This book sets out to explain the foreign policy of Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (February 2014 to December 2016). It offers a unique analytical framework to make sense of Renzi's foreign policy: the domestically-focused outsider. It argues that to untangle Renzi's foreign policy one must first understand that his clear priority was enacting domestic economic and political reforms. Domestic focus means that Renzi made foreign policy decisions with a sensitivity to public opinion and party unity. The book also argues that Renzi's status as an outsider in Italian politics-having previously served only as the mayor of Florence-provides critical insight into his foreign policy. Renzi was prone to skepticism of the establishment and dramatic, symbolic gestures rather than patient coalition building. The book applies this framework to the five most important foreign policy issues Renzi's government faced: migration, finance and the EU, Russia, ISIL, and Libya. The book's analysis of the cases benefits from over twenty elite interviews, including those with senior members of Renzi's government.

How and why the three losers of the Second World War reconsidered their pacifism, embraced a more active military role and transformed their armed forces after the Cold War Analysis of the process of military transformation in Italy, Germany and Japan Addresses the impact of historical legacies on the pacing and direction of transformation Looks at the transformation of military doctrine and force structure over three decades Assesses the impact of different external and internal factors in military transformation While armed forces in several countries underwent deep transformations after the end of the Cold War, few if any, however, experiences more radical changes than Germany and Italy, and Japan. The book explores how the three countries modified posture and structure of their militaries over the past three decades. While the three countries all had to overcome a pacifist constitution, a widespread view in both elites and public opinion that that war was a taboo, and armed forces designed to defend and deter against large-scale threats, they all became more active security providers over the last decades. Each country followed a distinct path, though. The book reconstructs these paths, trying to show how a mix of external and domestic factors affected the pace and the extent of transformations. The book also identifies critical junctures in such process: any push to change it is argued is mediated by the need to come to terms with the cumbersone weight of the past.

This volume presents three claims regarding the role of middle powers in the 21st Century: first, states aspiring to become or remain middle powers choose from three possible role: to be a global middle powers; to be a regional pivot; or to be a niche leader. Second, states seeking such roles need different mixes of hard and soft power sources. Third, more so than great or small powers, middle powers walk a thin line between the domestic and systemic pressures they face. In this volume, these claims are based on (comparative) case studies of Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey.

This volume presents three claims regarding the role of middle powers in the 21st Century: first, states aspiring to become or remain middle powers choose from three possible role: to be a global middle powers; to be a regional pivot; or to be a niche leader. Second, states seeking such roles need different mixes of hard and soft power sources. Third, more so than great or small powers, middle powers walk a thin line between the domestic and systemic pressures they face. In this volume, these claims are based on (comparative) case studies of Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey.