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This is the first collection of original essays entirely devoted to
a detailed study of the Pyrrhonian tradition. The twelve
contributions collected in the present volume combine to offer a
historical and systematic analysis of the form of skepticism known
as "Pyrrhonism". They discuss whether the Pyrrhonist is an
ethically engaged agent, whether he can claim to search for truth,
and other thorny questions concerning ancient Pyrrhonism; explore
its influence on certain modern thinkers such as Pierre Bayle and
David Hume; and examine Pyrrhonian skepticism in relation to
contemporary analytic philosophy.
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in evolutionary
debunking arguments directed against certain types of belief,
particularly moral and religious beliefs. According to those
arguments, the evolutionary origins of the cognitive mechanisms
that produce the targeted beliefs render these beliefs
epistemically unjustified. The reason is that natural selection
cares for reproduction and survival rather than truth, and false
beliefs can in principle be as evolutionarily advantageous as true
beliefs. The present volume brings together fourteen essays that
examine evolutionary debunking arguments not only in ethics and
philosophy of religion, but also in philosophy of mathematics,
metaphysics, and epistemology. The essays move forward research on
those arguments by shedding fresh light on old problems and
proposing new lines of inquiry. The book will appeal to scholars
and graduate students interested in the possible skeptical
implications of evolutionary theory in any of the above domains.
Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical
inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the debates
between moral skeptics of various stripes and their opponents have
gained renewed force not only by taking account of innovative ideas
in moral philosophy, but also by drawing on novel positions in
epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language as well as on
recent findings in empirical sciences. As a result, new arguments
for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the
traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original
essays will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of
moral skepticism by discussing such topics as error theory,
disagreement, constructivism, non-naturalism, expressivism,
fictionalism, and evolutionary debunking arguments. It will be a
valuable resource for academics and advanced students working in
metaethics and moral philosophy more generally.
This book explores the nature and significance of Pyrrhonism, the
most prominent and influential form of skepticism in Western
philosophy. Not only did Pyrrhonism play an important part in the
philosophical scene of the Hellenistic and Imperial age, but it
also had a tremendous impact on Renaissance and modern philosophy
and continues to be a topic of lively discussion among both
scholars of ancient philosophy and epistemologists. The focus and
inspiration of the book is the brand of Pyrrhonism expounded in the
extant works of Sextus Empiricus. Its aim is twofold: to offer a
critical interpretation of some of the central aspects of Sextus's
skeptical outlook and to examine certain debates in contemporary
philosophy from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective. The first part
explores the aim of skeptical inquiry, the defining features of
Pyrrhonian argumentation, the epistemic challenge posed by the
Modes of Agrippa, and the Pyrrhonist's stance on the requirements
of rationality. The second part focuses on present-day discussions
of the epistemic significance of disagreement, the limits of
self-knowledge, and the nature of rationality. The book will appeal
to researchers and graduate students interested in skepticism.
The thirteen essays in this volume explore for the first time the
possible skeptical implications of disagreement in different areas
and from different perspectives, with an emphasis in the current
debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. They
represent a new contribution to the study of the connection between
disagreement and skepticism in epistemology, metaethics, ancient
philosophy, and metaphilosophy.
Although the connection between disagreement and skepticism has
been a focus of analysis in recent discussions of the epistemic
significance of disagreement, it has arguably received less
attention than it deserves. This collection fills in the gap by
exploring the skeptical implications of disagreement not only in
epistemology, but also in ethics, philosophy of religion, and
philosophical inquiry itself, and by looking at the Pyrrhonian
skeptic's treatment of disagreement from the perspective of
contemporary analytic epistemology.
Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical
inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the debates
between moral skeptics of various stripes and their opponents have
gained renewed force not only by taking account of innovative ideas
in moral philosophy, but also by drawing on novel positions in
epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language as well as on
recent findings in empirical sciences. As a result, new arguments
for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the
traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original
essays will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of
moral skepticism by discussing such topics as error theory,
disagreement, constructivism, non-naturalism, expressivism,
fictionalism, and evolutionary debunking arguments. It will be a
valuable resource for academics and advanced students working in
metaethics and moral philosophy more generally.
This is the first collection of original essays entirely devoted to
a detailed study of the Pyrrhonian tradition. The twelve
contributions collected in the present volume combine to offer a
historical and systematic analysis of the form of skepticism known
as "Pyrrhonism". They discuss whether the Pyrrhonist is an
ethically engaged agent, whether he can claim to search for truth,
and other thorny questions concerning ancient Pyrrhonism; explore
its influence on certain modern thinkers such as Pierre Bayle and
David Hume; and examine Pyrrhonian skepticism in relation to
contemporary analytic philosophy.
This book explores the nature and significance of Pyrrhonism, the
most prominent and influential form of skepticism in Western
philosophy. Not only did Pyrrhonism play an important part in the
philosophical scene of the Hellenistic and Imperial age, but it
also had a tremendous impact on Renaissance and modern philosophy
and continues to be a topic of lively discussion among both
scholars of ancient philosophy and epistemologists. The focus and
inspiration of the book is the brand of Pyrrhonism expounded in the
extant works of Sextus Empiricus. Its aim is twofold: to offer a
critical interpretation of some of the central aspects of
Sextus’s skeptical outlook and to examine certain debates in
contemporary philosophy from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective. The
first part explores the aim of skeptical inquiry, the defining
features of Pyrrhonian argumentation, the epistemic challenge posed
by the Modes of Agrippa, and the Pyrrhonist’s stance on the
requirements of rationality. The second part focuses on present-day
discussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement, the
limits of self-knowledge, and the nature of rationality. The book
will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in
skepticism.
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