Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been an important policy tool of government since the 1980s, when the Reagan administration ordered that all major new regulations be subjected to a rigorous test of whether their projected benefits would outweigh their costs. Not surprisingly, CBA has been criticized by many who claim that it neglects, especially on the benefit side, important values that are hard to measure.

In this book, the authors reconceptualize cost-benefit analysis, arguing that its objective should be overall well-being rather than economic efficiency. They show why the link between preferences and well-being is more complicated than economists have thought. Satisfying a person's preference for some outcome is welfare-enhancing only if he or she is self-interested and well-informed. Also, cost-benefit analysis is not a super-procedure but simply a way to identify welfare-maximizing policies. A separate kind of analysis is required to weigh rights and equal treatment.

This book not only places cost-benefit analysis on a firmer theoretical foundation, but also has many practical implications for how government agencies should undertake cost-benefit studies.

In International Human Rights, acclaimed legal scholar Eric Posner seeks to explain a paradox: the language of human rights is now the dominant mode of international moral criticism of governments, and yet the evidence suggests that most countries flagrantly violate the human rights treaties that they solemnly ratify. The prevailing consensus, he notes, is that governments should promote the well-being of citizens in their countries, and that in extreme cases, foreign countries should intervene and replace governments that fail to comply with this duty. The problem, he contends, is countries disagree on how they can achieve those goals. This weakness is on full display in existing human rights treaties, and the result is a general failure. Because countries have not been able to agree about 'well-being,' they ended up negotiating treaties that are vague and (by design) unenforceable. In addition, countries have ensured that international organizations possess weak enforcement powers. Moreover, when enforcement does occur, it is invariably partial and scattershot. In whack-a-mole style, target countries can compensate for addressing some violations by reducing their compliance with other norms that are not the focus of enforcement. Posner closes by arguing that foreign aid provides a better model for pressuring governments to improve their treatment of citizens. Under the foreign aid regime, western countries look at overall indicators of well-being in other countries-such as per capita GDP-and offer aid based on whether it is likely to help people escape poverty. Governments that make progress in reducing poverty should be deemed in compliance with their human rights obligations, and we should not waste time trying to enforce more specific rights like freedom of the press or the right to privacy. In addition to offering a powerful and provocative thesis, this is a concise introduction to international human rights law. Posner describes the major treaties and the major international organizations; the evidence regarding the effect of human rights treaties on the behavior of governments; and recent international controversies over human rights such as the United States' use of torture, China's persecution of political dissidents, and the debate over the alleged right against defamation of religion.

What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and nonlegal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But he also argues that the proper regulation of social norms is a delicate and complex task, and that current understanding of social norms is inadequate for guiding judges and lawmakers. What is needed, and what this book offers, is a model of the relationship between law and social norms. The model shows that people's concern with establishing cooperative relationships leads them to engage in certain kinds of imitative behavior. The resulting behavioral patterns are called social norms.

Posner applies the model to several areas of law that involve the regulation of social norms, including laws governing gift-giving and nonprofit organizations; family law; criminal law; laws governing speech, voting, and discrimination; and contract law. Among the engaging questions posed are: Would the legalization of gay marriage harm traditional married couples? Is it beneficial to shame criminals? Why should the law reward those who make charitable contributions? Would people vote more if non-voters were penalized? The author approaches these questions using the tools of game theory, but his arguments are simply stated and make no technical demands on the reader.