China's expanding air and naval capabilities, coupled with the proliferation of long-range anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, are making US naval diplomacy an increasingly risky enterprise. It is surprising therefore how little attention has been devoted to comparing the way in which different administrations have reacted in dissimilar manners to major naval incidents. This book provides the first comparative analysis of multiple cases. In particular, it examines three incidents: the Maine incident (1898), which led to war in the short term; the Lusitania crisis (1915), which set the trajectory for intervention; and the Panay incident (1937), which was settled diplomatically. After scrutinizing these incidents and the domestic and international factors shaping the subsequent crisis, Douglas Carl Peifer analyses the presidential decision making in terms of options considered and policies selected. The book draws upon international relations and coercion theory but emphasizes the importance of context, complexity, and contingency when assessing presidential decision making. The contemporary tensions in East Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Baltic, and the Black Sea are increasingly vexing US naval diplomacy. By analyzing how Presidents William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt responded to the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay incidents, this book provides an essential instrument to deal with the growing threats of a new naval crisis.

Throughout US history, presidents have had vastly different reactions to naval incidents. Though some incidents have been resolved diplomatically, others have escalated to outright war. What factors influence the outcome of a naval incident, especially when calls for retribution mingle with recommendations for restraint? Given the rise of long range anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, coupled with tensions in East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Black and Baltic Seas, the question is more relevant than ever for US naval diplomacy. In Choosing War, Douglas Carl Peifer compares the ways in which different presidential administrations have responded when American lives were lost at sea. He examines in depth three cases: the Maine incident (1898), which led to war in the short term; the Lusitania crisis (1915), which set the trajectory for intervention; and the Panay incident (1937), which was settled diplomatically. While evaluating Presidents William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt's responses to these incidents, Peifer lucidly reflects on the options they had available and the policies they ultimately selected. The case studies illuminate how leadership, memory, and shifting domestic policy shape presidential decisions, providing significant insights into the connections between naval incidents, war, and their historical contexts. Rich in dramatic narrative and historical perspective, Choosing War offers an essential tool for confronting future naval crises.