|
Showing 1 - 3 of
3 matches in All Departments
Provides a timely and original contribution to the debate
surrounding privileged self-knowledge Contemporary epistemologists
and philosophers of mind continue to find puzzling the nature and
source of privileged self-knowledge: the ordinary and effortless
‘first-person’ knowledge we have of our own sensations, moods,
emotions, beliefs, desires, and hopes. In Expression and
Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright articulate their
joint dissatisfaction with extant accounts of self-knowledge and
engage in a sustained and substantial critical debate over the
merits of an expressivist approach to the topic. The authors
incorporate cutting-edge research while defending their own
alternatives to existing approaches to so-called ‘first-person
privilege’. Bar-On defends her neo-expressivist account,
addressing the objection that neo-expressivism fails to provide an
adequate epistemology of ordinary self-knowledge, and addresses new
objections levelled by Wright. Wright then presents an alternative
pluralist approach, and Bar-On argues in response that pluralism
faces difficulties neo-expressivism avoids. Providing invaluable
insights on a hotly debated topic in epistemology and philosophy of
mind, Expression and Self-Knowledge: Presents an in-depth debate
between two leading philosophers over the expressivist approach
Offers novel developments and penetrating criticisms of the
authors' respective views Features two different perspectives on
the influential remarks on expression and self-knowledge found in
Wittgenstein’s later writings Includes four jointly written
chapters that offer a critical overview of prominent existing
accounts, which provide a useful advanced introduction to the
subject. Expression and Self-Knowledge is essential reading for
epistemologists, philosophers of mind and language, psychologists
with an interest in self-knowledge, and researchers and graduate
students working in expression, expressivism, and self-knowledge.
We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a
given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what
we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm
thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed,
tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about
my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others
say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and
correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based
on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our
knowledge of our own present mental states?
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and
self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of
language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of
mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many
long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own
minds.
Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which avowals
are expressive acts that have truth-accessible self-ascriptions as
their products. When avowing, a person directly expresses, rather
than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal
ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an
adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of
the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology,
explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many
expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an
expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view
of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The
view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent
contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on
our special relationship to our own minds.
We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a
given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what
we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm
thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed,
tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about
my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others
say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and
correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based
on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our
knowledge of our own present mental states?
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and
self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of
language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of
mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many
long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own
minds.
Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which avowals
are expressive acts that have truth-accessible self-ascriptions as
their products. When avowing, a person directly expresses, rather
than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal
ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an
adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of
the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology,
explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many
expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an
expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view
of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The
view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent
contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on
our special relationship to our own minds.
|
|