|
Showing 1 - 2 of
2 matches in All Departments
Why do weak states resist threats of force from the United States,
especially when history shows that this superpower carries out its
ultimatums? Cheap Threats upends conventional notions of power
politics and challenges assumptions about the use of compellent
military threats in international politics. Drawing on an original
dataset of US compellence from 1945 to 2007 and four in-depth case
studies -- the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 2011 confrontation with
Libya, and the 1991 and 2003 showdowns with Iraq -- Dianne
Pfundstein Chamberlain finds that US compellent threats often fail
because threatening and using force became comparatively "cheap"
for the United States after the Cold War. Becoming the world's only
superpower and adopting a new light-footprint model of war, which
relied heavily on airpower and now drones, have reduced the
political, economic, and human costs that US policymakers face when
they go to war. Paradoxically, this lower-cost model of war has
cheapened US threats and fails to signal to opponents that the
United States is resolved to bear the high costs of a protracted
conflict. The result: small states gamble, often unwisely, that the
United States will move on to a new target before achieving its
goals. Cheap Threats resets the bar for scholars and planners
grappling with questions of state resolve, hegemonic stability,
effective coercion, and other issues pertinent in this new era of
US warfighting and diplomacy.
Why do weak states resist threats of force from the United States,
especially when history shows that this superpower carries out its
ultimatums? Cheap Threats upends conventional notions of power
politics and challenges assumptions about the use of compellent
military threats in international politics. Drawing on an original
dataset of US compellence from 1945 to 2007 and four in-depth case
studies -- the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 2011 confrontation with
Libya, and the 1991 and 2003 showdowns with Iraq -- Dianne
Pfundstein Chamberlain finds that US compellent threats often fail
because threatening and using force became comparatively "cheap"
for the United States after the Cold War. Becoming the world's only
superpower and adopting a new light-footprint model of war, which
relied heavily on airpower and now drones, have reduced the
political, economic, and human costs that US policymakers face when
they go to war. Paradoxically, this lower-cost model of war has
cheapened US threats and fails to signal to opponents that the
United States is resolved to bear the high costs of a protracted
conflict. The result: small states gamble, often unwisely, that the
United States will move on to a new target before achieving its
goals. Cheap Threats resets the bar for scholars and planners
grappling with questions of state resolve, hegemonic stability,
effective coercion, and other issues pertinent in this new era of
US warfighting and diplomacy.
|
You may like...
Rockstar
Dolly Parton
CD
R421
R319
Discovery Miles 3 190
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R398
R330
Discovery Miles 3 300
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R398
R330
Discovery Miles 3 300
|