First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is a translation of Edmund Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. The first part of the book was originally presented as a lecture course at the University of Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904–1905, while the second part is based on additional supplementary lectures that he gave between 1905 and 1910. In these essays and lectures, Husserl explores the terrain of consciousness in light of its temporality. He identifies two categories of temporality—retention and protention—and outlines how temporality provides the form for perception, phantasy, imagination, memory, and recollection. He demonstrates a distinction between cosmic and phenomenological time and explores the relevance of phenomenological time for the constitution of temporal objects. The ideas Husserl developed here are explored further in his Ideas and were pursued until the end of his philosophical career.

Translated by:
J.N. Findlay

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett.

With a new foreword by Dermot Moran 'the work here presented seeks to found a new science - though, indeed, the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes has been preparing the way for it - a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its own, that of "Transcendental Subjectivity"' - Edmund Husserl, from the author's preface to the English Edition Widely regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology, one of the most important movements in twentieth century philosophy, Edmund Husserl's Ideas is one of his most important works and a classic of twentieth century thought. This Routledge Classics edition of the original translation by W.R. Boyce Gibson includes the introduction to the English edition written by Husserl himself in 1931. Husserl's early thought conceived of phenomenology - the general study of what appears to conscious experience - in a relatively narrow way, mainly in relation to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge. The publication of Ideas in 1913 witnessed a significant and controversial widening of Husserl's thought, changing the course of phenomenology decisively. Husserl argued that phenomenology was the study of the very nature of what it is to think, "the science of the essence of consciousness" itself. Husserl's arguments ignited a heated debate regarding the nature of consciousness and experience that has endured throughout the twentieth and continues in the present day. No understanding of twentieth century philosophy is complete without some understanding of Husserl, and his work influenced some of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett.

Translated by:
J.N. Findlay

Der vorliegende Band enthält den Text der zweistündigen Vorlesung, die Husserl im Sommersemester 1912 unter dem Titel „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ in Göttingen gehalten hat. Das Thema der ursprünglich als „Urteilstheorie“ angekündigten Vorlesung wurde kurzfristig geändert, da es nicht möglich sei, wie Husserl zu Beginn der Vorlesung erläutert, „eine Urteilstheorie darzustellen, ohne weitgehende Kenntnis in Betreff gewisser allgemeiner Bewusstseinsgestaltungen vorauszusetzen“. Neben einer Untersuchung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen wie „äußere und innere Wahrnehmung, Erlebnis- und Zeitbewusstsein, Erinnerung, Erwartung, Aufmerksamkeit, Erfassung, Explikation und dergleichen� liegt das Hauptaugenmerk der Vorlesung auf der Erläuterung der beiden Grundpfeiler der phänomenologischen Methode: der Wesensschau und der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Die Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1912 diente Husserl als Vorlage bei der Niederschrift seines transzendental-phänomenologischen Hauptwerkes, der „Ideen I“ (Husserliana Bd. III/1), mit der er während der Vorlesungszeit, nämlich Ende Mai oder Anfang Juni 1912, begann. Inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen mit dem Vorlesungstext weisen der Erste Abschnitt der “Ideen I� („Tatsache und Wesen“), der Zweite Abschnitt („Die phänomenologische Fundamentalbetrachtung“) und teilweise der Dritte Abschnitt („Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie“) auf. – Die hier erstmals veröffentlichte Vorlesung „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ aus dem Sommersemester 1912 bietet Forschern und Studenten interessante Einblicke in Entwicklung und Thematik von Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden,vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben. Der erste Teilband enthält Manuskripte, die der deskriptiven Analyse verschiedener Weisen der Objektivation in unterschiedlichen Aktformen und Aktvollzügen des Vorstellens und Denkens wie dem thematischen Meinen, dem Aufmerken und Zuwenden, dem Explizieren und Urteilen sowie dem Stellungnehmen gewidmet sind. Husserls besonderes Interesse gilt dabei der Beziehung zwischen Rezeptivität und Spontaneität. Dieser Band ist der erste Teilband des vier Teilbände umfassenden Sets Husserliana 43. Er enthält keinen Index (erhältlich als Teilband 4).   This volume is the first part of the four-part set Husserliana 43. It does not contain the Index (available as the fourth volume of the set).

