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Der vorliegende Band enthält den Text der zweistündigen
Vorlesung, die Husserl im Sommersemester 1912 unter dem Titel
„Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ in Göttingen gehalten hat.
Das Thema der ursprünglich als „Urteilstheorie“ angekündigten
Vorlesung wurde kurzfristig geändert, da es nicht möglich sei,
wie Husserl zu Beginn der Vorlesung erläutert, „eine
Urteilstheorie darzustellen, ohne weitgehende Kenntnis in Betreff
gewisser allgemeiner Bewusstseinsgestaltungen vorauszusetzen“.
Neben einer Untersuchung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen wie
„äußere und innere Wahrnehmung, Erlebnis- und Zeitbewusstsein,
Erinnerung, Erwartung, Aufmerksamkeit, Erfassung, Explikation und
dergleichen” liegt das Hauptaugenmerk der Vorlesung auf der
Erläuterung der beiden Grundpfeiler der phänomenologischen
Methode: der Wesensschau und der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Die
Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1912 diente Husserl als Vorlage bei
der Niederschrift seines transzendental-phänomenologischen
Hauptwerkes, der „Ideen I“ (Husserliana Bd. III/1), mit der er
während der Vorlesungszeit, nämlich Ende Mai oder Anfang Juni
1912, begann. Inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen mit dem Vorlesungstext
weisen der Erste Abschnitt der “Ideen I” („Tatsache und
Wesen“), der Zweite Abschnitt („Die phänomenologische
Fundamentalbetrachtung“) und teilweise der Dritte Abschnitt
(„Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie“)
auf. – Die hier erstmals veröffentlichte Vorlesung „Einleitung
in die Phänomenologie“ aus dem Sommersemester 1912 bietet
Forschern und Studenten interessante Einblicke in Entwicklung und
Thematik von Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie.
The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in
Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl
probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e.,
"The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded
this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his
theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these
lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and
intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his
planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with
several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has
a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary
way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further,
with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with
himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written
down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl
was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements
these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."
In this fresh translation of five lectures delivered in 1907 at the
University of Goettingen, Edmund Husserl lays out the philosophical
problem of knowledge, indicates the requirements for its solution,
and for the first time introduces the phenomenological method of
reduction. For those interested in the genesis and development of
Husserl's phenomenology, this text affords a unique glimpse into
the epistemological motivation of his work, his concept of
intentionality, and the formation of central phenomenological
concepts that will later go by the names of `transcendental
consciousness', the `noema', and the like. As a teaching text, The
Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it is unencumbered by
the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, it bears a clear
connection to the problem of knowledge as formulated in the
Cartesian tradition, and it is accompanied by a translator's
introduction that clearly spells out the structure, argument, and
movement of the text.
Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in
the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The
Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were
written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin
Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's
marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der
Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this
volume contain texts from both Hussed and Heidegger, and date from
1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document
Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status
(March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm
that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then
colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia
Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927,
Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology
that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four
versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial
condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F).
Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to
as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final
version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared
only in 1962."
What follows is a translation of Volume X in the Husserliana
series, the critical edition of the works of Edmund HusserI. I
Volume X was published in 1966. Its editor, Rudolf Boehm, provided
the title: Zur Phiinomen%gie des inneren Zeitbewusst- seins
(1893-1917). Some of the texts included in Volume X were published
during HusserI's lifetime, but the majority were not. Given the
fact that the materials assembled in Volume X do not constitute a
single and previously published Husserlian work, some acquaintance
with their history and chronology is indis- pensable to
understanding them. These introductory remarks are intended to
provide the outlines of such an acquaintance, together with a brief
account of the main themes that appear in the texts. The Status of
the Texts In 1928, HusserI's "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des
inneren Zeitbewusstseins" appeared in the Jahrbuch fur Philoso- I
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phiinomen%gie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
(1893~1917) [On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal
time (l893~1917)I, herausgegeben von Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana X
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). The references in Roman
numerals that occur in parentheses in this Introduction are to
Rudolf Boehm's "Editor's Introduction" to Husserliana X. References
in Arabic numerals, unless otherwise noted, will be to this
translation. Corresponding page numbers of Husserliana X will be
found in the margins of the translation. The translation includes
Parts A and B of Husserliana X, with Boehm's notes.
