes Schreiner (University of Amsterdam), Simone Schroff (Plymouth University), Tobias Schulte in den Bäumen (Hapag-Llyod, Hamburg), Simona Štrancar (University of Maribor), Tomasz Targosz (Jagiellonian University), Elżbieta Traple (Jagiellonian University), and Gabriele Venskaityte (European Commission, Brussels).

This book analyses the concept of legal dignity employed in current bioethical debate and corresponding legal instruments. It develops a view of human dignity in existing regulation of activities such as pre-natal genetic selection, commodification of the human body, cloning, and euthanasia.