With a new foreword by Dermot Moran 'the work here presented seeks to found a new science - though, indeed, the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes has been preparing the way for it - a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its own, that of "Transcendental Subjectivity"' - Edmund Husserl, from the author's preface to the English Edition Widely regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology, one of the most important movements in twentieth century philosophy, Edmund Husserl's Ideas is one of his most important works and a classic of twentieth century thought. This Routledge Classics edition of the original translation by W.R. Boyce Gibson includes the introduction to the English edition written by Husserl himself in 1931. Husserl's early thought conceived of phenomenology - the general study of what appears to conscious experience - in a relatively narrow way, mainly in relation to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge. The publication of Ideas in 1913 witnessed a significant and controversial widening of Husserl's thought, changing the course of phenomenology decisively. Husserl argued that phenomenology was the study of the very nature of what it is to think, "the science of the essence of consciousness" itself. Husserl's arguments ignited a heated debate regarding the nature of consciousness and experience that has endured throughout the twentieth and continues in the present day. No understanding of twentieth century philosophy is complete without some understanding of Husserl, and his work influenced some of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Klarheit in betreff dieser Satze anstrebt, d. i. Einsicht in das Wesen der bei dem Vollzug und den ideal-moglichen Anwendungen solcher Satze ins Spiel tretenden Erkenntnisweisen und der mit diesen sich wesensmassig konstituierenden Sinngebungen und objektiven Gel- 1 11 S tungen * Sprachliche Erorterungen gehoren r nun sicherlich zu den 1 r philosophisch I unerlasslichen Vorbereitungen fur den Aufbau der [A 4] reinen Logik, weil nur durch ihre Mithilfe die eigentlichen Objekte der logischen Forschung und, in weiterer Folge, die wesentlichen Arten und Unterschiede dieser Objekte zu unmissverstandlicher 10 Klarheit herauszuarbeiten sind. Es handelt sich dabei aber nicht um 12 grammatische Erorterungen im r empirischen , auf irgendeine historisch gegebene Sprache bezogenen Sinn, sondern um Erorterun- gen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphare einer objekti- ven Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammen- 13 15 hangt, einer rreinen Phanomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse gehoren. rDicse, wie die sie umspannende reine Phanomenologie der Erlebnisse uberhaupt, hat es ausschliesslich mit den in der Intuition erlassbaren und analysierba- ren Erlebnissen in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit 20 empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnis- sen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfassten Wesen und rein in den Wesen grundenden Zusammenhan- ge bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 25 Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist eine 1 14 apriorische im vorzuglichsten Sinne des Wortes.

Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed and Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927, Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F). Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared only in 1962."

6 werden kann, musste die Einsicht erwecken, dass das Quantitative gar nicht zum allgemeinsten Wesen des Mathematischen oder "Formalen" und der in ihm grundenden kalkulatorischen Me- thode gehore. Als ich dann in der "mathematisierenden Logik" 5 eine in der Tat quantitatslose Mathematik kennenlemte, und zwar als eine unanfechtbare Disziplin von mathematischer Form und Methode, welche teils die alten Syllogismen, teils neue, der Uberlieferung fremd gebliebene Schlussformen behandelte, gestalteten sich mir die wichtigen Probleme nach dem allgemei- 10 nen Wesen des Mathematischen uberhaupt, nach den naturlichen Zusammenhangen oder etwaigen Grenzen zwischen den Systemen der quantitativen und nichtquantitativen Mathematik, und spe- ziell z. B. nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen dem Formalen der Arithmetik und dem Formalen der Logik. Naturgemass musste 15 ich von hier aus weiter fortschreiten zu den fundamentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnisform im Unterschiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach dem Sinn des Unter- schiedes zwischen formalen (reinen) und materialen Bestimmun- gen, Wahrheiten, Gesetzen. 20 Aber noch in einer ganz anderen Richtung fand ich mich in Probleme der allgemeinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ver- wickelt. Ich war von der herrschenden Uberzeugung ausgegangen, dass es die Psychologie sei, von der, wie die Logik uberhaupt, so die Logik der deduktiven Wissenschaften ihre philosophische 25 Aufklarung erhoffen musse. Demgemass nehmen psychologische Untersuchungen in dem ersten (und allein veroffentlichten) B- de meiner Philosophie der Arithmetik einen sehr breiten Raum ein. {[A VII] Diese psychologische Fundierung wollte 11 mir in gewissen Zu- [B VII] sammenhangen nie recht genugen.

