This work examines the practice of air interdiction in three wars: World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Southeast Asia or Vietnam War. It considers eleven important interdiction campaigns, all of them American or Anglo-American, for only the United States and Great Britain had the resources to conduct interdiction campaigns on a large scale in World War II. Mark proposes a realistic objective for interdiction - preventing me, equipment and supplies from reaching the combat area when the enemy needs them and in the quantity he requires. Center for Air Force History, Washington, D.C.

The United States Army Air Forces became and independent service in 1947. There had just been a long conflict between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and the satellite states subject to it. In 1949 the United States and most of the no-Communist countries of Europe signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States Air Force, which had only been a token presence on the continent since the end of World War II, once more crossed the Atlantic in strength. The commitment of that service to peace and security in Europe, which continues still, has long been the longest of its history. This manuscript attempts to give the general reader some sense of the role the USAF has played in Europe since the end of World War II.

This analytical work by Dr. Eduard Mark of the Center for Air Force History examines the practice of interdiction in three wars: World War II, the Korean war, and the war in Southeast Asia. It considers eleven important interdiction campaigns, all of them American or Anglo-American, for only the United States and Great Britain had the resources to conduct interdiction campaigns on a large scale in World War II. Dr. Mark proposes what he considers to be a realistic objective for interdiction: preventing men, equipment, and supplies from reaching the combat area when the enemy needs them and in the quantity he requires. As Mark notes, there has been little intensive scholarship on the subject of interdiction especially when contrasted with the work done on strategic bombardment.

For the period between World War II and the full onset of the Cold War, histories of American intelligence seem to go dark. Yet in those years a little known clandestine organization, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), emerged from the remnants of wartime American intelligence to lay the groundwork for what would become the CIA and, in ways revealed here for the first time, conduct its own secret warof espionage and political intrigue in postwar Europe. Telling the full story of this early and surprisingly effective espionage arm ofthe United States, Spying through a Glass Darkly brings a critical chapter in the history of Cold War intelligence out of the shadows. Constrained by inadequate staff and limited resources, distracted by the conflicting demands of agencies of the US government,and victimized by disinformation and double agents, the Strategic Services Unit struggled to maintain an effective Americanclandestine capability after the defeat of the Axis Powers. Never viscerally anti-communist, the Strategic Services Unit was slow torecognize the Soviet Union as a potential threat, but gradually it began to mount operations, often in collaboration with the intelligence services of Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, and Sweden, to throw light into the darker corners of the Soviet regime. Bringing to bear a wealth of archival documents, operational records, interviews, and correspondence, David Alvarez and Eduard Mark chronicle SSU's successes and failures in procuring intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, a chronicle that delves deeply into the details of secret operations against Soviet targets throughout Europe: not only in the backstreets of the divided cities of Berlin and Vienna, but also the cafes, hotels, offices, and salons of such cosmopolitan capitals as Paris, Rome, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw.