Inheritances are often regarded as a societal "evil, " enabling great fortunes to be passed from one generation to another, thus exacerbating wealth inequality and reducing wealth mobility. Discussions of inheritances in America bring to mind the Vanderbilts, Rockefellers, and "trust fund babies "--people who receive enough money through inheritances or gifts that they do not have any need to work during their lifetime. Though these are, of course, extreme outliers, inheritances in America have a reputation for being a way the rich keep getting richer. In Inheriting Wealth in America, Edward Wolff seeks to counter these misconceptions with data and arguments that illuminate who inherits what in the United States and what results from these wealth transfers. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances--a triennial survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board that contains detailed information on household wealth, inheritances, and gifts--as well as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and a simulation model over years 1989 to 2010, Wolff reports six major findings on the state of inheritances in America. First, wealth transfers (inheritances and gifts) accounted for less than one quarter of household wealth. However, for persons age 75 and over, the figure was about two-fifths since they have more time to receive wealth transfers. Indirect evidence, derived from the simulation model, indicates a figure closer to two-thirds at end of life - probably the best estimate. Second, despite prognostications of a coming "inheritance boom, " it has not materialized yet. Only a small (and statistically insignificant) uptick in average wealth transfers was observed over the period, and wealth transfers were actually down as a share of household wealth. Third, while wealth transfers are greater in dollar amount for richer households than poorer ones, they constitute a smaller share of the accumulated wealth of the rich. Fourth, contrary to popular belief, inheritances and gifts, on net, reduce wealth inequality rather than raising it. The rationale is that inheritances and particularly gifts typically flow from richer to poorer persons, thus lowering wealth inequality. Fifth, despite a rapid rise in income inequality, the inequality of wealth transfers shows no discernible time trend from 1989 to 2010, neither upward nor downward. Sixth, among the very wealthy, the share of wealth accounted for by wealth transfers is surprisingly low, only about a sixth, and this share has trended significantly downward over time. It is true that inheritances and gifts are unequal, with only one fifth of families receiving wealth transfers and these transfers benefitting the rich far more than the middle class and the poor. That, however, is not the whole picture of inheritances in America. Clearly-written and illuminating, this books expertly distills an abundance of data on inheritances into important takeaways for all who wonder about the current state of inheritances and gifts in the United States.

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that greater schooling and skill improvement leads to higher wages, that income inequality falls with wider access to schooling, and that the Information Technology revolution will re-ignite worker pay. Indeed, the econometric results provide no evidence that the growth of skills or educational attainment has any statistically significant relation to earnings growth or that greater equality in schooling has led to a decline in income inequality. Results also indicate that computer investment is negatively related to earnings gains and positively associated with changes in both income inequality and the dispersion of worker skills. The findings reports here have direct relevance to ongoing policy debates on educational reform in the U.S.

Throughout the 1990s the US expanded its lead over other advanced industrial nations in terms of conventionally measured per capita income. However, it is not clear that welfare levels in America have grown concomitantly with per capita income, or that Americans are necessarily better off than citizens of other advanced countries. The contributors to this volume investigate to what extent welfare has increased in the United States over the postwar period and provide a rigorous examination of both conventional measures of the standard of living, as well as more inclusive indices. The chapters cover such topics as: race, home ownership and family structure; the status of children; the consumer price index; a historical perspective on the standard of living; worker rights and labor strength in advanced economies. In addition, they explore two economic systems delivering the goods - the free enterprise system of the United States and the European social welfare state. They then present international comparisons and highlight the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two systems. This provocative and accessible volume answers the intriguing question posed by the title and will be of interest to economists, sociologists, policymakers and policy analysts, as well as students of these fields.

A vast new literature on the sources of economic growth has now accumulated. This book critically reviews the most significant works in this field and summarizes what is known today about the sources of economic growth. The first part discusses the most important theoretical models that have been used in modern growth theory as well as methodological issues in productivity measurement. The second part examines the long-term record on productivity among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, considers the sources of growth among them with particular attention to the role of education, investigates convergence at the industry level among them, and examines the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. The third part looks at the sources of growth among non-OECD countries. Each chapter emphasizes the factors that appear to be most important in explaining growth performance.

This book documents the growth of unproductive activity in the United States economy since World War II and its relation to the economic surplus, capital accumulation, and economic growth. Unproductive activities broadly consist of those involved in the circulation process, including wholesaling and retailing, banking and financial services, advertising, legal services, business services and many (though not all) government activities. The results indicate that the level of unproductive activity in the postwar economy has been a significant factor in the slowdown in the rate of capital accumulation, productivity growth and the overall growth rate. Here, the villain is shown to be the gradual but persistent shift of resources to unproductive activities. The consequence has been a reduction in new capital formation and productivity growth and an erosion in the rate of growth in per capita living standards. Moreover, the rise in unproductive activity is itself seen to be rooted in the logic of advanced capitalism. The forces of competition, which in the early stages of capitalism lead to rapid technical change and productivity growth, promote non-productive and even counterproductive activities in its more advanced stages.

This book documents the growth of unproductive activity in the United States economy since World War II and its relation to the economic surplus, capital accumulation, and economic growth. Unproductive activities broadly consist of those involved in the circulation process, including wholesaling and retailing, banking and financial services, advertising, legal services, business services and many (though not all) government activities. The results indicate that the level of unproductive activity in the postwar economy has been a significant factor in the slowdown in the rate of capital accumulation, productivity growth and the overall growth rate. Here, the villain is shown to be the gradual but persistent shift of resources to unproductive activities. The consequence has been a reduction in new capital formation and productivity growth and an erosion in the rate of growth in per capita living standards. Moreover, the rise in unproductive activity is itself seen to be rooted in the logic of advanced capitalism. The forces of competition, which in the early stages of capitalism lead to rapid technical change and productivity growth, promote non-productive and even counterproductive activities in its more advanced stages.

The contributors to this comprehensive book compile and analyse the latest data available on household wealth using, as case studies, the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Finland during the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. The authors show that in the US, trends are highlighted in terms of wealth holdings, among the low-income population, along with changes in wealth polarization, racial differences in wealth holdings, and the dynamics of portfolio choices. The consensus between the authors is that wealth inequality has generally risen among these OECD countries since the early 1980s, although Germany stands out as an exception. In the case of the US, it is also noted that wealth holdings have generally failed to improve among low-income families and that the racial wealth gap widened during the late 1980s. International Perspectives on Household Wealth also contains new results on a number of topics, including measures and changes of wealth polarization in the US, measurement and changes of portfolio span in the US, asset holdings of low-income households in the US, and the effects of parental resources on asset holdings in Chile. Academic, government, and public policy economists in OECD countries, as well as those in so-called middle-income countries around the world, will find much to engage them within this book. It will also appeal to academics and researchers of international and welfare economics and other social scientists interested in the issue of inequality.

Understanding wealth in the United States-who has it, how they acquired it, and how they preserve it-is crucial to addressing the economic and political challenges facing the nation. But until now we have had little reliable information. Edward Wolff, one of the world's great experts on the economics of wealth, offers an authoritative account of patterns in the accumulation and distribution of wealth since 1900. A Century of Wealth in America demonstrates that the most remarkable change has been the growth of per capita household wealth, which climbed almost eightfold prior to the 2007 recession. But overlaid on this base rate are worrying trends. The share of personal wealth claimed by the richest one percent almost doubled between the mid-1970s and 2013, concurrent with a steep run-up of debt in the middle class. As the wealth of the average family dropped precipitously-by 44 percent-between 2007 and 2013, with black families hit hardest, the debt-income ratio more than doubled. The Great Recession also caused a sharp spike in asset poverty, as more and more families barely survived from one paycheck to the next. In short, the United States has changed from being one of the most economically equal of the advanced industrialized countries to being one of the most unequal. At a time of deep uncertainty about the future, A Century of Wealth in America provides a sober bedrock of facts and astute analysis. It will become one of the few indispensable resources for contemporary public debate.

This comprehensive study is a collection of original articles that view the current state of knowledge of the convergence hypothesis. The hypothesis asserts that at least since the Second World War, and perhaps for a considerable period before that, the group of industrial countries was growing increasingly homogeneous in terms of levels of productivity, technology and per capita incomes. In addition, there was general catch up toward the leader, with gradual erosion of the gap between the leader country, the U.S., throughout most of the pertinent period, and that of the countries lagging most closely behind it.
The book examines patterns displayed by individual industries within countries as well as the aggregate economies, various influences that underlie the process of convergence that seems to have occurred, and the role that convergence has played and promises to play in the future of the newly industrialized nations and the less developed countries. Much of the analysis is set in a historical perspective, with particular attention paid to the record following World War II. The prestigious editors conclude that increasing productivity is the key to rising living standards in a globalized marketplace. Contributors include: Moses Abramovitz, Alice M. Amsden, Magnus Blomstrom, David Dollar, Takashi Hikino, Gregory Ingram, William Lazonick, Frank Lichtenberg, Robert E. Lipsey, Angus Maddison, Gavin Wright, and Mario Zejan.

We found that on average over the period from 1989 to 2007, 21 percent of American households at a given point of time received a wealth transfer and these accounted for 23 percent of their net worth. Over the lifetime, about 30 percent of households could expect to receive a wealth transfer and these would account for close to 40 percent of their net worth near time of death. However, there is little evidence of an inheritance "boom." In fact, from 1989 to 2007, the share of households reporting a wealth transfer fell by 2.5 percentage points. The average value of inheritances received among all households did increase but at a slow pace, by 10 percent, and wealth transfers as a proportion of current net worth fell sharply over this period from 29 to 19 percent or by 10 percentage points. We also found, somewhat surprisingly, that inheritances and other wealth transfers tend to be equalizing in terms of the distribution of household wealth. Indeed, the addition of wealth transfers to other sources of household wealth has had a sizeable effect on reducing the inequality of wealth.

We found that on average over the period from 1989 to 2007, 21 percent of American households at a given point of time received a wealth transfer and these accounted for 23 percent of their net worth. Over the lifetime, about 30 percent of households could expect to receive a wealth transfer and these would account for close to 40 percent of their net worth near time of death. However, there is little evidence of an inheritance "boom." In fact, from 1989 to 2007, the share of households reporting a wealth transfer fell by 2.5 percentage points. The average value of inheritances received among all households did increase but at a slow pace, by 10 percent, and wealth transfers as a proportion of current net worth fell sharply over this period from 29 to 19 percent or by 10 percentage points. We also found, somewhat surprisingly, that inheritances and other wealth transfers tend to be equalizing in terms of the distribution of household wealth. Indeed, the addition of wealth transfers to other sources of household wealth has had a sizeable effect on reducing the inequality of wealth.

A vast new literature on the sources of economic growth has now accumulated. This book critically reviews the most significant works in this field and summarizes what is known today about the sources of economic growth. The first part discusses the most important theoretical models that have been used in modern growth theory as well as methodological issues in productivity measurement. The second part examines the long-term record on productivity among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, considers the sources of growth among them with particular attention to the role of education, investigates convergence at the industry level among them, and examines the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. The third part looks at the sources of growth among non-OECD countries. Each chapter emphasizes the factors that appear to be most important in explaining growth performance.