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The authors argue that the rules and practices of corporate law
mimic contractual provisions that parties involved in corporate
enterprise would reach if they bargained about every contingency at
zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining
and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides the rules
and an enforcement mechanism that govern relations among those who
commit their capital to such ventures. The authors work out the
reasons for supposing that this is the exclusive function of
corporate law and the implications of this perspective.
The authors have developed a natural order for students to
understand the antitrust field based upon a division of the
practices challenged into two groups. One group of competing firms
eliminate competition purely among themselves. The second group of
firms seek to exclude actual or potential competitors. In selecting
and editing cases, the authors have preserved a sense of the
historical development and jurisprudential character of antitrust
law. In citing lower-court cases and secondary materials, the
authors have selected only material that casts significant
illumination on the subject.
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