Taking the example of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima as a case in point, Francis Winters analyzes the ethics of warfare, demonstrating how the examples of World War II hold relevance to the contemporary world. The volume examines the ethics of Japan's refusal to surrender and seeks to balance the verdict of responsibility for Hiroshima by extending the analysis to the ethics of the end of the war. It also illustrates how two displays of American naval and munitions power had an impact on Japan comparable to the September 11, 2001 assaults on America. Linking his study with two contemporary films on Iwo Jima, the author illustrates how the 1940s were an era of costly triumph that can still inspire national pride in American citizens. Unique in concept and approach, this volume will have relevance to scholars interested in both historical and contemporary politics, US-Japan relations as well as foreign policy and the ethics of warfare.

Taking the example of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima as a case in point, Francis Winters analyzes the ethics of warfare, demonstrating how the examples of World War II hold relevance to the contemporary world. The volume examines the ethics of Japan's refusal to surrender and seeks to balance the verdict of responsibility for Hiroshima by extending the analysis to the ethics of the end of the war. It also illustrates how two displays of American naval and munitions power had an impact on Japan comparable to the September 11, 2001 assaults on America. Linking his study with two contemporary films on Iwo Jima, the author illustrates how the 1940s were an era of costly triumph that can still inspire national pride in American citizens. Unique in concept and approach, this volume will have relevance to scholars interested in both historical and contemporary politics, US-Japan relations as well as foreign policy and the ethics of warfare.

When the United States government engineered the overthrow of the troublesome South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, it set in motion a tumultuous course of events deepening the Vietnam War. The Year of the Hare asks why President John E Kennedy decided to depose his ally of nine years, despite almost daily warnings from some cabinet officials that the most likely consequence of a coup would be chaos.

Why did Kennedy and his colleagues choose this perilous course in the midst of an uncertain civil war? To answer this question, The Year of the Hare takes us inside the Kennedy administration, where the State Department largely supported the coup while the Pentagon and the CIA consistently resisted it. Francis X. Winters's research is based on in-depth interviews with high-ranking members of the Kennedy administration, including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and George Ball, along with the newly issued multivolume compilation Foreign Relations and the United States, 1961-1964, Vietnam and the recently opened General Records of the U.S. State Department for 1963.

The reasons for American support of the coup in Vietnam, Winters asserts, lie both in the ethos of the era, with its dynamic confidence in the superiority of American ideals, and in Kennedy's political aspirations. The Year of the Hare explores the synergy between the idealism and personal ambition that were at the root of our troubled memories of the war that haunts us still.