Coming from what is arguably the most productive period of
Husserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation
into English of Husserl's renowned lectures on passive synthesis',
given between 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensive
application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to
perceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected to
judgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on
the crisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide an
archaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented
layers of meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in active
synthesis'. Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences,
the Analyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtle
emergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology of
association that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis,
temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and the
unconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body
in its affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of
these diverse modes of evidence and their modalizations
(transcendental aesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of
truth up to judicative achievements (transcendental logic). Joined
by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method, the
Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by the
majority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students
of phenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an
indispensable work.
ihr Wesen, iiber die Eigenart ihres Gebiets ins klare zu kommen,
das ist in der Tat eins der Hauptstiicke und Grundstiicke der
Erkennt- nistheorie, wie sich ohne weiteres begreift aus der
allumspannenden Weite der rein logischen Begriffe und der
normativen Anwendung 5 der formallogischen Gesetze. Das
formallogische Denken, das analytische im pragnantesten Sinn des W
ortes, ist nach meinen Logischen Untersuchungen ein Denken auf
Grund bloBer Bedeutungen. Es bezieht sich auf aIle und jede
Gegenstandlichkeit (mag sie eine reale sein oder nicht) darum, 10
weil Gegenstande iiberhaupt fUr das Denken Gegenstande nur sind
durch sein Bedeuten und weil Gesetze, die im Wesen der Bedeutun-
gen als solcher, die also in ihren wesentlichen Arten oder Formen
griinden, notwendig fUr aIle bedeutungsmaBig so und so gefaBten
bestimmten Gegenstandlichkeiten gelten miissen. 15 Da tritt uns
also gleich zu Anfang der Begriff der Bedeutung e- gegen, der nun
freilich so allerlei bedeuten kann und der KIarlegung allergroBte
Schwierigkeiten bietet. Ihm werden wir und den mit ihm
zusammenhangenden Begriffen und Phanomenen umfassende Be-
trachtungen zuwenden; solche Betrachtungen sind iibrigens auch, 20
unabhangig von dem Interesse an der klaren Bestimmung des Sinnes
formaler Logik, fUr die Logik selbst und die Erkenntniskritik von
selbstverstandlicher und aIlergroBter Wichtigkeit. So werden ver-
schiedene, obschon nahe zusammenhangende Interessen ihre Befrie-
digung finden konnen, und darauf habe ich es urn so mehr abgese- 25
hen, als ich ja weiB, welche Bemiihungen meine jungen Freunde in
der Philosophischen Gesellschaft in den beiden letzten Semestern
den Bedeutungsproblemen in ihren Diskussionen zugewendet haben.
There is no author's introduction to Phenomenology and the
Foundations of the Sciences, either as published here in the first
English translation or in the standard German edition, because its
proper introduction is its companion volume: General Introduction
to Pure Phenomenology. 2 The latter is the first book of Edmund
Husserl's larger work: Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and
Phenomenological Philosophy, and is commonly referred to as Ideas I
(or Ideen 1). The former is commonly called Ideen III. Between
these two parts of the whole stands a third: Phenomeno 3 logical
Investigations of Constitution, generally known as Ideen II. In
this introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as
well as the abbreviation PFS for the translation at hand. In many
translation projects there is an initial problem of establish ing
the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of
the books of Husserl's Ideas in different ways. The Ideas was
written in 1912, during Husserl's years in Gottingen (1901-1916).
Books I and II were extensively revised over nearly two decades and
the changes were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the
Husserliana editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of
the various reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl
Archives, but for those unable to work there the only one directly
available for Ideen II is the reconstructed one."
The primary intent of this volume is to give the English reader
access to all the philosophical texts published by Husserl between
the appearance of his first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik, and
that of his second book, Logische Untersuchungen- roughly, from
1890 through 1901. Along with these texts we have included a number
of unpublished manuscripts from the same period and dealing with
the same or closely related topics. A few of the texts here
translated (the review of Pahigyi, the five "report" articles of
1903-1904, the "notes" in Lalande's Vocabulaire, and the brief
discussion. article on Marty of 1910) obviously fall outside this
time period, so far as their publication dates are concerned; but
in content they seem clearly confined to it. The final piece
translated, a set of personal notes that date from 1906 through
1908, provides insight into how Husserl experienced his early
labors and their results, and into how he saw their relation to
work before him: a phenomenological critique of reason in all of
its forms. Thus the texts here translated - which obviously are to
be read in conjunction with his first two books - cover the
progression of Husserl's Problematik from the relatively narrow one
of clarifying the epistemic structure of general arithmetic, to the
all-encompassing one of establishing in principle, through
phenomenological research, the line between legitimate and
illegitimate claims to know or to be rational, regardless of the
domain concerned.
This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the
volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that
gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on
representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches
comprising Husserliana XXIII come from a period of enormous
productivity and pivotal development in Husserl's philosophical
life, extending from the years immediately preceding the Logical
Investigations (1900-01) almost to the time of his retirement in
1928. They make available the most profound and comprehensive
Husserlian account of image consciousnessa "the awareness we have
when we look at a picture or see a playa "and of its relation to
art and the aesthetic. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish
nuanced accounts of perception and memory. They enrich the
Husserlian analysis of time consciousness and offer a fascinating
picture of the sometimes tortuous paths Husserl took in his efforts
to comprehend how the forms of representation are constituted and
how they are related to one another and to perception. Phantasy,
Image Consciousness, and Memory should prove to be an indispensable
resource for Husserlian phenomenologists and for anyone else
interested in thinking about these fundamental phenomena.