ihr Wesen, iiber die Eigenart ihres Gebiets ins klare zu kommen, das ist in der Tat eins der Hauptstiicke und Grundstiicke der Erkennt- nistheorie, wie sich ohne weiteres begreift aus der allumspannenden Weite der rein logischen Begriffe und der normativen Anwendung 5 der formallogischen Gesetze. Das formallogische Denken, das analytische im pragnantesten Sinn des W ortes, ist nach meinen Logischen Untersuchungen ein Denken auf Grund bloBer Bedeutungen. Es bezieht sich auf aIle und jede Gegenstandlichkeit (mag sie eine reale sein oder nicht) darum, 10 weil Gegenstande iiberhaupt fUr das Denken Gegenstande nur sind durch sein Bedeuten und weil Gesetze, die im Wesen der Bedeutun- gen als solcher, die also in ihren wesentlichen Arten oder Formen griinden, notwendig fUr aIle bedeutungsmaBig so und so gefaBten bestimmten Gegenstandlichkeiten gelten miissen. 15 Da tritt uns also gleich zu Anfang der Begriff der Bedeutung e- gegen, der nun freilich so allerlei bedeuten kann und der KIarlegung allergroBte Schwierigkeiten bietet. Ihm werden wir und den mit ihm zusammenhangenden Begriffen und Phanomenen umfassende Be- trachtungen zuwenden; solche Betrachtungen sind iibrigens auch, 20 unabhangig von dem Interesse an der klaren Bestimmung des Sinnes formaler Logik, fUr die Logik selbst und die Erkenntniskritik von selbstverstandlicher und aIlergroBter Wichtigkeit. So werden ver- schiedene, obschon nahe zusammenhangende Interessen ihre Befrie- digung finden konnen, und darauf habe ich es urn so mehr abgese- 25 hen, als ich ja weiB, welche Bemiihungen meine jungen Freunde in der Philosophischen Gesellschaft in den beiden letzten Semestern den Bedeutungsproblemen in ihren Diskussionen zugewendet haben.

The primary intent of this volume is to give the English reader access to all the philosophical texts published by Husserl between the appearance of his first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik, and that of his second book, Logische Untersuchungen- roughly, from 1890 through 1901. Along with these texts we have included a number of unpublished manuscripts from the same period and dealing with the same or closely related topics. A few of the texts here translated (the review of Pahigyi, the five "report" articles of 1903-1904, the "notes" in Lalande's Vocabulaire, and the brief discussion. article on Marty of 1910) obviously fall outside this time period, so far as their publication dates are concerned; but in content they seem clearly confined to it. The final piece translated, a set of personal notes that date from 1906 through 1908, provides insight into how Husserl experienced his early labors and their results, and into how he saw their relation to work before him: a phenomenological critique of reason in all of its forms. Thus the texts here translated - which obviously are to be read in conjunction with his first two books - cover the progression of Husserl's Problematik from the relatively narrow one of clarifying the epistemic structure of general arithmetic, to the all-encompassing one of establishing in principle, through phenomenological research, the line between legitimate and illegitimate claims to know or to be rational, regardless of the domain concerned.

5 sehr merkwurdiger Tatsachen zutage gefordert, die vordem verborgen waren, und wirklich psychologische Tatsachen, wenn auch die Physiologen manche grosse Gruppen von ihnen ihrer eigenen Wissenschaft mit zurechnen. Mag die Einstimmigkeit 5 in der theoretischen Interpretation dieser Tatsachen auch sehr weit zuruckstehen hinter derjenigen der exakten naturwissen- schaftlichen Disziplinen, so ist sie in gewisser Hinsicht doch wieder eine vollkommene, namlich was den methodischen Stil der gesuchten Theorien anlangt. Jedenfalls ist man in den inter- 10 nationalen Forscherkreisen der neuen Psychologie der festen Uberzeugung, einer bis vor kurzem ungebrochenen Uberzeugung, dass nun endlich die allein wahre und echte Psychologie in den Gang gebracht sei, als eine strenge Wissenschaft, auf deren Wegen die Gesamtheit aller psychologischen Probleme, aller 15 zur individuellen und Kulturgeistigkeit gehorigen, liegen mussen. Es bedurfe nur, wie in jeder auf elementaren Aufbau und auf die Erklarung aus elementaren Gesetzen bedachten Erfahrungs- wissenschaft, geduldiger Zuruckhaltung und eines ganz vor- sichtigen Emporschreitens; man durfe nur nicht voreilig nach 20 Problemen greifen, die noch nicht zu wissenschaftlicher Be- arbeitung reif, fur die noch nicht die Tatsachenunterlage bereit- gestellt und die notigen Erfahrungsbegriffe geschaffen sind. Einen nicht geringen Zuwachs an innerer Sicherheit hat die neue Psychologie durch die gelingende Schopfung einer Psycho- 25 technik erhalten. Nun schien diese Psychologie wirklich der exakten Physik gleichzustehen. Sie war nun sogar so weit, um ihre psychologische Erkenntnis, ganz so wie physikalische und chemische, technisch nutzbar zu machen.

