Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support. A geometric theory is developed to remove much of the mystery of three-candidate voting procedures. In this manner, the spectrum of election outcomes from all positional methods can be compared, new flaws with widely accepted concepts (such as the "Condorcet winner") are identified, and extensions to standard results (e.g. Black's single-peakedness) are obtained. Many of these results are based on the "profile coordinates" introduced here, which makes it possible to "see" the set of all possible voters' preferences leading to specified election outcomes. Thus, it now is possible to visually compare the likelihood of various conclusions. Also, geometry is applied to apportionment methods to uncover new explanations why such methods can create troubling problems.

We decide by elections, but do we elect who the voters really want? The answer, as we have learned over the last two centuries, is 'not necessarily'. What a negative, frightening assertion about a principal tool of democracy! This negativism has been supported by two hundred years of published results showing how bad the situation can be. This expository, largely non-technical book is the first to find positive results showing that the situation is not anywhere as dire and negative as we have been led to believe. Instead there are surprisingly simple explanations for the negative assertions, and positive conclusions can be obtained.

This highly accessible book offers undergraduates and professionals a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated. These include inter alia legislative cycles, supply and demand economics, statistical paradoxes, and diverse voting/election paradoxes.

This highly accessible book offers undergraduates and professionals a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated. These include inter alia legislative cycles, supply and demand economics, statistical paradoxes, and diverse voting/election paradoxes.

We decide by elections, but do we elect who the voters really want? The answer, as we have learned over the last two centuries, is 'not necessarily'. What a negative, frightening assertion about a principal tool of democracy! This negativism has been supported by two hundred years of published results showing how bad the situation can be. This expository, largely non-technical book is the first to find positive results showing that the situation is not anywhere as dire and negative as we have been led to believe. Instead there are surprisingly simple explanations for the negative assertions, and positive conclusions can be obtained.

Amazingly, the complexities of voting theory can be explained and resolved with comfortable geometry. A geometry which unifies such seemingly disparate topics as manipulation, monotonicity, and even the apportionment issues of the US Supreme Court. Although directed mainly toward students and others wishing to learn about voting, experts will discover here many previously unpublished results. As an example, a new profile decomposition quickly resolves the age-old controversies of Condorcet and Borda, demonstrates that the rankings of pairwise and other methods differ because they rely on different information, casts serious doubt on the reliability of a Condorcet winner as a standard for the field, makes the famous Arrow's Theorem predictable, and simplifies the construction of examples.

This monograph develops a method of creating convenient coordinate systems for game theory that will allow readers to more easily understand, analyze, and create games at various levels of complexity. By identifying the unique characterization of games that separates the individual's strategic interests from the group's collective behavior, the authors construct a single analytical methodology that readers will be able to apply to a wide variety of games. With its emphasis on practicality and approachability, readers will find this book an invaluable tool, and a viable alternative to the ad hoc analytical approach that has become customary for researchers utilizing game theory. The introductory chapters serve two important purposes: they review several games of fundamental importance, and also introduce a dynamic that is inherent in games, but has gone unexplored until now. After this has been established, readers will advance from simple 2 x 2 games to games with more player strategies and dynamics. For interested readers, a rigorous treatment of the underlying mathematics is conveniently gathered at the end of the book. Additional topics of interest, such as extensive form and coalitional games, are presented to help readers visualize more complex settings that will be vital in aiding the understanding of advanced topics, such as coalition-free Nash points, multi-player repeated games, and more. Coordinate Systems for Games is ideal for a wide variety of researchers interested in game theory, including social scientists, economists, mathematicians, computer scientists, and more. The authors' approachable style also makes this accessible to an audience at any scale of experience, from beginning non-specialists to more practiced researchers.

This textbook invites the reader to develop a holistic grounding in mathematical finance, where concepts and intuition play as important a role as powerful mathematical tools. Financial interactions are characterized by a vast amount of data and uncertainty; navigating the inherent dangers and hidden opportunities requires a keen understanding of what techniques to apply and when. By exploring the conceptual foundations of options pricing, the author equips readers to choose their tools with a critical eye and adapt to emerging challenges. Introducing the basics of gambles through realistic scenarios, the text goes on to build the core financial techniques of Puts, Calls, hedging, and arbitrage. Chapters on modeling and probability lead into the centerpiece: the Black-Scholes equation. Omitting the mechanics of solving Black-Scholes itself, the presentation instead focuses on an in-depth analysis of its derivation and solutions. Advanced topics that follow include the Greeks, American options, and embellishments. Throughout, the author presents topics in an engaging conversational style. "Intuition breaks" frequently prompt students to set aside mathematical details and think critically about the relevance of tools in context. Mathematics of Finance is ideal for undergraduates from a variety of backgrounds, including mathematics, economics, statistics, data science, and computer science. Students should have experience with the standard calculus sequence, as well as a familiarity with differential equations and probability. No financial expertise is assumed of student or instructor; in fact, the text's deep connection to mathematical ideas makes it suitable for a math capstone course. A complete set of the author's lecture videos is available on YouTube, providing a comprehensive supplementary resource for a course or independent study.