During the 1930s and 1940s, and again in the 1970s and 1980s, most European nations, indeed most industrial nations, undertook major changes in macroeconomic policy orientation and financial regulation. The contributors to this volume, historians, political scientists, and economists, identify the forces which drove these major policy shifts, and explore their implications for other areas of economic and social policy.

In this major interpretation of the crisis of democracy in Italy after World War I, Douglas Forsyth uses unpublished documents in Italy's central state archives, as well as private papers, diplomatic and bank archives in Italy, France, Britain and the United States, to analyse monetary and financial policy in Italy from the outbreak of war until the march on Rome. The study focuses on real and perceived conflicts and often painful choices between great power politics, economic growth, macroeconomic stabilisation and the preservation or strengthening of democratic consensus. The key issue explored is why governments in Italy after World War I, although headed by left-liberal reformers, were unable to press ahead with the democratic reformism which had characterised the so-called 'Giolittian era', 1901-1914. Their failure paved the way for parliamentary deadlock and Mussolini's seizure of power.

Since the 19th Century, there has been an accepted distinction between financial systems that separate commercial and investment banking and those that do not. This comprehensive collection aims to establish how and why financial systems develop, and how knowledge of financial differentiation in the 19th Century may afford insight into the development of contemporary banking structure.
This book poses a systematic challenge to Alexander Gerschenkron's 1950s thesis on universal banks. With contributions from leading scholars such as Ranald Michie and Jaime Reis, this well written book provides solid and intriguing arguments throughout.


eBook available with sample pages: 0203222113

Professor Forsyth provides an important new interpretation of the crisis of democracy in Italy after World War I. He argues that liberal governments after 1918 failed to balance the conflicting claims of great power conflicts, social welfare, economic growth, and macroeconomic stability in a harsh economic environment. Postwar liberal leaders put stability ahead of the redistributive social policies that would have been necessary to secure broad electoral support: this failure led to parliamentary deadlock and Mussolini's seizure of power.