During the twentieth century, and particularly between the 1930s and 1950s, ideas about the nature of constitutional government, the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking, and the proper role of the federal courts evolved and shifted. This book focuses on Supreme Court justice Louis D. Brandeis and his opinion in the 1938 landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which resulted in a significant relocation of power from federal to state courts. Distinguished legal historian Edward A. Purcell, Jr., shows how the Erie case provides a window on the legal, political, and ideological battles over the federal courts in the New Deal era. Purcell also offers an in-depth study of Brandeis's constitutional jurisprudence and evolving legal views. Examining the social origins and intended significance of the Erie decision, Purcell concludes that the case was a product of early twentieth-century progressivism. The author explores Brandeis's personal values and political purposes and argues that the justice was an exemplar of neither "judicial restraint" nor "neutral principles," despite his later reputation. In an analysis of the continual reconceptions of both Brandeis and Erie by new generations of judges and scholars in the twentieth century, Purcell also illuminates how individual perspectives and social pressures combined to drive the law's evolution.

Purcell explores the dynamic relationship between legal and social change through a study of litigation practice and tactics. He examines changing litigation patterns in suits between individuals and national corporations over tort claims for personal injuries and contract claims for insurance benefits.

He refines the progressive claim that the federal courts found both in favour of and against business enterprises during this time, and identifies specific ways and particular time periods in which the federal courts both advantaged and disadvantaged national corporations. He also identifies 1892-1908 as a critical period in the evolution of the twentieth-century federal judicial system.

Antonin Scalia and American Constitutionalism is an in-depth study of Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence, his work on the Supreme Court, and his significance in the history of American constitutionalism. After tracing Scalia's rise to Associate Justice and his subsequent emergence as a hero of the Republican Party and the political right, this book reviews and criticizes his general jurisprudential theory, arguing that he failed to produce either the objective method he claimed or the correct constitutional results he promised. Focusing on his judicial performance over his thirty years on the Court, it examines his decisions and opinions on virtually all of the constitutional issues he addressed from the fundamentals of structure (federalism, separation of powers, and the Article III judicial power) to specific interpretations of most major constitutional provisions involving governmental powers and the rights of individuals under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. This book argues that Scalia applied his jurisprudential theories in inconsistent and contradictory ways and often ignored, distorted, or abandoned the interpretive methods he proclaimed to reach the results he sought, results that were aligned with and supported by the post-Reagan Republican coalition. Scalia was far more consistent in enforcing such ideologically compatible results than he was in following his proclaimed jurisprudential theories. Finally, assessing Scalia's historical significance, Antonin Scalia and American Constitutionalism argues that his jurisprudence and career are particularly illuminating because they exemplify-contrary to his persistent claims-three paramount characteristics of American constitutionalism: the inherent inadequacy of originalism and other formal interpretive methodologies to produce consistent and correct answers to controverted constitutional questions; the close relationship that exists, particularly so in Scalia's case, between constitutional theories and interpretations on one hand and substantive political goals and values on the other; and the unavoidably living nature of American constitutionalism itself. All in all, Scalia stands as a towering figure of irony because his judicial career deconstructed the central claims of his own jurisprudence.

In this lively historical examination of American federalism, a leading scholar in the field refutes the widely accepted notion that the founding fathers carefully crafted a constitutional balance of power between the states and the federal government. Edward A. Purcell Jr. bases his argument on close analysis of the Constitution's original structure and the ways that structure both induced and accommodated changes over the centuries. There was no clear agreement among the founding fathers regarding the "true" nature of American federalism, Purcell contends, nor was there a consensus on "correct" lines dividing state and national authority. Furthermore, even had there been some true "original" understanding, the elastic and dynamic nature of the constitutional structure would have made it impossible for subsequent generations to maintain any "original" or permanent balance. The author traces the evolution of federalism through the centuries, focusing particularly on shifting interpretations founded on political interests. He concludes with insights into current issues of federal power and a discussion of the grounds on which legitimate decisions about federal and state power should rest.

"Widely acclaimed for its originality and penetration, this award-winning study of American thought in the twentieth century examines the ways in which the spread of pragmatism and scientific naturalism affected developments in philosophy, social science, and law, and traces the effects of these developments on traditional assumptions of democratic theory."