When groups feature in political philosophy, it is usually in one of three contexts: the redressing of past or current injustices suffered by ethnic or cultural minorities; the nature and scope of group rights; and questions around how institutions are supposed to treat a certain specific identity/cultural/ethnic group. What is missing from these debates is a comprehensive analysis of groups as both agents and objects of social policies. While this has been subject to much scrutiny by sociologists and social psychologists, it has received less attention from a normative and philosophical point of view. This volume asks: what problems are posed to political philosophy by a collection of individuals who act or are treated in a collective way? Focusing not only on ways in which institutions should treat groups, but also on the normative implications of considering groups as possible social agents, when acting either in vertical relations with the state or in horizontal relations with other groups (or individuals), this book explores these issues from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Contributors address both the nature of political and social philosophy itself, and the ways in which specific issues - affirmative action, race, religion and places of worship, the rights of states - have become political and social priorities.

When groups feature in political philosophy, it is usually in one of three contexts: the redressing of past or current injustices suffered by ethnic or cultural minorities; the nature and scope of group rights; and questions around how institutions are supposed to treat a certain specific identity/cultural/ethnic group. What is missing from these debates is a comprehensive analysis of groups as both agents and objects of social policies. While this has been subject to much scrutiny by sociologists and social psychologists, it has received less attention from a normative and philosophical point of view. This volume asks: what problems are posed to political philosophy by a collection of individuals who act or are treated in a collective way? Focusing not only on ways in which institutions should treat groups, but also on the normative implications of considering groups as possible social agents, when acting either in vertical relations with the state or in horizontal relations with other groups (or individuals), this book explores these issues from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Contributors address both the nature of political and social philosophy itself, and the ways in which specific issues - affirmative action, race, religion and places of worship, the rights of states - have become political and social priorities.

This book explores the problem of disagreement concerning the treatment of animals in a liberal society. Current laws include an unprecedented concern for animal welfare, yet disagreement remains pervasive. This issue has so far been neglected both in political philosophy and animal ethics. Although starting from disagreement has been the hallmark of many politically liberal theories, none have been devoted to the treatment of animals, and conversely, most theories in animal ethics do not take the disagreement on this issue seriously. Bridging this divide with a change of perspective, Zuolo argues that we should begin from the disagreement on the moral status of animals and the treatment we owe them. Reconstructing the epistemic nature of disagreement about animals, Zuolo proposes a novel form of public justification to find principles acceptable to all. By setting out a unified framework which honours the liberal principles of respect for diversity, a robust liberal political theory capable of dealing with diverse forms of disagreement, and even some forms of radical dissent, is achieved.

This book explores the problem of disagreement concerning the treatment of animals in a liberal society. Current laws include an unprecedented concern for animal welfare, yet disagreement remains pervasive. This issue has so far been neglected both in political philosophy and animal ethics. Although starting from disagreement has been the hallmark of many politically liberal theories, none have been devoted to the treatment of animals, and conversely, most theories in animal ethics do not take the disagreement on this issue seriously. Bridging this divide with a change of perspective, Zuolo argues that we should begin from the disagreement on the moral status of animals and the treatment we owe them. Reconstructing the epistemic nature of disagreement about animals, Zuolo proposes a novel form of public justification to find principles acceptable to all. By setting out a unified framework which honours the liberal principles of respect for diversity, a robust liberal political theory capable of dealing with diverse forms of disagreement, and even some forms of radical dissent, is achieved.