When can a group legitimately form its own state? Under international law, some groups can but others cannot. But the standard is unclear, and traditional legal analysis has failed to elucidate it. In The Theory of Self-Determination, leading scholars chart new territory in our theoretical conception of self-determination. Drawing from diverse scholarship in international law, philosophy, and political science, they attempt to move beyond the prevailing nationalist conceptions of group definition. At issue are such universal questions as: when does a group qualify as a 'people'? Does history matter? Or is it a question of ethnic status? Are these matters properly solved by popular vote? Anchored in modern analytical political philosophy but with implications for a wide range of scholarship, this volume will prove essential for scholars and practitioners of international law, global justice, and international relations.

The current global-justice literature starts from the premise that world poverty is the result of structural injustice mostly attributable to past and present actions of governments and citizens of rich countries. As a result, that literature recommends vast coercive transfers of wealth from rich to poor societies, alongside stronger national and international governance. Justice at a Distance, in contrast, argues that global injustice is largely home-grown and that these native restrictions to freedom lie at the root of poverty and stagnation. The book is the first philosophical work to emphasize free markets in goods, services, and labor as an ethical imperative that allows people to pursue their projects and as the one institutional arrangement capable of alleviating poverty. Supported by a robust economic literature, Justice at a Distance applies the principle of noninterference to the issues of wealth and poverty, immigration, trade, the status of nation-states, war, and aid.

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy (let alone repressive or non-democratic societies) cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets.

The current global-justice literature starts from the premise that world poverty is the result of structural injustice mostly attributable to past and present actions of governments and citizens of rich countries. As a result, that literature recommends vast coercive transfers of wealth from rich to poor societies, alongside stronger national and international governance. Justice at a Distance, in contrast, argues that global injustice is largely home-grown and that these native restrictions to freedom lie at the root of poverty and stagnation. The book is the first philosophical work to emphasize free markets in goods, services, and labor as an ethical imperative that allows people to pursue their projects and as the one institutional arrangement capable of alleviating poverty. Supported by a robust economic literature, Justice at a Distance applies the principle of noninterference to the issues of wealth and poverty, immigration, trade, the status of nation-states, war, and aid.

When can a group legitimately form its own state? Under international law, some groups can but others cannot. But the standard is unclear, and traditional legal analysis has failed to elucidate it. In The Theory of Self-Determination, leading scholars chart new territory in our theoretical conception of self-determination. Drawing from diverse scholarship in international law, philosophy, and political science, they attempt to move beyond the prevailing nationalist conceptions of group definition. At issue are such universal questions as: when does a group qualify as a 'people'? Does history matter? Or is it a question of ethnic status? Are these matters properly solved by popular vote? Anchored in modern analytical political philosophy but with implications for a wide range of scholarship, this volume will prove essential for scholars and practitioners of international law, global justice, and international relations.

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy (let alone repressive or non-democratic societies) cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets.