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This book offers a clear, analytic, and innovative interpretation
of Heidegger's late work. This period of Heidegger's philosophy
remains largely unexplored by analytic philosophers, who consider
it filled with inconsistencies and paradoxical ideas, particularly
concerning the notions of Being and nothingness. This book takes
seriously the claim that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism -
namely the position according to which some contradictions are true
- and shows that the idea that Being is both an entity and not an
entity is neither incoherent nor logically trivial. The author
achieves this by presenting and defending the idea that reality has
an inconsistent structure. In doing so, he takes one of the most
discussed topics in current analytic metaphysics, grounding theory,
into a completely unexplored area. Additionally, in order to make
sense of Heidegger's concept of nothingness, the author introduces
an original axiomatic mereological system that, having a
paraconsistent logic as a base logic, can tolerate inconsistencies
without falling into logical triviality. This is the first book to
set forth a complete and detailed discussion of the late Heidegger
in the framework of analytic metaphysics. It will be of interest to
Heidegger scholars and analytic philosophers working on theories of
grounding, mereology, dialetheism, and paraconsistent logic.
This book offers a clear, analytic, and innovative interpretation
of Heidegger’s late work. This period of Heidegger’s philosophy
remains largely unexplored by analytic philosophers, who consider
it filled with inconsistencies and paradoxical ideas, particularly
concerning the notions of Being and nothingness. This book takes
seriously the claim that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism
– namely the position according to which some contradictions are
true – and shows that the idea that Being is both an entity and
not an entity is neither incoherent nor logically trivial. The
author achieves this by presenting and defending the idea that
reality has an inconsistent structure. In doing so, he takes one of
the most discussed topics in current analytic metaphysics,
grounding theory, into a completely unexplored area. Additionally,
in order to make sense of Heidegger’s concept of nothingness, the
author introduces an original axiomatic mereological system that,
having a paraconsistent logic as a base logic, can tolerate
inconsistencies without falling into logical triviality. This is
the first book to set forth a complete and detailed discussion of
the late Heidegger in the framework of analytic metaphysics. It
will be of interest to Heidegger scholars and analytic philosophers
working on theories of grounding, mereology, dialetheism, and
paraconsistent logic.
This third volume continues Richard Routley's explorations of an
improved Meinongian account of non-referring and intensional
discourse (including joint work with Val Routley, later Val
Plumwood). It focuses on the essays 8 to 12 of the original
monograph, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, following on from
the material of the first two volumes and further explores aspects
and implications of the Noneist position. It begins with a
discussion of the value of nonexistent objects championed by
noneism, especially as regards theories of perception, universals,
value theory and a commonsense account of belief. It continues
with: a detailed analysis of what it means to exist; the importance
of nonexistent objects to adequate accounts of mathematics and the
theoretical sciences; and an account of noneisms' distinctiveness
from other accounts of nonexistent objects. These essays are
supplemented with scholarly essays from Naoya Fujikawa, and Maureen
Eckert and Charlie Donahue.
Does adherence to the principles of logic commit us to a particular
way of viewing the world? Or are there ways of being - ways of
behaving in the world, including ways of thinking, feeling, and
speaking - that ground the normative constraints that logic
imposes? Does the fact that assertions, the traditional elements of
logic, are typically made about beings present a problem for
metaphysical (or post-metaphysical) prospects of making assertions
meaningfully about being? Does thinking about being (as opposed to
beings) accordingly require revising or restricting logic's reach -
and, if so, how is this possible? Or is there something precious
about the very idea of thinking the limits of thinking?
Contemporary scholars have become increasing sensitive to how
Heidegger, much like Wittgenstein, instructively poses such
questions. Heidegger on Logic is a collection of new essays by
leading scholars who critically ponder the efficacy of his
responses to them.
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