In a community that takes rights seriously, consent features pervasively in both moral and legal discourse as a justifying reason: stated simply, where there is consent, there can be no complaint. However, without a clear appreciation of the nature of a consent-based justification, its integrity, both in principle and in practice, is liable to be compromised. This book examines the role of consent as a procedural justification, discussing the prerequisites for an adequate consent -- in particular, that an agent with the relevant capacity has made an unforced and informed choice, that the consent has been clearly signalled, and that the scope of the authorisation covers the act in question. It goes on to highlight both the Fallacy of Necessity (where there is no consent, there must be a wrong) and the Fallacy of Sufficiency (where there is consent, there cannot be a wrong). Finally, the extent to which the authority of law itself rests on consent is considered. If the familiarity of consent-based justification engenders confusion and contempt, the analysis in this book acts as a corrective, identifying a range of abusive or misguided practices that variously under-value or over-value consent, that fictionalise it or that are fixated by it, and that treat it too casually or too cautiously. In short, the analysis in Consent in the Law points the way towards recognising an important procedural justification for precisely what it is as well as giving it a more coherent application.

As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date.

This book analyses the concept of legal dignity employed in current bioethical debate and corresponding legal instruments. It develops a view of human dignity in existing regulation of activities such as pre-natal genetic selection, commodification of the human body, cloning, and euthanasia.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant's justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant's views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant's argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents a logical construction of Kant's argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant's argument.

Alan Gewirth's "Reason and Morality," in which he set forth the Principle of Generic Consistency, is a major work of modern ethical theory that, though much debated and highly respected, has yet to gain full acceptance. Deryck Beyleveld contends that this resistance stems from misunderstanding of the method and logical operations of Gewirth's central argument. In this book Beyleveld seeks to remedy this deficiency. His rigorous reconstruction of Gewirth's argument gives its various parts their most compelling formulation and clarifies its essential logical structure.
Beyleveld then classifies all the criticisms that Gewirth's argument has received and measures them against his reconstruction of the argument. The overall result is an immensely rich picture of the argument, in which all of its complex issues and key moves are clearly displayed and its validity can finally be discerned.
The comprehensiveness of Beyleveld's treatment provides ready access to the entire debate surrounding the foundational argument of "Reason and Morality," It will be required reading for all who are interested in Gewirth's theory and deontological ethics and will be of central importance to moral and legal theorists.