The Battle of Britain was one of the most iconic campaigns of World War II, where the 'Few' of the Royal Air Force took on the might of the German Luftwaffe. At stake was not just air superiority over the British Isles - a German victory would enable Hitler's plan to invade and conquer the last Allied country left fighting.

While most narratives of the battle focus on the brave pilots of Fighter Command, this book tells it from the perspective of the German strategists as they attempted the clear the skies over Britain. Explaining Hermann Göring's plans, the Luftwaffe's capabilities in 1940, the RAF's defences, and how the fierce aerial battles over south-east England were fought, this fully illustrated fresh study is based on original documents and new analysis by an expert on the campaign.

Following Argentina's military operation to take possession of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government launched a major naval operation to return them to British rule. Defending the Royal Navy task force were two small squadrons totalling 20 Sea Harriers (SHARs). Initial clashes between SHARs and Argentine Mirages and Daggers on 1 May 1982 failed to eliminate the Sea Harrier defenders. FAA fighter-bomber pilots relied on daring and courageous ultra-low level attacks, frequently escaping the Sea Harrier's limited capabilities, against Royal Navy warships and auxiliaries, causing considerable damage during Operation Corporate, the large-scale amphibious operation to repossess the islands. Publishing 35 years after the end of the conflict, this fully illustrated volume offers a balanced and objective examination of the SHAR and the Argentine Mirage and Dagger aircraft, highlighting the attributes of both and the skills and courage of the pilots flying them.

This fully illustrated study details Germany and Italy's failed development of World War II aircraft carriers, and the naval aviation ships that the two Axis powers sent into action in their place. The quest for a modern aircraft carrier was the ultimate symbol of the Axis powers' challenge to Allied naval might, but fully-fledged carriers proved either too difficult, expensive or politically unpopular for either to make operational. After the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, Hitler publicly stated his intention to build an aircraft carrier, the Graf Zeppelin, which was launched in 1938. A year later, the ambitious fleet-expansion Z-Plan, was unveiled with two additional aircraft carriers earmarked for production . However, by the beginning of World War II, Graf Zeppelin was not yet completed and work was halted. Further aircraft carrier designs and conversion projects such as the ocean liner Europa and heavy cruiser Seydlitz were considered but, in January 1943, all construction work on surface vessels ceased and naval resources were diverted to the U-boat Campaign. This book explains not only the history of Germany's famous Graf Zeppelin fleet carrier and German carrier conversion projects but also Italy's belated attempt to convert two of her ocean liners into carriers. It considers the role of naval aviation in the two countries' rearmament programmes and describes how ultimately it was only Italian seaplane carriers and German ocean-going, catapult-equipped flying boat carriers that both Axis powers did eventually send into combat.

A rigorous new analysis of America's legendary 'Big Week' air campaign which enabled the Allies to gain air superiority before D-Day. The USAAF's mighty World War II bomber forces were designed for unescorted, precision daylight bombing, but no-one foresaw the devastation that German radar-directed interceptors would inflict on them. Following the failures of 1943's Schweinfurt-Regensburg raids, and with D-Day looming, the Allies urgently needed to crush the Luftwaffe's ability to oppose the landings. In February 1944, the Allies conceived and fought history's first-ever successful offensive counter air (OCA) campaign, Operation Argument or "Big Week." Attacking German aircraft factories with hundreds of heavy bombers, escorted by the new long-range P-51 Mustang, it aimed both to slash aircraft production and force the Luftwaffe into combat, allowing the new Mustangs to take their toll on the German interceptors. This expertly written, illustration-packed account explains how the Allies finally began to win air superiority over Europe, and how Operation Argument marked the beginning of the Luftwaffe's fall.

Over the past 80 years, histories of the Battle of Britain have consistently portrayed the feats of 'The Few' (as they were immortalized in Churchill's famous speech) as being responsible for the RAF's victory in the epic battle. However, this is only part of the story. The results of an air campaign cannot be measured in terms of territory captured, cities occupied or armies defeated, routed or annihilated. Successful air campaigns are those that achieve their intended aims or stated objectives. Victory in the Battle of Britain was determined by whether the Luftwaffe achieved its objectives. The Luftwaffe, of course, did not, and this detailed and rigorous study explains why. Analysing the battle in its entirety in the context of what it was - history's first independent offensive counter-air campaign against the world's first integrated air defence system - Douglas C. Dildy and Paul F. Crickmore set out to re-examine this remarkable conflict. Presenting the events of the Battle of Britain in the context of the Luftwaffe's campaign and RAF Fighter Command's battles against it, this title is a new and innovative history of the battle that kept alive the Allies' chances of defeating Nazi Germany.

It was almost exactly 15.00 hours local time, on 25 June 1950, when nine Yakovlev Yak-9P fighters of the North Korea's 'Korean People's Air Force' (KPAF) simultaneously attacked Seoul International Airport and the Kimpo Airfield outside Seoul, the capitol of South Korea. In the course of their attacks, the Yaks shot up ground installations and strafed one of Douglas C-54 transports of the US Air Force involved in evacuation of US citizens from the war-stricken country. The Yaks returned to finish off the C-54 at Kimpo around 19.00. Thus began the aerial component of the Korean War, which was to last until mid-1953. While dozens of accounts about this air war have been published over the time, nearly all of these are concentrating on its most spectacular segment: air combats between jet fighters of two primary belligerents: North American F-86 Sabres of the US Air Force (USAF) and Mikoyan i Gurevich MiG-15s of the Soviet Air Force (V-VS). On the contrary, the story of KPAF's coming into being and its involvement in the Korean War remain entirely unknown. Certainly enough, the small service was virtually wiped out of the skies in a matter of few weeks after the start of that conflict. Therefore, the impression is that it never took part in the Korean War again. Actually, the KPAF - backgrounds of which can be traced back to the times only three months after the Japanese capitulation that ended the World War II - was re-built and even made a come-back: re-equipped with piston-engined fighters of Soviet origin already by the end of 1950, it went a step further and converted to jets just a year later. This is a story of the - often problematic - coming into being of the KPAF. Clearly, building a modern, effective air force was always a daunting undertaking - even in the late 1940s when there was abundance of combat aircraft left over from the World War II. Nevertheless, the communist government of North Korea and its airmen never stopped trying. Surprisingly enough - especially for a military service of a staunchly communist and underdeveloped country of the 1940s - it was greatly bolstered by efforts of a single wealthy man that provided installations necessary for education of future pilots and ground personnel.