In this fresh translation of five lectures delivered in 1907 at the University of Goettingen, Edmund Husserl lays out the philosophical problem of knowledge, indicates the requirements for its solution, and for the first time introduces the phenomenological method of reduction. For those interested in the genesis and development of Husserl's phenomenology, this text affords a unique glimpse into the epistemological motivation of his work, his concept of intentionality, and the formation of central phenomenological concepts that will later go by the names of `transcendental consciousness', the `noema', and the like. As a teaching text, The Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it is unencumbered by the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, it bears a clear connection to the problem of knowledge as formulated in the Cartesian tradition, and it is accompanied by a translator's introduction that clearly spells out the structure, argument, and movement of the text.

This is a translation of Edmund HusserI's lecture course from the Summer semester 1907 at the University of Gottingen. The German original was pub lished posthumously in 1973 as Volume XVI of Husserliana, Husserl's opera omnia. The translation is complete, including both the main text and the supplementary texts (as Husserliana volumes are usually organized), except for the critical apparatus which provides variant readings. The announced title of the lecture course was "Main parts of the phenome nology and critique of reason." The course began with five, relatively inde pendent, introductory lectures. These were published on their own in 1947, bearing the title The idea ojphenomenology.l The "Five Lectures" comprise a general orientation by proposing the method to be employed in the subsequent working out of the actual problems (viz., the method of "phenomenological reduction") and by clarifying, at least provisionally, some technical terms that will be used in the labor the subsequent lectures will carry out. The present volume, then, presents that labor, i.e., the method in action and the results attained. As such, this text dispels the abstract impression which could not help but cling to the first five lectures taken in isolation. Accord ingly, we are here given genuine "introductory lectures," i.e., an introduction to phenomenology in the genuine phenomenological sense of engaging in the work of phenomenology, going to the "matters at issue themselves," rather than remaining aloof from them in abstract considerations of standpoint and approach."

This course on logic and theory of knowledge fell exactly midway between the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900-01 and Ideas I in 1913. It constitutes a summation and consolidation of Husserl's logico-scientific, epistemological, and epistemo-phenomenological investigations of the preceding years and an important step in the journey from the descriptivo-psychological elucidation of pure logic in the Logical Investigations to the transcendental phenomenology of the absolute consciousness of the objective correlates constituting themselves in its acts in Ideas I. In this course Husserl began developing his transcendental phenomenology as the genuine realization of what had only been realized in fragmentary form in the Logical Investigations.

Husserl considered that in the courses that he gave at the University of G?ttingen he had progressed well beyond the insights of the Logical Investigations. Once he exposed the objective theoretical scaffolding needed to keep philosophers from falling into the quagmires of psychologism and skepticism, he set out on his voyage of discovery of the world of the intentional consciousness and to introduce the phenomenological analyses of knowledge that were to yield the general concepts of knowledge needed to solve the most recalcitrant problems of theory of knowledge understood as the investigation of the thorny problems involving the relationship of the subjectivity of the knower to the objectivity of what is known.

This translation appears at a time when philosophers in English-speaking countries have heartily embraced the thoughts of Husserl's German contemporary Gottlob Frege and his concerns. It is replete with insights intomatters that many philosophers have been primed to appreciate out of enthusiasm for Frege's ideas. Among these are: his anti-psychologism, meaning, the foundations of mathematics, logic, science, and knowledge, his questions about sets and classes, intensions, identity, calculating with concepts, perspicuity, and even his idealism.

This book provides a short introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Husserl himself. Husserl highly regarded his work "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He considered this work as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity and for his theory of the life-world. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself.

The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."

This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising this work make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousness. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory.