This interdisciplinary review series provides an economic analysis of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, the implicit or explicit economic reasoning employed by the Court, and the economic consequences of the Court's decisions.

"The Supreme Court Economic Review" series applies economic and legal scholarship to the work of the United States Supreme Court. Contributions provide economic analyses of events that generate the Court's cases, its organizational functioning, its rationale, and the societal impact of these verdicts.

This interdisciplinary review series provides an economic analysis of the situations and events that generate a case or group of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, the implicit or explicit economic reasoning employed by the Court to reach its decisions, and the economic consequences of the Court's decisions.

Distribution Restrictions Operate by Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, Benjamin KleinThe Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, Theodore Eisenberg amp Martin T. WellsShould Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, Maxwell L. StearnsAntitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, John E. Lopatka amp William H. PagePreserving the American Common Market: State and Local Governments in the United States Supreme Court, Christopher R. DrahozalMaking Something Out of Nothing: The Law of Takings and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, Michael A. Heller amp James E. Krier