|
Showing 1 - 9 of
9 matches in All Departments
|
Interfaith Activism (Paperback)
Harold Kasimow; Foreword by Edward Kaplan, Alan Race
|
R534
R435
Discovery Miles 4 350
Save R99 (19%)
|
Ships in 10 - 15 working days
|
|
Interfaith Activism (Hardcover)
Harold Kasimow; Foreword by Edward Kaplan, Alan Race
|
R984
R787
Discovery Miles 7 870
Save R197 (20%)
|
Ships in 10 - 15 working days
|
The End of Victory recounts the costs of failure in nuclear war
through the work of the most secret deliberative body of the
National Security Council, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC).
From 1953 onward, US leaders wanted to know as precisely as
possible what would happen if they failed in a nuclear war—how
many Americans would die and how much of the country would remain.
The NESC told Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy what
would be the result of the worst failure of American strategy—a
maximum-effort surprise Soviet nuclear assault on the United
States. Edward Kaplan details how NESC studies provided key
information for presidential decisions on the objectives of a war
with the USSR and on the size and shape of the US military. The
subcommittee delivered its annual reports in a decade marked by
crises in Berlin, Quemoy and Matsu, Laos, and Cuba, among others.
During these critical moments and day-to-day containment of the
USSR, the NESC's reports offered the best estimates of the
butcher's bill of conflict and of how to reduce the cost in
American lives. Taken with the intelligence community's assessment
of the probability of a surprise attack, the NESC's work framed the
risks of US strategy in the chilliest years of the Cold War. The
End of Victory reveals how all policy decisions run risks—and
ones involving military force run grave ones—though they can
rarely be known with precision.
In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American
strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early
air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet
Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and
gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into
question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic
doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural,
institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes
insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they
could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the
suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of
Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the
marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of
ballistic missiles.
In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American
strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early
air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet
Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and
gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into
question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic
doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural,
institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes
insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they
could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the
suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of
Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the
marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of
ballistic missiles.
An account of the history, structure, and operation of the First
and Second Banks of the United States, this study examines how the
banks performed as national and central institutions, and what
happened to the economy when the charter of the Second Bank was
allowed to expire in 1836. Historians have paid little recent
attention to the early history of central banking in the United
States, and many Americans believe that the Federal Reserve,
created in 1913, was our first central bank. The economic crisis
during the American Revolution actually led to the founding of a
national bank, called the Bank of North America, during the period
of Confederation. Although it became a private bank before the
Constitution was ratified in 1788, it proved to be such a success
that in 1791 Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the
Treasury, was able to convince President Washington that a similar
bank should be established.
While the First Bank of the United States performed well during
its tenure, its charter was allowed to lapse in 1811. A Second Bank
of the United States was created five years later in 1816, and it
prospered under the leadership of its third president, Nicholas
Biddle, from 1823 to 1830, when central banking was practiced. This
success ended with the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson, who refused
to recharter the bank and withdrew the government's funds in 1833.
Severely weakened, the Bank continued, but its charter finally
expired in 1836, much to Biddle's dismay.
Latin America's proximity to the United States made the improvement
of relations between the two regions imperative in the first two
decades of the 20th century. William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of
State for Woodrow Wilson until 1915, was largely responsible for
this task. Although Bryan had denounced as imperialistic his
predecessors' political and economic intervention in Latin America,
his own policies also had an imperialistic tone. Bryan resigned in
June 1915, but his actions while in office served as the foundation
for later intervention in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
This work details Bryan's attitudes toward Latin America prior to
assuming the title of secretary of state, his actions while in
office, and his political stance after resignation. Six topical
chapters cover Bryan's policies toward Nicaragua, Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Panama Canal Tolls Controversy, and
the Columbian Treaty. The work concludes with an analysis of
Bryan's inconsistent attitude on imperialism.
This work covers trade policy from 1923 to 1995 taking the history
of American tariffs from the Prelude to Trade Wars to the present.
It begins during the period of high tariffs and discusses the
arguments for and against protectionism. Cordell Hull and the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements of the 1930s are discussed along with
the increase in trade revenue from these agreements. The major
changes in trade policy including GATT, the European Community, and
many more are discussed in the work. It is part of an on-going
debate among economic historians over the supposed movement of the
United States toward protectionism since the 1980s.
The tariff policies of the 1890-1922 led to the development of
tariff rates that launched the United States on a path that led to
later trade wars. The Republican Party and Porter McCumber took the
lead in promoting these policies, claiming that the tariff would
protect new and struggling industries. In many instances, items
subjected to high tariffs were not in conflict with industries in
the United States. In addition, although the tariff covered
agricultural products, it was not sufficient to halt an
agricultural decline. This work traces the course of U.S. policy
through five tariffs which preceded the Fordney-McCumber tariff of
1922, when the tariff was used for both protection and revenue.
McCumber's economic nationalism combined with his internationalism
in other areas is detailed in the work.
|
|