This book introduces and develops Contract Governance as a new approach to contract theory. While the concept of governance has already been developed in Williamson's seminal article, it has, ironically, not received much attention in general contract law theory. Indeed, Contract Governance appears to be an important and necessary complement to corporate governance and in fact, as the second, equally important pillar of governance research in the core of private law. With this in mind, Grundmann, Moeslein, and Riesenhuber provide a novel approach in setting an international and interdisciplinary research agenda for developing contract law scholarship. Contract Governance focuses particularly on the ways in which a governance perspective leads to research questions that have been neglected in traditional contract law scholarship, and how, from a governance perspective, the questions are dealt with in a different manner and style. Combining substantive chapters and commentaries, this collection of essays addresses an array of topics, including: third party impact and contract governance problems in herd behaviour; governance of networks of contracts; governance in long-term contractual relationships; contract governance and rule setting; and contract governance and political dimensions.

The current financial crisis is preoccupying business and politics like no prior crisis. The economic effects are being felt on global, European, and national levels and are forcing governments to take extreme counter-measures. The long-term goal is not merely stabilization but rather to stabilize the financial system. System stability requires a regulatory framework that can comprehensively prevent possible future crises. For the first time at a conference held at the Humboldt-University in Berlin, leading experts from the legal and economic academic fields discussed the common effects and impact of the financial crisis on the (future) economic system.

The search forthe limits of entrepreneurial powerinvolves an age-old core question of stock corporation law and at the same time a modern central subject in the corporate governance discussion. In general, the limits of entrepreneurial power to direct in open-market associations can only be determined logically in the interplay of rules governing stock corporations and takeovers and function mechanisms. The special feature of the present work is found in the interlinking examination of market and organization law.