This book seeks to bridge the gap between academic, political and military thinking concerning the success and failure of peacekeeping operations and their termination. Exit strategies have recently gained attention in political, military, academic and public debates, due to the Western engagement in international and intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Yet, many of those debates took place separately. This volume, which is predominantly a joint product of academics and the military of the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy, shows new venues by bridging the putative political-military divide. Drawing on theory, empirics, and personal experiences the authors address exits at political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of current and past military missions and interventions, ranging from decolonisation wars to Afghanistan and Iraq. Although some of those conflicts are still ongoing, valid inferences can be drawn. An important one is that exit forms a problem for those who leave and for those who stay. While political and military objectives might not have been reached and many of those involved have the feeling that the job is still not yet done, the termination of the entire mission or transitions at operational level necessitate both departures and handovers-takeovers and are thereby characterised by discontinuities and continuities at the same time. It is these dynamics between unfulfilled end states and end dates that, in the end, lead to the dilemma of leaving. All the editors, except van den Wollenberg, are affiliated with the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda, the Netherlands. Joerg Noll is Associate Professor of International Conflict Studies. First Lieutenant Air-Commodore Frans Osinga is Professor of Military Operational Art and Sciences. Georg Frerks is Professor International Security Studies and Irene van Kemenade runs the Research Office of the Faculty. Daan van den Wollenberg is Commander of a mechanized artillery platoon of the Netherlands armed forces.

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today's strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today's world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.

When NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan in 2003, ISAF conceptualized its mission largely as a stabilization and reconstruction deployment. However, as the campaign has evolved and the insurgency has proved to more resistant and capable, key operational imperatives have emerged, including military support to the civilian development effort, closer partnering with Afghan security forces, and greater military restraint. All participating militaries have adapted, to varying extents, to these campaign imperatives and pressures.
This book analyzes these initiatives and their outcomes by focusing on the experiences of three groups of militaries: those of Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US, which have faced the most intense operational and strategic pressures; Germany, who's troops have faced the greatest political and cultural constraints; and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Taliban, who have been forced to adapt to a very different sets of circumstances.

When NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan in 2003, ISAF conceptualized its mission largely as a stabilization and reconstruction deployment. However, as the campaign has evolved and the insurgency has proved to more resistant and capable, key operational imperatives have emerged, including military support to the civilian development effort, closer partnering with Afghan security forces, and greater military restraint. All participating militaries have adapted, to varying extents, to these campaign imperatives and pressures.
This book analyzes these initiatives and their outcomes by focusing on the experiences of three groups of militaries: those of Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US, which have faced the most intense operational and strategic pressures; Germany, who's troops have faced the greatest political and cultural constraints; and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Taliban, who have been forced to adapt to a very different sets of circumstances.