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One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write
contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also
implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic,
noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to
provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which
have these properties. This volume contains original contributions
on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies
with differential information and provides answers to the above
questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity
of alternative equilibria are also examined.
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write
contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also
implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic,
noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to
provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which
have these properties. This volume contains original contributions
on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies
with differential information and provides answers to the above
questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity
of alternative equilibria are also examined.
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