This is a translation of Edmund HusserI's lecture course from the
Summer semester 1907 at the University of Gottingen. The German
original was pub lished posthumously in 1973 as Volume XVI of
Husserliana, Husserl's opera omnia. The translation is complete,
including both the main text and the supplementary texts (as
Husserliana volumes are usually organized), except for the critical
apparatus which provides variant readings. The announced title of
the lecture course was "Main parts of the phenome nology and
critique of reason." The course began with five, relatively inde
pendent, introductory lectures. These were published on their own
in 1947, bearing the title The idea ojphenomenology.l The "Five
Lectures" comprise a general orientation by proposing the method to
be employed in the subsequent working out of the actual problems
(viz., the method of "phenomenological reduction") and by
clarifying, at least provisionally, some technical terms that will
be used in the labor the subsequent lectures will carry out. The
present volume, then, presents that labor, i.e., the method in
action and the results attained. As such, this text dispels the
abstract impression which could not help but cling to the first
five lectures taken in isolation. Accord ingly, we are here given
genuine "introductory lectures," i.e., an introduction to
phenomenology in the genuine phenomenological sense of engaging in
the work of phenomenology, going to the "matters at issue
themselves," rather than remaining aloof from them in abstract
considerations of standpoint and approach."
First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor &
Francis, an informa company.
5 sehr merkwurdiger Tatsachen zutage gefordert, die vordem
verborgen waren, und wirklich psychologische Tatsachen, wenn auch
die Physiologen manche grosse Gruppen von ihnen ihrer eigenen
Wissenschaft mit zurechnen. Mag die Einstimmigkeit 5 in der
theoretischen Interpretation dieser Tatsachen auch sehr weit
zuruckstehen hinter derjenigen der exakten naturwissen-
schaftlichen Disziplinen, so ist sie in gewisser Hinsicht doch
wieder eine vollkommene, namlich was den methodischen Stil der
gesuchten Theorien anlangt. Jedenfalls ist man in den inter- 10
nationalen Forscherkreisen der neuen Psychologie der festen
Uberzeugung, einer bis vor kurzem ungebrochenen Uberzeugung, dass
nun endlich die allein wahre und echte Psychologie in den Gang
gebracht sei, als eine strenge Wissenschaft, auf deren Wegen die
Gesamtheit aller psychologischen Probleme, aller 15 zur
individuellen und Kulturgeistigkeit gehorigen, liegen mussen. Es
bedurfe nur, wie in jeder auf elementaren Aufbau und auf die
Erklarung aus elementaren Gesetzen bedachten Erfahrungs-
wissenschaft, geduldiger Zuruckhaltung und eines ganz vor-
sichtigen Emporschreitens; man durfe nur nicht voreilig nach 20
Problemen greifen, die noch nicht zu wissenschaftlicher Be-
arbeitung reif, fur die noch nicht die Tatsachenunterlage bereit-
gestellt und die notigen Erfahrungsbegriffe geschaffen sind. Einen
nicht geringen Zuwachs an innerer Sicherheit hat die neue
Psychologie durch die gelingende Schopfung einer Psycho- 25 technik
erhalten. Nun schien diese Psychologie wirklich der exakten Physik
gleichzustehen. Sie war nun sogar so weit, um ihre psychologische
Erkenntnis, ganz so wie physikalische und chemische, technisch
nutzbar zu machen.
6 werden kann, musste die Einsicht erwecken, dass das Quantitative
gar nicht zum allgemeinsten Wesen des Mathematischen oder
"Formalen" und der in ihm grundenden kalkulatorischen Me- thode
gehore. Als ich dann in der "mathematisierenden Logik" 5 eine in
der Tat quantitatslose Mathematik kennenlemte, und zwar als eine
unanfechtbare Disziplin von mathematischer Form und Methode, welche
teils die alten Syllogismen, teils neue, der Uberlieferung fremd
gebliebene Schlussformen behandelte, gestalteten sich mir die
wichtigen Probleme nach dem allgemei- 10 nen Wesen des
Mathematischen uberhaupt, nach den naturlichen Zusammenhangen oder
etwaigen Grenzen zwischen den Systemen der quantitativen und
nichtquantitativen Mathematik, und spe- ziell z. B. nach dem
Verhaltnis zwischen dem Formalen der Arithmetik und dem Formalen
der Logik. Naturgemass musste 15 ich von hier aus weiter
fortschreiten zu den fundamentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der
Erkenntnisform im Unterschiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach
dem Sinn des Unter- schiedes zwischen formalen (reinen) und
materialen Bestimmun- gen, Wahrheiten, Gesetzen. 20 Aber noch in
einer ganz anderen Richtung fand ich mich in Probleme der
allgemeinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ver- wickelt. Ich war von
der herrschenden Uberzeugung ausgegangen, dass es die Psychologie
sei, von der, wie die Logik uberhaupt, so die Logik der deduktiven
Wissenschaften ihre philosophische 25 Aufklarung erhoffen musse.
