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This is the autobiography of Abdul Salam Zaeef, a senior former
member of the Taliban. His memoirs, translated from Pashto, are
more than just a personal account of his extraordinary life. My
Life with the Taliban offers a counter-narrative to the standard
accounts of Afghanistan since 1979. Zaeef describes growing up in
rural poverty in Kandahar province. Both of his parents died at an
early age, and the Russian invasion of 1979 forced him to flee to
Pakistan. He started fighting the jihad in 1983, during which time
he was associated with many major figures in the anti-Soviet
resistance, including the current Taliban head Mullah Mohammad
Omar. After the war Zaeef returned to a quiet life in a small
village in Kandahar, but chaos soon overwhelmed Afghanistan as
factional fighting erupted after the Russians pulled out. Disgusted
by the lawlessness that ensued, Zaeef was one among the former
mujahidin who were closely involved in the discussions that led to
the emergence of the Taliban, in 1994. Zaeef then details his
Taliban career as civil servant and minister who negotiated with
foreign oil companies as well as with Afghanistan's own resistance
leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. Zaeef was ambassador to Pakistan at the
time of the 9/11 attacks, and his account discusses the strange
"phoney war" period before the US-led intervention toppled the
Taliban. In early 2002 Zaeef was handed over to American forces in
Pakistan, notwithstanding his diplomatic status, and spent four and
a half years in prison (including several years in Guantanamo)
before being released without having been tried or charged with any
offence. My Life with the Taliban offers a personal and privileged
insight into the rural Pashtun village communities that are the
Taliban's bedrock. It helps to explain what drives men like Zaeef
to take up arms against the foreigners who are foolish enough to
invade his homeland.
The Taliban are synonymous with the war in Afghanistan. Doughty,
uncompromising fighters, they plant IEDs, deploy suicide bombers
and wage guerrilla warfare. While much has been written about their
military tactics, media strategy and harsh treatment of women, the
cultural and sometimes less overtly political representation of
their identity, the Taliban's other face, is often overlooked. Most
Taliban fighters are Pashtuns, a people who cherish their vibrant
poetic tradition, closely associated with that of song. The poems
in this collection are meant to be recited and sung; and this is
the manner in which they are enjoyed by the wider Pashtun public
today. From audiotapes traded in secret in the bazaars of Kandahar,
to mp3s exchanged via bluetooth in Kabul, to video files downloaded
in Dubai and London, Taliban poetry has an appeal that transcends
the insurgency. For the Taliban today, these poems, or ghazals,
have a resonance back to the 1980s war against the Soviets, when
similar rhetorical styles, poetic formulae and tricks with metre
inspired mujahideen combatants and non-combatants alike. The poetry
presented here includes 'classics' of the genre from the 1980s and
1990s as well as a selection from the odes and ghazals of today's
conflict . Veering from nationalist paeans to dirges replete with
religious symbolism, the poems are organised under four headings -
- War, Pastoral, Religious and Love - - and cover many themes and
styles. The political is intertwined with the aesthetic, the
celebratory cry is never far from the funeral dirge and praise of
martyrs lost. Two prefatory essays introduce the cultural and
historical context of the poetry. The editors discuss its
importance to the Pashtuns and highlight how poetic themes
correspond to the past thirty years of war in Afghanistan. Faisal
Devji comments on what the poetry reveals of the Taliban's
emotional and ethical hinterland.
There is a widespread belief that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are in
many respects synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are
closely intertwined and that they have made common cause against
the West for decades. Such opinions have been stridently supported
by politicians, media pundits and senior military figures, yet they
have hardly ever been scrutinised. This is all the more surprising
given that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is
commonly predicated on the need to defeat the Taliban in order to
forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. The relationship
between the two groups and the individuals who established them is
undeniably complex, and has remained so for many years. Links
between the Taliban and al-Qaeda were retained in the face of a
shared enemy following the invasion of Afghanistan after the
September 11 attacks, an adversary that was selected by al-Qaeda
rather than by the Taliban, and which led the latter to become
entangled in a war that was not of its choosing. This book is the
first to examine in detail the relationship from the Taliban's
perspective based on Arabic, Dari and Pashtu sources, drawing on
the authors' many years experience in southern Afghanistan, the
Taliban's heartland. They also interviewed Taliban decision-makers,
field commanders and ordinary fighters while immersing themselves
in Kandahar's society. Van Linschoten and Kuehn's forensic
examination of the evolution of the two groups allows the
background and historical context that informed their respective
ideologies to come to the fore. The story of those individuals who
were to become their key decision-makers, and the relationships
among all those involved, from the mid-1990s onwards, reveal how
complex the interactions were between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and
how they frequently diverged rather than converged. An Enemy We
Created concludes that there is room to engage the Taliban on the
issues of renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing that Afghanistan
will deny sanctuary to international terrorists. Yet the insurgency
is changing, and it could soon be too late to find a political
solution. The authors contend that certain aspects of the campaign,
especially night raids and attempts to fragment and decapitate the
Taliban, are transforming the resistance, creating more
opportunities for al-Qaeda and helping it to attain its goals.
To this day, the belief is widespread that the Taliban and al-Qaeda
are synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are closely
intertwined, and that they have made common cause against the West
for decades.
In An Enemy We Created, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn
debunk this myth and reveal the much more complex reality that lies
beneath it. Drawing upon their unprecedented fieldwork in
Afghanistan, as well as their Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu skills, the
authors show that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is
predicated on the false assumption that defeating the Taliban will
forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. While immersing
themselves in Kandahar society, the authors interviewed Taliban
decision-makers, field commanders, and ordinary fighters,
thoroughly exploring the complexity of the relationship between the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and the individuals who established both
groups. They show that from the mid-1990s onward, the Taliban and
al-Qaeda diverged far more often than they converged. They also
argue that this split creates an opportunity to engage the Taliban
on two fundamental issues: renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing
that Afghanistan will not be a sanctuary for international
terrorists. Yet the insurgency is changing, and it could soon be
too late to find a political solution. The authors contend that
certain aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan, especially night
raids, the killings of innocent civilians, and attempts to fragment
and decapitate the Taliban are having the unintended consequence of
energizing the resistance, creating more opportunities for
al-Qaeda, and helping it to attain its objectives.
The first book to fully untangle the myths from the realities in
the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, An Enemy We
Created is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand
what's really happening in Afghanistan.
To this day, the belief is widespread that the Taliban and al-Qaeda
are synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are closely
intertwined, and that they have made common cause against the West
for decades.
In An Enemy We Created, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn
debunk this myth and reveal the much more complex reality that lies
beneath it. Drawing upon their unprecedented fieldwork in
Afghanistan, as well as their Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu skills, the
authors show that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is
predicated on the false assumption that defeating the Taliban will
forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. While immersing
themselves in Kandahar society, the authors interviewed Taliban
decision-makers, field commanders, and ordinary fighters,
thoroughly exploring the complexity of the relationship between the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and the individuals who established both
groups. They show that from the mid-1990s onward, the Taliban and
al-Qaeda diverged far more often than they converged. They also
argue that this split creates an opportunity to engage the Taliban
on two fundamental issues: renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing
that Afghanistan will not be a sanctuary for international
terrorists. Yet the insurgency is changing, and it could soon be
too late to find a political solution. The authors contend that
certain aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan, especially night
raids, the killings of innocent civilians, and attempts to fragment
and decapitate the Taliban are having the unintended consequence of
energizing the resistance, creating more opportunities for
al-Qaeda, and helping it to attain its objectives.
The first book to fully untangle the myths from the realities in
the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, An Enemy We
Created is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand
what's really happening in Afghanistan.
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