The main intention of this book is to bring together contributions from biology, cognitive science, and the humanities for a joint exploration of some of the main contemporary notions dealing with the understanding of origins in life, mind and society. The question of origin is inseparable from a web of hypotheses that both shape and explain us. Although origin invites examination, it always seems to elude our grasp. Notions have always been produced to interpret the genesis of life, mind, and the social order, and these notions have all remained unstable in the face of theoretical and empirical challenges. In any given period, the central ideas on origin have had a mutual resonance frequently overlooked by specialists engaged in theirown particular fields. As a consequence, this book should be of interest to a wide audi ence. In particular, for all those engaged in the social sciences and the philosophy of science, it is unique document, since bridges to the natural sciences in a mutually illuminating way are hard to find. Whether as a primary source or as inspirational reading, we feel this book has a place in every library. The material comes from an international meeting held in September 13-16, 1987 at Stanford University, organized by F. Varela and J.-P. Dupuy at the request of the Program of Interdisciplinary Research of Stanford University. We are grateful to Rene Girard, the Program Director, for making it possible with the help of the Mellon Foundation."

How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science: first, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization; second, creating an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject, or a soul.
In earlier modes of cognitive science, cognition was conceptualized according to a model of representation and abstract reasoning. In the realm of ethics, this corresponded to the philosophical tenet that to do what is ethical is to do what corresponds to an abstract set of rules. By contrast to this computationalism, the author places central emphasis on what he terms "enaction"--cognition as the ability to negotiate embodied, everyday living in a world that is inseparable from our sensory-motor capacities.
Apart from his researches in cognitive science, the bodies of thought that enable Varela to make this link are phenomenology and two representatives of what he calls the "wisdom traditions": Confucian ethics and Buddhist epistemology. From the Confucian tradition, he draws upon the "Mencius" to propose an ethics of praxis, one in which ethical action is conceived as a project of being rather than as a system of judgment, less a matter of rules that are universally applicable than a goal of expertise, sagehood.
The Buddhist contribution to his project encompasses "the embodiment of the void" and the "pragmatics of a virtual self." How does a belief system that does not posit a unitary self or subject conceive the living of an "I"? In summation, the author proposes an ethics founded on "savoir faire" that is a practice of transformation based on a constant recognition of the "virtual" nature of ourselves in the actual operations of our mental lives.

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition--with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses.
The book's primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl's writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology.
Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description.
This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.

The main intention of this book is to bring together contributions from biology, cognitive science, and the humanities for a joint exploration of some of the main contemporary notions dealing with the understanding of origins in life, mind and society. The question of origin is inseparable from a web of hypotheses that both shape and explain us. Although origin invites examination, it always seems to elude our grasp. Notions have always been produced to interpret the genesis of life, mind, and the social order, and these notions have all remained unstable in the face of theoretical and empirical challenges. In any given period, the central ideas on origin have had a mutual resonance frequently overlooked by specialists engaged in theirown particular fields. As a consequence, this book should be of interest to a wide audi ence. In particular, for all those engaged in the social sciences and the philosophy of science, it is unique document, since bridges to the natural sciences in a mutually illuminating way are hard to find. Whether as a primary source or as inspirational reading, we feel this book has a place in every library. The material comes from an international meeting held in September 13-16, 1987 at Stanford University, organized by F. Varela and J.-P. Dupuy at the request of the Program of Interdisciplinary Research of Stanford University. We are grateful to Rene Girard, the Program Director, for making it possible with the help of the Mellon Foundation."

A new edition of a classic work that originated the "embodied cognition" movement and was one of the first to link science and Buddhist practices. This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the "embodied cognition" approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science-claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, The Embodied Mind introduced a new form of cognitive science called "enaction," in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book's arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience. This revised edition includes substantive introductions by Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by Jon Kabat-Zinn, the originator of the mindfulness-based stress reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work.

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition--with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses.
The book's primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl's writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology.
Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description.
This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.

The study of conscious experience per se has not kept pace with the dramatic advances in PET, fMRI and other brain-scanning technologies. If anything, the standard approaches to examining the 'view from within' involve little more than cataloguing its readily accessible components. Thus the study of lived subjective experience is still at the level of Aristotelian science, leading to a widespread scepticism over the possibility of a truly scientific study of conscious experience.

Drawing on a wide range of approaches -- from phenomenology to meditation -- The View From Within examines the possibility of a disciplined approach to the study of subjective states. The focus is on the practical issues involved.

With the help of illustrations and examples from biology, linguistics and social and cultural phenomena, this book shows that the process of learning is not a means of knowing an absolute world of facts, but is rather an active process which itself creates the world of human experiences. To convey this, the authors examine cognition in all its facets, exploring topics such as the nature of scientific exploration, the organization of living things, evolution, language and the emergence of self-awareness. The authors maintain that the nature of cognition has important social and ethical consequences, for the only world that we humans can have is one that we bring forth together the action of our coexistence. Written for a general audience, this book invites readers to let go of their preconceptions and gain fresh insights into what it means to be human.

Artificial life embodies a recent and important conceptual step in modem science: asserting that the core of intelligence and cognitive abilities is the same as the capacity for living. The recent surge of interest in artificial life has pushed a whole range of engineering traditions, such as control theory and robotics, beyond classical notions of goal and planning into biologically inspired notions of viability and adaptation, situatedness and operational closure.These proceedings serve two important functions: they address bottom-up theories of artificial intelligence and explore what can be learned from simple models such as insects about the cognitive processes and characteristic autonomy of living organisms, while also engaging researchers and philosophers in an exciting examination of the epistemological basis of this new trend.Francisco J. Varela is Director of Research at CNRS in Paris, France. Paul Bourgine is Professor of Artificial Intelligence at CEMAGREF, Antony, France.Topics include: Artificial Animals. Genetic Algorithms. Autonomous Systems. Emergent Behaviors. Artificial Ecologies. Immunologic Algorithms. Self-Adapting Systems. Emergent Structures. Emotion And Motivation. Neural Networks. Coevolution. Fitness Landscapes Contributors include: H. Bersini. Domenico Parisi. Rodney A. Brooks. Christopher G. Langton. S. Kauffman. J.-L. Denenbourg. Pattie Maes. John Holland. T. Smithers. H. Swefel. H. Muhlenbein.

This book is based on a week-long series of daily meetings between Western scientists and His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, who was awarded the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. The discussions took place in the meeting room of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, India, in the relaxed atmosphere of a living room conversation. Topics ranged widely over mind and brain, the self, perception, memory, evolution, artificial intelligence, and the sources of knowledge in science and Buddhism. The various themes have been woven into clear and accessible presentations and dialogues that convey the lively flavor of the original meetings.