Demgemass nehmen psychologische Untersuchungen in dem ersten (und
allein veroffentlichten) B- de meiner Philosophie der Arithmetik
einen sehr breiten Raum ein. {[A VII] Diese psychologische
Fundierung wollte 11 mir in gewissen Zu- [B VII] sammenhangen nie
recht genugen.
Klarheit in betreff dieser Satze anstrebt, d. i. Einsicht in das
Wesen der bei dem Vollzug und den ideal-moglichen Anwendungen
solcher Satze ins Spiel tretenden Erkenntnisweisen und der mit
diesen sich wesensmassig konstituierenden Sinngebungen und
objektiven Gel- 1 11 S tungen * Sprachliche Erorterungen gehoren r
nun sicherlich zu den 1 r philosophisch I unerlasslichen
Vorbereitungen fur den Aufbau der [A 4] reinen Logik, weil nur
durch ihre Mithilfe die eigentlichen Objekte der logischen
Forschung und, in weiterer Folge, die wesentlichen Arten und
Unterschiede dieser Objekte zu unmissverstandlicher 10 Klarheit
herauszuarbeiten sind. Es handelt sich dabei aber nicht um 12
grammatische Erorterungen im r empirischen , auf irgendeine
historisch gegebene Sprache bezogenen Sinn, sondern um Erorterun-
gen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphare einer objekti-
ven Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammen- 13 15
hangt, einer rreinen Phanomenologie der Denk- und
Erkenntniserlebnisse gehoren. rDicse, wie die sie umspannende reine
Phanomenologie der Erlebnisse uberhaupt, hat es ausschliesslich mit
den in der Intuition erlassbaren und analysierba- ren Erlebnissen
in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit 20 empirisch
apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnis- sen
erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als
Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt
erfassten Wesen und rein in den Wesen grundenden Zusammenhan- ge
bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 25
Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist eine 1
14 apriorische im vorzuglichsten Sinne des Wortes.
As is made plain in the critical apparatus and editorial matter
appended to the original German publication of Hussed's Ideas II, I
this is a text with a history. It underwent revision after
revision, spanning almost 20 years in one of the most fertile
periods of the philosopher's life. The book owes its form to the
work of many hands, and its unity is one that has been imposed on
it. Yet there is nothing here that cannot be traced back to Hussed
himself. Indeed, the final" clean copy" for publication, prepared
by an assistant, was completely reviewed by the master three times
and emended by him in detail on each occasion. Nevertheless, in the
end the work was in fact not submitted for publication, and after
Hussed's pen last touched the manuscript in 1928 it was set aside
until posthumously edited and published by the Hussed-Archives in
1952. The story of the composition of Ideas II begins with the
"pencil manuscript" of 1912. This is the ultimate textual source
for both Ideas II and Ideas III. 2 It has been preserved as a folio
of 84 sheets in very dense shorthand of the Gabelsberger system,
written mostly with a pencil. It was composed by Hussed "in one
stroke" immediately after the completion of I Edmund Husser : Ideen
zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen
Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phiinomenologische Untersuchungen zur
Konstitution. Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus NijhofT,
1952 (Husserliana IV).
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is a translation
of Edmund Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewußtseins. The first part of the book was originally
presented as a lecture course at the University of Göttingen in
the winter semester of 1904–1905, while the second part is based
on additional supplementary lectures that he gave between 1905 and
1910. In these essays and lectures, Husserl explores the terrain of
consciousness in light of its temporality. He identifies two
categories of temporality—retention and protention—and outlines
how temporality provides the form for perception, phantasy,
imagination, memory, and recollection. He demonstrates a
distinction between cosmic and phenomenological time and explores
the relevance of phenomenological time for the constitution of
temporal objects. The ideas Husserl developed here are explored
further in his Ideas and were pursued until the end of his
philosophical career.
Translated by: J.N. Findlay
the Logische Untersuchungen, l phenomenology has been conceived as
a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma
nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere
compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is
understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal
experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception
has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply
pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have
not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the
replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are
also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of
my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at
all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage
the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare
certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the
removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of
psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary
amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found
to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology
against my supposed "attacks."
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