As the character of conflict in the 21st century evolves, the Army's strength will continue to rest on our values, our ethos, and our people. Our Soldiers and leaders must remain true to these values as they operate in increasingly complex environments where moral-ethical failures can have strategic implications. Most of our Soldiers do the right thing--and do it well--time and again under intense pressure. But we must stay ever vigilant in upholding our high professional standards, mindful of the strains that accompany repeated combat deployments in the longest war our country has fought with an all-volunteer force. We must think critically about our Professional Military Ethic and promote dialogue at all levels as we deepen our understanding of what this time-honored source of strength means to the profession today.

"American Civil-Military Relations" offers the first comprehensive assessment of the subject since the publication of Samuel P. Huntington's field-defining book, "The Soldier and the State." Using this seminal work as a point of departure, experts in the fields of political science, history, and sociology ask what has been learned and what more needs to be investigated in the relationship between civilian and military sectors in the 21st century.

Leading scholars--such as Richard Betts, Risa Brooks, James Burk, Michael Desch, Peter Feaver, Richard Kohn, Williamson Murray, and David Segal--discuss key issues, including: - changes in officer education since the end of the Cold War;- shifting conceptions of military expertise in response to evolving operational and strategic requirements;- increased military involvement in high-level politics; and- the domestic and international contexts of U.S. civil-military relations.

The first section of the book provides contrasting perspectives of American civil-military relations within the last five decades. The next section addresses Huntington's conception of societal and functional imperatives and their influence on the civil-military relationship. Following sections examine relationships between military and civilian leaders and describe the norms and practices that should guide those interactions. The editors frame these original essays with introductory and concluding chapters that synthesize the key arguments of the book.

What is clear from the essays in this volume is that the line between civil and military expertise and responsibility is not that sharply drawn, and perhaps given the increasing complexity of international security issues, it should not be. When forming national security policy, the editors conclude, civilian and military leaders need to maintain a respectful and engaged dialogue.

"American Civil-Military Relations" is essential reading for students and scholars interested in civil-military relations, U.S. politics, and national security policy.

This monograph places the Army's 2011 campaign of learning about the Army as profession after a decade of war into the context of the just-initiated Department of Defense (DoD) reductions. The exact shape of those reductions and the defense strategy our down-sized land forces are to execute in the future are only now becoming clear as this monograph goes to press in early 2012. But what is already clear is that the U.S. Army will undergo a severely resource-con-strained transition to a significantly smaller force than it sustained during the past decade of war. As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Bill Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the Army centers on the qualitative and institutional character of the Army after the reductions. Will the Army manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession comprised of Soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to vocation? Will the Army perceive its service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filling a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? Strategic Studies Institute.

One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America? To large measure, the answer to this question should determine the behavior of the strategic leaders of these professions, including the uncommon behavior of public dissent. Using the "Revolt of the Generals" in 2006 as stimulus, the author develops from the study of military professions the critical trust relationships that should have informed their individual decisions to dissent. After doing so, he makes recommendations for the restoration of the professions' ethic in this critical area of behavior by the senior officers who are the professions' strategic leaders.

The successful application of national military strategy depends upon the existence of a balanced, flexible military establishment; a national force structured, manned, equipped, and trained to execute the broad range of potential missions that exist in the post-cold war world. With this in mind, the national leaders of the previous administration developed a concept for a military that was considerably smaller; but well-equipped, highly trained, and capable of rapid response to a number of probable scenarios in the final decade of the 20th century. The author's masterful assessment of the processes by which these plans for the future state of America's armed forces were developed is a valuable addition to the literature on strategy formulation. Working with a great deal of original source material, he is able to illuminate the critical series of events that resulted in the development of the National Military Strategy of the United States and the "base force." He comments upon the roles played throughout this process by the Secretary of Defense, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Service Chiefs. He assesses the extent to which the "build-down" has been achieved since the concept was approved, and how the process was affected by the Gulf War, domestic needs, and, to a lesser degree, by a change in administrations.