Latin America's proximity to the United States made the improvement of relations between the two regions imperative in the first two decades of the 20th century. William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State for Woodrow Wilson until 1915, was largely responsible for this task. Although Bryan had denounced as imperialistic his predecessors' political and economic intervention in Latin America, his own policies also had an imperialistic tone. Bryan resigned in June 1915, but his actions while in office served as the foundation for later intervention in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This work details Bryan's attitudes toward Latin America prior to assuming the title of secretary of state, his actions while in office, and his political stance after resignation. Six topical chapters cover Bryan's policies toward Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Panama Canal Tolls Controversy, and the Columbian Treaty. The work concludes with an analysis of Bryan's inconsistent attitude on imperialism.

This work covers trade policy from 1923 to 1995 taking the history of American tariffs from the Prelude to Trade Wars to the present. It begins during the period of high tariffs and discusses the arguments for and against protectionism. Cordell Hull and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements of the 1930s are discussed along with the increase in trade revenue from these agreements. The major changes in trade policy including GATT, the European Community, and many more are discussed in the work. It is part of an on-going debate among economic historians over the supposed movement of the United States toward protectionism since the 1980s.

An account of the history, structure, and operation of the First and Second Banks of the United States, this study examines how the banks performed as national and central institutions, and what happened to the economy when the charter of the Second Bank was allowed to expire in 1836. Historians have paid little recent attention to the early history of central banking in the United States, and many Americans believe that the Federal Reserve, created in 1913, was our first central bank. The economic crisis during the American Revolution actually led to the founding of a national bank, called the Bank of North America, during the period of Confederation. Although it became a private bank before the Constitution was ratified in 1788, it proved to be such a success that in 1791 Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, was able to convince President Washington that a similar bank should be established.

While the First Bank of the United States performed well during its tenure, its charter was allowed to lapse in 1811. A Second Bank of the United States was created five years later in 1816, and it prospered under the leadership of its third president, Nicholas Biddle, from 1823 to 1830, when central banking was practiced. This success ended with the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson, who refused to recharter the bank and withdrew the government's funds in 1833. Severely weakened, the Bank continued, but its charter finally expired in 1836, much to Biddle's dismay.

The tariff policies of the 1890-1922 led to the development of tariff rates that launched the United States on a path that led to later trade wars. The Republican Party and Porter McCumber took the lead in promoting these policies, claiming that the tariff would protect new and struggling industries. In many instances, items subjected to high tariffs were not in conflict with industries in the United States. In addition, although the tariff covered agricultural products, it was not sufficient to halt an agricultural decline. This work traces the course of U.S. policy through five tariffs which preceded the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922, when the tariff was used for both protection and revenue. McCumber's economic nationalism combined with his internationalism in other areas is detailed in the work.

In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.

The End of Victory recounts the costs of failure in nuclear war through the work of the most secret deliberative body of the National Security Council, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC). From 1953 onward, US leaders wanted to know as precisely as possible what would happen if they failed in a nuclear war—how many Americans would die and how much of the country would remain. The NESC told Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy what would be the result of the worst failure of American strategy—a maximum-effort surprise Soviet nuclear assault on the United States. Edward Kaplan details how NESC studies provided key information for presidential decisions on the objectives of a war with the USSR and on the size and shape of the US military. The subcommittee delivered its annual reports in a decade marked by crises in Berlin, Quemoy and Matsu, Laos, and Cuba, among others. During these critical moments and day-to-day containment of the USSR, the NESC's reports offered the best estimates of the butcher's bill of conflict and of how to reduce the cost in American lives. Taken with the intelligence community's assessment of the probability of a surprise attack, the NESC's work framed the risks of US strategy in the chilliest years of the Cold War. The End of Victory reveals how all policy decisions run risks—and ones involving military force run grave ones—though they can rarely be known with precision.

In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.