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The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative and International
Law, 1600-1926, brings together foreign, comparative, and
international titles in a single resource. Its International Law
component features works of some of the great legal theorists,
including Gentili, Grotius, Selden, Zouche, Pufendorf,
Bijnkershoek, Wolff, Vattel, Martens, Mackintosh, Wheaton, among
others. The materials in this archive are drawn from three
world-class American law libraries: the Yale Law Library, the
George Washington University Law Library, and the Columbia Law
Library.Now for the first time, these high-quality digital scans of
original works are available via print-on-demand, making them
readily accessible to libraries, students, independent scholars,
and readers of all ages.+++++++++++++++The below data was compiled
from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of
this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping
to insure edition identification: +++++++++++++++Yale Law
LibraryLP3Y006040019220101The Making of Modern Law: Foreign,
Comparative, and International Law, 1600-1926"Presents the American
version of the Conference on the limitation or armament]"--p.
vi.New York City: American Army & Navy Journal, Inc., c1922]x,
140 p. fold. maps. 20 cmUnited States
Purchase of this book includes free trial access to
www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books
for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book:
CHAPTER III THE GKEAT LIBERALITY OF THE AMERICAN OFFER The 5-5-3
ratio in capital ships was determined by omitting purely paper
programs and by including as a part of the capital ship strength of
each nation not only those ships already built but also those under
construction, to the extent to which construction had already
progressed. Japan later maintained that a ship was not a ship until
finished and contested strongly the inclusion of ships under
construction. Such omission would have brought their status quo
ratio up to about 5-5-31/2. But manifestly a new ship, say 98 per
cent ready for service, represented a state of naval power that
could not be ignored, and in fact an element of strength greater
than a completed ship that might be of antiquated design or out of
repair. The logic and justice of the American view was finally
conceded by the Japanese after somewhat prolonged discussion. In
reality America was extremely liberal in not assigning much greater
weight than was assumed by the plan to her building program of 15
capital ships. Construction was proceeding rapidly upon this vast
project, which already averaged about 35 per cent completion, and
which would be finished in about two years. The designs
incorporated all the principal lessons of the war so that the
completed ships would entirely outclass most of the existing ships
of the British and Japanese navies, which had no equivalent number
of ships under construction. Japan had 5 capital ships under
construction, together with a paper program for 10 more which were
omitted from the status quo calculations. But she was on the verge
of an acute financial crisis due to excessive taxation and to the
spending of more than 50 per cent of her revenue upon military and
naval activities. Her prospect was that shew...
This scarce antiquarian book is a selection from Kessinger
Publishing's Legacy Reprint Series. Due to its age, it may contain
imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed
pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we
have made it available as part of our commitment to protecting,
preserving, and promoting the world's literature. Kessinger
Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and
hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone
Purchase of this book includes free trial access to
www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books
for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book:
CHAPTER III THE GKEAT LIBERALITY OF THE AMERICAN OFFER The 5-5-3
ratio in capital ships was determined by omitting purely paper
programs and by including as a part of the capital ship strength of
each nation not only those ships already built but also those under
construction, to the extent to which construction had already
progressed. Japan later maintained that a ship was not a ship until
finished and contested strongly the inclusion of ships under
construction. Such omission would have brought their status quo
ratio up to about 5-5-31/2. But manifestly a new ship, say 98 per
cent ready for service, represented a state of naval power that
could not be ignored, and in fact an element of strength greater
than a completed ship that might be of antiquated design or out of
repair. The logic and justice of the American view was finally
conceded by the Japanese after somewhat prolonged discussion. In
reality America was extremely liberal in not assigning much greater
weight than was assumed by the plan to her building program of 15
capital ships. Construction was proceeding rapidly upon this vast
project, which already averaged about 35 per cent completion, and
which would be finished in about two years. The designs
incorporated all the principal lessons of the war so that the
completed ships would entirely outclass most of the existing ships
of the British and Japanese navies, which had no equivalent number
of ships under construction. Japan had 5 capital ships under
construction, together with a paper program for 10 more which were
omitted from the status quo calculations. But she was on the verge
of an acute financial crisis due to excessive taxation and to the
spending of more than 50 per cent of her revenue upon military and
naval activities. Her prospect was that shew...
Recounts the role of the United States in World War II at sea, from
encounters in the Atlantic before the country entered the war to
the surrender of Japan.
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