Supported in large part by evidence released after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this book follows the career of the Red Army from its birth in 1918 as the designated vanguard of world revolution to its affiliation in 1941 with 'the citadel of capitalism', the United States. Effectiveness of leadership and military doctrine are particular concerns here, and Josef Stalin is the dominant personality. On the basis of the Russian Civil War (1918-20), the Red Army began to bill itself as 'an army of a new type', inherently superior to all others. However, in late 1920, the Poles trounce it soundly. Later, Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) reveals widespread obsolescence in armament and equipment. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 gives Germany and the USSR a free hand to act against Poland. However, slack performance by the Red Army in the unopposed occupation of eastern Poland and the bungled war with Finland in the winter of 1939-40 necessitate sweeping military reforms. Germany was an enemy in 1918, ally in the 1920s, enemy again in 1933, ally again in 1939, and the enemy once more in 1941, following the German invasion on 22 June 1941. This brings on a catastrophe that by the year's end has consumed nearly the entire pre-invasion Red Army. The United States' entry into the war on 7 December 1941 and the Red Army's subsequent recovery raise the question: Who won the Second World War?

Long before the dust settled on European battlefields in World War II, the U.S. Army had to face the difficult tasks of occupying and governing war-torn Germany. Its leaders and troops were called upon to deal with a series of complex challenges in political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs, tasks beyond the traditional combat roles of soldiers. This volume provides an authoritative account of the role of the U.S. Army in military government and occupation of Germany from the inception of planning until the relative separation of military government and tactical troops in 1946. In the process it offers an in-depth study of the first year, the formative period of the occupation, a most eventful phase in the shaping of post-war Europe. The story ranges from Washington and theater headquarters down to military government detachments in the field, and covers the varied national and international civilian and military apparatus that evolved. Illustrating the diverse approaches of the Americans, British, and Russians, it analyzes efforts to combat hunger, disease, and crime, preserve cultural artifacts, re-establish industry and utilities, and resolve thorny problems involving currency, housing, education, newspapers, elections, and displaced persons. The account shows the pitfalls and difficulties in planning, organizing, and executing such a complex undertaking. While this volume is part of the Army Historical Series, it continues in effect the history begun in the largely documentary volume of the U.S. Army in World War II series, Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors, as well as in the narrative volumes on the European conflict in the same series. Besides being of particular interest to that large number of men, still surviving, who participated in the events depicted here, Dr. Ziemke's volume will constitute for the Army an important source for lessons learned in planning, training, and organization for civil affairs and military government. For the scholar this book should provide a most valuable addition to the literature of the occupation, and for the general reader an enlightening and interesting account of a remarkable episode in the history of the U.S. Army and of Germany.

Long before the dust settled on European battlefields in World War II, the U.S. Army had to face the difficult tasks of occupying and governing war-torn Germany. Its leaders and troops were called upon to deal with a series of complex challenges in political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs, tasks beyond the traditional combat roles of soldiers. This volume provides an authoritative account of the role of the U.S. Army in military government and occupation of Germany from the inception of planning until the relative separation of military government and tactical troops in 1946. In the process it offers an in-depth study of the first year, the formative period of the occupation, a most eventful phase in the shaping of post-war Europe. The story ranges from Washington and theater headquarters down to military government detachments in the field, and covers the varied national and international civilian and military apparatus that evolved. Illustrating the diverse approaches of the Americans, British, and Russians, it analyzes efforts to combat hunger, disease, and crime, preserve cultural artifacts, re-establish industry and utilities, and resolve thorny problems involving currency, housing, education, newspapers, elections, and displaced persons. The account shows the pitfalls and difficulties in planning, organizing, and executing such a complex undertaking. While this volume is part of the Army Historical Series, it continues in effect the history begun in the largely documentary volume of the U.S. Army in World War II series, Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors, as well as in the narrative volumes on the European conflict in the same series. Besides being of particular interest to that large number of men, still surviving, who participated in the events depicted here, Dr. Ziemke's volume will constitute for the Army an important source for lessons learned in planning, training, and organization for civil affairs and military government. For the scholar this book should provide a most valuable addition to the literature of the occupation, and for the general reader an enlightening and interesting account of a remarkable episode in the history of the U.S. Army and of Germany.

Army Historical Series. CMH Pub. 30-5-1. Describes the German-Soviet conflict in World War II and the events that resulted in the Soviet Union becoming a dominant military power in Europe. Frist published in 1968. Illustrated.

Long before the dust settled on European battlefields in World War II, the U.S. Army had to face the difficult tasks of occupying and governing war-torn Germany. Its leaders and troops were called upon to deal with a series of complex challenges in political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs, tasks beyond the traditional combat roles of soldiers. This volume provides an authoritative account of the role of the U.S. Army in military government and occupation of Germany from the inception of planning until the relative separation of military government and tactical troops in 1946. In the process it offers an in-depth study of the first year, the formative period of the occupation, a most eventful phase in the shaping of post-war Europe. The story ranges from Washington and theater headquarters down to military government detachments in the field, and covers the varied national and international civilian and military apparatus that evolved. Illustrating the diverse approaches of the Americans, British, and Russians, it analyzes efforts to combat hunger, disease, and crime, preserve cultural artifacts, re-establish industry and utilities, and resolve thorny problems involving currency, housing, education, newspapers, elections, and displaced persons. The account shows the pitfalls and difficulties in planning, organizing, and executing such a complex undertaking.

This major study of the Soviet-German conflict in World War II has enjoyed an outstanding reputation among those interested in military history and in such areas as the development of Soviet command skills and the exigencies of total land war across a huge front.Save for the introduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet victory over Germany was the most fateful development of World War II. Both wrought changes and raised problems that have constantly preoccupied the world in the more than twenty years since the war ended. The purpose of this volume is to investigate one aspect of the Soviet victory - how the war was won on the battlefield. The author sought, in following the march of the Soviet and German armies from Stalingrad to Berlin, to depict the war as it was and to describe the manner in which the Soviet Union emerged as the predominant military power in Europe.Earl F. Ziemke is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, where he received a Ph.D. degree in history. In World War II he served with the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific theater. In 1951 he joined the staff of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and in 1955 he moved to the Office of the Chief of Military History. Since 1967 he has been a member of the history faculty at the University of Georgia. He is the author of a number of books on military history.