Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using "Maoist Warfare" has been a common phenomenon since Mao's victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao's writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies.

The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy examines a comprehensive range of counterterrorism policies, strategies, and practices across dozens of states and actors around the world. It covers the topics of terrorism and counterterrorism both thematically and by region, allowing for discussions about the underpinning dynamics of these fields, consideration of how terrorism and counterterrorism are evolving in the modern period, and in-depth analyses of individual states and non-state actors, and their approaches to countering terrorism and terrorist threats. It draws upon a multidisciplinary range of established scholars and upcoming new researchers from across multiple fields including political science and international relations, sociology, and history, examining both theory and practice in their respective chapters. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and practitioners alike.

This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of US warfare, including its military practices and the domestic and global challenges it faces. The need to undertake a comprehensive analysis about the future of warfare for the US is more pressing today than ever before. New technologies and adversaries, both old and new, have the potential to revolutionize how wars are fought, and it is imperative that policy makers, military planners, and scholars engage with the latest analyses regarding these new threats and weapon systems. The primary aim of this book is to provide a clear and comprehensive depiction of the types of conflict that the United States is likely to become involved with in the future, as well as the methods of warfare that it may employ within these struggles. While a number of scholarly books have previously considered some of the potential features of US warfare in the future, many of these writings are either outdated or have limited their focus to just one or two of the main types of warfare that may occur and omitted consideration of the others. This book intends to remedy this deficiency in the literature. The volume consists of thematic chapters which address the key issues relevant to the future of US warfare, including cyber warfare, asymmetric conflicts, drone warfare, and nuclear strategy. Through the provision of a series of analyses by leading international academics, the volume provides an important interdisciplinary examination of the different areas of warfare that the United States is expected to use or encounter in the future. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, military studies, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of US warfare, including its military practices and the domestic and global challenges it faces. The need to undertake a comprehensive analysis about the future of warfare for the US is more pressing today than ever before. New technologies and adversaries, both old and new, have the potential to revolutionize how wars are fought, and it is imperative that policy makers, military planners, and scholars engage with the latest analyses regarding these new threats and weapon systems. The primary aim of this book is to provide a clear and comprehensive depiction of the types of conflict that the United States is likely to become involved with in the future, as well as the methods of warfare that it may employ within these struggles. While a number of scholarly books have previously considered some of the potential features of US warfare in the future, many of these writings are either outdated or have limited their focus to just one or two of the main types of warfare that may occur and omitted consideration of the others. This book intends to remedy this deficiency in the literature. The volume consists of thematic chapters which address the key issues relevant to the future of US warfare, including cyber warfare, asymmetric conflicts, drone warfare, and nuclear strategy. Through the provision of a series of analyses by leading international academics, the volume provides an important interdisciplinary examination of the different areas of warfare that the United States is expected to use or encounter in the future. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, military studies, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using "Maoist Warfare" has been a common phenomenon since Mao's victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao's writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies.