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Der vorliegende Band enthält den Text der zweistündigen Vorlesung, die Husserl im Sommersemester 1912 unter dem Titel „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ in Göttingen gehalten hat. Das Thema der ursprünglich als „Urteilstheorie“ angekündigten Vorlesung wurde kurzfristig geändert, da es nicht möglich sei, wie Husserl zu Beginn der Vorlesung erläutert, „eine Urteilstheorie darzustellen, ohne weitgehende Kenntnis in Betreff gewisser allgemeiner Bewusstseinsgestaltungen vorauszusetzen“. Neben einer Untersuchung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen wie „äußere und innere Wahrnehmung, Erlebnis- und Zeitbewusstsein, Erinnerung, Erwartung, Aufmerksamkeit, Erfassung, Explikation und dergleichen” liegt das Hauptaugenmerk der Vorlesung auf der Erläuterung der beiden Grundpfeiler der phänomenologischen Methode: der Wesensschau und der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Die Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1912 diente Husserl als Vorlage bei der Niederschrift seines transzendental-phänomenologischen Hauptwerkes, der „Ideen I“ (Husserliana Bd. III/1), mit der er während der Vorlesungszeit, nämlich Ende Mai oder Anfang Juni 1912, begann. Inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen mit dem Vorlesungstext weisen der Erste Abschnitt der “Ideen I” („Tatsache und Wesen“), der Zweite Abschnitt („Die phänomenologische Fundamentalbetrachtung“) und teilweise der Dritte Abschnitt („Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie“) auf. – Die hier erstmals veröffentlichte Vorlesung „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ aus dem Sommersemester 1912 bietet Forschern und Studenten interessante Einblicke in Entwicklung und Thematik von Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie.
The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."
In this fresh translation of five lectures delivered in 1907 at the University of Goettingen, Edmund Husserl lays out the philosophical problem of knowledge, indicates the requirements for its solution, and for the first time introduces the phenomenological method of reduction. For those interested in the genesis and development of Husserl's phenomenology, this text affords a unique glimpse into the epistemological motivation of his work, his concept of intentionality, and the formation of central phenomenological concepts that will later go by the names of `transcendental consciousness', the `noema', and the like. As a teaching text, The Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it is unencumbered by the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, it bears a clear connection to the problem of knowledge as formulated in the Cartesian tradition, and it is accompanied by a translator's introduction that clearly spells out the structure, argument, and movement of the text.
Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed and Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927, Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F). Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared only in 1962."
What follows is a translation of Volume X in the Husserliana series, the critical edition of the works of Edmund HusserI. I Volume X was published in 1966. Its editor, Rudolf Boehm, provided the title: Zur Phiinomen%gie des inneren Zeitbewusst- seins (1893-1917). Some of the texts included in Volume X were published during HusserI's lifetime, but the majority were not. Given the fact that the materials assembled in Volume X do not constitute a single and previously published Husserlian work, some acquaintance with their history and chronology is indis- pensable to understanding them. These introductory remarks are intended to provide the outlines of such an acquaintance, together with a brief account of the main themes that appear in the texts. The Status of the Texts In 1928, HusserI's "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins" appeared in the Jahrbuch fur Philoso- I Edmund Husserl, Zur Phiinomen%gie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893~1917) [On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (l893~1917)I, herausgegeben von Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). The references in Roman numerals that occur in parentheses in this Introduction are to Rudolf Boehm's "Editor's Introduction" to Husserliana X. References in Arabic numerals, unless otherwise noted, will be to this translation. Corresponding page numbers of Husserliana X will be found in the margins of the translation. The translation includes Parts A and B of Husserliana X, with Boehm's notes.
Coming from what is arguably the most productive period of Husserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation into English of Husserl's renowned lectures on passive synthesis', given between 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected to judgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on the crisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide an archaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented layers of meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in active synthesis'. Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences, the Analyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtle emergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology of association that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis, temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and the unconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body in its affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of these diverse modes of evidence and their modalizations (transcendental aesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of truth up to judicative achievements (transcendental logic). Joined by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method, the Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by the majority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students of phenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an indispensable work.
ihr Wesen, iiber die Eigenart ihres Gebiets ins klare zu kommen, das ist in der Tat eins der Hauptstiicke und Grundstiicke der Erkennt- nistheorie, wie sich ohne weiteres begreift aus der allumspannenden Weite der rein logischen Begriffe und der normativen Anwendung 5 der formallogischen Gesetze. Das formallogische Denken, das analytische im pragnantesten Sinn des W ortes, ist nach meinen Logischen Untersuchungen ein Denken auf Grund bloBer Bedeutungen. Es bezieht sich auf aIle und jede Gegenstandlichkeit (mag sie eine reale sein oder nicht) darum, 10 weil Gegenstande iiberhaupt fUr das Denken Gegenstande nur sind durch sein Bedeuten und weil Gesetze, die im Wesen der Bedeutun- gen als solcher, die also in ihren wesentlichen Arten oder Formen griinden, notwendig fUr aIle bedeutungsmaBig so und so gefaBten bestimmten Gegenstandlichkeiten gelten miissen. 15 Da tritt uns also gleich zu Anfang der Begriff der Bedeutung e- gegen, der nun freilich so allerlei bedeuten kann und der KIarlegung allergroBte Schwierigkeiten bietet. Ihm werden wir und den mit ihm zusammenhangenden Begriffen und Phanomenen umfassende Be- trachtungen zuwenden; solche Betrachtungen sind iibrigens auch, 20 unabhangig von dem Interesse an der klaren Bestimmung des Sinnes formaler Logik, fUr die Logik selbst und die Erkenntniskritik von selbstverstandlicher und aIlergroBter Wichtigkeit. So werden ver- schiedene, obschon nahe zusammenhangende Interessen ihre Befrie- digung finden konnen, und darauf habe ich es urn so mehr abgese- 25 hen, als ich ja weiB, welche Bemiihungen meine jungen Freunde in der Philosophischen Gesellschaft in den beiden letzten Semestern den Bedeutungsproblemen in ihren Diskussionen zugewendet haben.
There is no author's introduction to Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, either as published here in the first English translation or in the standard German edition, because its proper introduction is its companion volume: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. 2 The latter is the first book of Edmund Husserl's larger work: Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and is commonly referred to as Ideas I (or Ideen 1). The former is commonly called Ideen III. Between these two parts of the whole stands a third: Phenomeno 3 logical Investigations of Constitution, generally known as Ideen II. In this introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as well as the abbreviation PFS for the translation at hand. In many translation projects there is an initial problem of establish ing the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of the books of Husserl's Ideas in different ways. The Ideas was written in 1912, during Husserl's years in Gottingen (1901-1916). Books I and II were extensively revised over nearly two decades and the changes were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the Husserliana editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of the various reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl Archives, but for those unable to work there the only one directly available for Ideen II is the reconstructed one."
The primary intent of this volume is to give the English reader access to all the philosophical texts published by Husserl between the appearance of his first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik, and that of his second book, Logische Untersuchungen- roughly, from 1890 through 1901. Along with these texts we have included a number of unpublished manuscripts from the same period and dealing with the same or closely related topics. A few of the texts here translated (the review of Pahigyi, the five "report" articles of 1903-1904, the "notes" in Lalande's Vocabulaire, and the brief discussion. article on Marty of 1910) obviously fall outside this time period, so far as their publication dates are concerned; but in content they seem clearly confined to it. The final piece translated, a set of personal notes that date from 1906 through 1908, provides insight into how Husserl experienced his early labors and their results, and into how he saw their relation to work before him: a phenomenological critique of reason in all of its forms. Thus the texts here translated - which obviously are to be read in conjunction with his first two books - cover the progression of Husserl's Problematik from the relatively narrow one of clarifying the epistemic structure of general arithmetic, to the all-encompassing one of establishing in principle, through phenomenological research, the line between legitimate and illegitimate claims to know or to be rational, regardless of the domain concerned.
This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising Husserliana XXIII come from a period of enormous productivity and pivotal development in Husserl's philosophical life, extending from the years immediately preceding the Logical Investigations (1900-01) almost to the time of his retirement in 1928. They make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousnessa "the awareness we have when we look at a picture or see a playa "and of its relation to art and the aesthetic. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory. They enrich the Husserlian analysis of time consciousness and offer a fascinating picture of the sometimes tortuous paths Husserl took in his efforts to comprehend how the forms of representation are constituted and how they are related to one another and to perception. Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory should prove to be an indispensable resource for Husserlian phenomenologists and for anyone else interested in thinking about these fundamental phenomena.
This is a translation of Edmund HusserI's lecture course from the Summer semester 1907 at the University of Gottingen. The German original was pub lished posthumously in 1973 as Volume XVI of Husserliana, Husserl's opera omnia. The translation is complete, including both the main text and the supplementary texts (as Husserliana volumes are usually organized), except for the critical apparatus which provides variant readings. The announced title of the lecture course was "Main parts of the phenome nology and critique of reason." The course began with five, relatively inde pendent, introductory lectures. These were published on their own in 1947, bearing the title The idea ojphenomenology.l The "Five Lectures" comprise a general orientation by proposing the method to be employed in the subsequent working out of the actual problems (viz., the method of "phenomenological reduction") and by clarifying, at least provisionally, some technical terms that will be used in the labor the subsequent lectures will carry out. The present volume, then, presents that labor, i.e., the method in action and the results attained. As such, this text dispels the abstract impression which could not help but cling to the first five lectures taken in isolation. Accord ingly, we are here given genuine "introductory lectures," i.e., an introduction to phenomenology in the genuine phenomenological sense of engaging in the work of phenomenology, going to the "matters at issue themselves," rather than remaining aloof from them in abstract considerations of standpoint and approach."
First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
5 sehr merkwurdiger Tatsachen zutage gefordert, die vordem verborgen waren, und wirklich psychologische Tatsachen, wenn auch die Physiologen manche grosse Gruppen von ihnen ihrer eigenen Wissenschaft mit zurechnen. Mag die Einstimmigkeit 5 in der theoretischen Interpretation dieser Tatsachen auch sehr weit zuruckstehen hinter derjenigen der exakten naturwissen- schaftlichen Disziplinen, so ist sie in gewisser Hinsicht doch wieder eine vollkommene, namlich was den methodischen Stil der gesuchten Theorien anlangt. Jedenfalls ist man in den inter- 10 nationalen Forscherkreisen der neuen Psychologie der festen Uberzeugung, einer bis vor kurzem ungebrochenen Uberzeugung, dass nun endlich die allein wahre und echte Psychologie in den Gang gebracht sei, als eine strenge Wissenschaft, auf deren Wegen die Gesamtheit aller psychologischen Probleme, aller 15 zur individuellen und Kulturgeistigkeit gehorigen, liegen mussen. Es bedurfe nur, wie in jeder auf elementaren Aufbau und auf die Erklarung aus elementaren Gesetzen bedachten Erfahrungs- wissenschaft, geduldiger Zuruckhaltung und eines ganz vor- sichtigen Emporschreitens; man durfe nur nicht voreilig nach 20 Problemen greifen, die noch nicht zu wissenschaftlicher Be- arbeitung reif, fur die noch nicht die Tatsachenunterlage bereit- gestellt und die notigen Erfahrungsbegriffe geschaffen sind. Einen nicht geringen Zuwachs an innerer Sicherheit hat die neue Psychologie durch die gelingende Schopfung einer Psycho- 25 technik erhalten. Nun schien diese Psychologie wirklich der exakten Physik gleichzustehen. Sie war nun sogar so weit, um ihre psychologische Erkenntnis, ganz so wie physikalische und chemische, technisch nutzbar zu machen.
6 werden kann, musste die Einsicht erwecken, dass das Quantitative gar nicht zum allgemeinsten Wesen des Mathematischen oder "Formalen" und der in ihm grundenden kalkulatorischen Me- thode gehore. Als ich dann in der "mathematisierenden Logik" 5 eine in der Tat quantitatslose Mathematik kennenlemte, und zwar als eine unanfechtbare Disziplin von mathematischer Form und Methode, welche teils die alten Syllogismen, teils neue, der Uberlieferung fremd gebliebene Schlussformen behandelte, gestalteten sich mir die wichtigen Probleme nach dem allgemei- 10 nen Wesen des Mathematischen uberhaupt, nach den naturlichen Zusammenhangen oder etwaigen Grenzen zwischen den Systemen der quantitativen und nichtquantitativen Mathematik, und spe- ziell z. B. nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen dem Formalen der Arithmetik und dem Formalen der Logik. Naturgemass musste 15 ich von hier aus weiter fortschreiten zu den fundamentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnisform im Unterschiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach dem Sinn des Unter- schiedes zwischen formalen (reinen) und materialen Bestimmun- gen, Wahrheiten, Gesetzen. 20 Aber noch in einer ganz anderen Richtung fand ich mich in Probleme der allgemeinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ver- wickelt. Ich war von der herrschenden Uberzeugung ausgegangen, dass es die Psychologie sei, von der, wie die Logik uberhaupt, so die Logik der deduktiven Wissenschaften ihre philosophische 25 Aufklarung erhoffen musse. Demgemass nehmen psychologische Untersuchungen in dem ersten (und allein veroffentlichten) B- de meiner Philosophie der Arithmetik einen sehr breiten Raum ein. {[A VII] Diese psychologische Fundierung wollte 11 mir in gewissen Zu- [B VII] sammenhangen nie recht genugen.
Klarheit in betreff dieser Satze anstrebt, d. i. Einsicht in das Wesen der bei dem Vollzug und den ideal-moglichen Anwendungen solcher Satze ins Spiel tretenden Erkenntnisweisen und der mit diesen sich wesensmassig konstituierenden Sinngebungen und objektiven Gel- 1 11 S tungen * Sprachliche Erorterungen gehoren r nun sicherlich zu den 1 r philosophisch I unerlasslichen Vorbereitungen fur den Aufbau der [A 4] reinen Logik, weil nur durch ihre Mithilfe die eigentlichen Objekte der logischen Forschung und, in weiterer Folge, die wesentlichen Arten und Unterschiede dieser Objekte zu unmissverstandlicher 10 Klarheit herauszuarbeiten sind. Es handelt sich dabei aber nicht um 12 grammatische Erorterungen im r empirischen , auf irgendeine historisch gegebene Sprache bezogenen Sinn, sondern um Erorterun- gen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphare einer objekti- ven Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammen- 13 15 hangt, einer rreinen Phanomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse gehoren. rDicse, wie die sie umspannende reine Phanomenologie der Erlebnisse uberhaupt, hat es ausschliesslich mit den in der Intuition erlassbaren und analysierba- ren Erlebnissen in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit 20 empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnis- sen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfassten Wesen und rein in den Wesen grundenden Zusammenhan- ge bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 25 Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist eine 1 14 apriorische im vorzuglichsten Sinne des Wortes.
As is made plain in the critical apparatus and editorial matter appended to the original German publication of Hussed's Ideas II, I this is a text with a history. It underwent revision after revision, spanning almost 20 years in one of the most fertile periods of the philosopher's life. The book owes its form to the work of many hands, and its unity is one that has been imposed on it. Yet there is nothing here that cannot be traced back to Hussed himself. Indeed, the final" clean copy" for publication, prepared by an assistant, was completely reviewed by the master three times and emended by him in detail on each occasion. Nevertheless, in the end the work was in fact not submitted for publication, and after Hussed's pen last touched the manuscript in 1928 it was set aside until posthumously edited and published by the Hussed-Archives in 1952. The story of the composition of Ideas II begins with the "pencil manuscript" of 1912. This is the ultimate textual source for both Ideas II and Ideas III. 2 It has been preserved as a folio of 84 sheets in very dense shorthand of the Gabelsberger system, written mostly with a pencil. It was composed by Hussed "in one stroke" immediately after the completion of I Edmund Husser : Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phiinomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus NijhofT, 1952 (Husserliana IV).
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is a translation of Edmund Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. The first part of the book was originally presented as a lecture course at the University of Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904–1905, while the second part is based on additional supplementary lectures that he gave between 1905 and 1910. In these essays and lectures, Husserl explores the terrain of consciousness in light of its temporality. He identifies two categories of temporality—retention and protention—and outlines how temporality provides the form for perception, phantasy, imagination, memory, and recollection. He demonstrates a distinction between cosmic and phenomenological time and explores the relevance of phenomenological time for the constitution of temporal objects. The ideas Husserl developed here are explored further in his Ideas and were pursued until the end of his philosophical career.
the Logische Untersuchungen, l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks." |
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