This book charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from 1967 to 1982. It shows how events such as the 1967 devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s, and the IMF loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It shows that the 'monetarist' experiment of the 1980s was based on a fundamental misreading of 1970s monetary policy.

This book explores the changing boundaries and relationships between market and state from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. Money and Markets celebrates Martin Daunton's distinguished career by bringing together essays from leading economic, social and cultural historians, many being colleagues and former students. Throughout his career, Dauntonhas focused on the relationship between structure and agency, how institutional structures create capacities and path dependencies, and how institutions are themselves shaped by agency and contingency - what Braudel referred to as 'turning the hour glass twice'. This volume reflects that focus, combining new research on the financing of the British fiscal-military state before and during the Napoleonic wars, its property institutions, and thelonger-term economic consequences of Sir Robert Peel. There are also chapters on the birth of the Eurodollar market, Conservative fiscal policy from the 1960s to the 1980s, the impact of neoliberalism on welfare policy and more broadly, the failed attempt to build an airport in the Thames Estuary in the 1970s, and the political economy of time in Britain since 1945. While much of the focus is on Britain, and British finance in a global economy, the volumealso reflects Daunton's more recent study of international political economy with essays on the French contribution to nineteenth-century globalization, Prussian state finances at the time of the 1848 revolution, Imperial German monetary policy, the role of international charity in the mixed economy of welfare and neoliberal governance, and the material politics of energy consumption from the 1930s to the 1960s. JULIAN HOPPIT is Astor Professor of British History at University College London. ADRIAN LEONARD is Associate Director of the Centre for Financial History at the University of Cambridge. DUNCAN NEEDHAM is Dean and Senior Tutor at Darwin College, University of Cambridge. CONTRIBUTORS: Martin Chick, Sean Eddie, Matthew Hilton, Julian Hoppit, Seung-Woo Kim, Adrian Leonard, Duncan Needham, Charles Read, Bernhard Rieger, Richard Rodger, Sabine Schneider, HirokiShin, David Todd, James Tomlinson, Frank Trentmann, Adrian Williamson

This book charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from 1967 to 1982. It shows how events such as the 1967 devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s, and the IMF loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It shows that the 'monetarist' experiment of the 1980s was based on a fundamental misreading of 1970s monetary policy.

Humanity is confronted by and attracted to extremes. Extreme events shape our thinking, feeling, and actions; they echo in our politics, media, literature, and science. We often associate extremes with crises, disasters, and risks to be averted, yet extremes also have the potential to lead us towards new horizons. Featuring essays by leading intellectuals and public figures arising from the 2017 Darwin College Lectures, this volume explores 'extreme' events, from the election of President Trump, the rise of populism, and the Brexit referendum, to the 2008 financial crisis, the Syrian war, and climate change. It also celebrates 'extreme' achievements in the realms of health, exploration, and scientific discovery. A fascinating, engaging, and timely collection of essays by renowned scholars, journalists, and intellectuals, this volume challenges our understanding of what is normal and what is truly extreme, and sheds light on some of the issues facing humanity in the twenty-first century.

In its 1981 Budget, the Thatcher government discarded Keynesian counter-cyclical policies and cut Britain's public sector deficit in the depths of the worst UK recession since the 1930s. Controversially, the government argued that fiscal contraction would produce economic growth. In this specially commissioned volume, contributors examine recently released archives alongside firsthand accounts from key players within No. 10 Downing Street, HM Treasury and the Bank of England, to provide the first comprehensive treatment of this critical event in British economic history. They assess the empirical and theoretical basis for expansionary fiscal contraction, drawing clear parallels with contemporary debates on austerity in Europe, USA and Japan in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. This timely and thoughtful book will have broad appeal among economists, political scientists, historians and policy makers.