To know that something is the case, if closely considered, turns out to be no more than to believe with good evidence that something is the case, and beliefs, however well supported by evidence, do not yield certainty. So the question is, what kind of evidence is sufficient to justify a 'knowledge claim'? And most important of all: What kind of beliefs do qualify as rational? This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning the rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs, and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgment. The book is typically discursive rather than merely informative, and introduces philosophy by doing it.

We share the capacity for knowledge with animals, but it is the nature and the scope of what we may rationally believe that makes us human. Yet what kind of beliefs do qualify as 'rational'? This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgement. The book is typically discursive rather than simply informative, and introduces philosophy by doing it.

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear and elegant introduction traces Husserl's philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl.

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear and elegant introduction traces Husserl's philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl.

Arguing for an original approach to the problem of change and the self, this is a critique of the naturalism which is dominant in the contemporary philosophy of the English-speaking world. It sees the problem as a philosophical puzzle to which naturalistic science has no answer. Whenever a thing changes, however slightly, it becomes in some ways unlike it was. But how is it possible for anything to be both like and unlike itself? This book explores the conditions that make the idea of change intelligible, in particular the connection between the possibility of change and the existence of selves.