Oswald argues that European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior. As U.S. leaders indicate a willingness to disengage from their former European protectorate, the Europeanization of Europe's own security needs-their ability to take care of their own crises-will proceed apace. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognizes Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management. At the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the postcommunist transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, the U.S.-led NATO alliance found itself without its erstwhile primary enemy. While NATO found new purpose as guarantor of stability for an increasing membership and crisis manager in Southeast Europe, the alliance's expansion also advanced its transformation from a collective defense organization into a security community. While NATO was redefining itself, the European Union created the institutional and political prerequisites for a European security and defense policy. In his analysis of Europe's emancipation from security dependence on the United States, Oswald expects the economic strength of the European bloc to translate into responsibility for regional security. Yet this is not to say that the EU is emerging as the primary challenger to U.S. hegemony. Instead, Oswald argues, European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior. As U.S. leaders indicate a willingness to disengage from their former European protectorate, the Europeanization of Europe's own security needs-their ability to take care of their own crises-will proceed apace. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognizes Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management.

The Party of Democratic Socialism is wrongly stigmatized as polarizing German politics on the left. In fact, Oswald argues, the PDS is East Germany's contribution to the regionalized pluralism of united Germany's party system. Although initially marginalized as the successor of East Germany's SED, the PDS legitimized itself by combining eastern regionalism, a left-socialist identity, and political ambition. The PDS has become an acceptable partner in center-left parties in eastern state governments, in stark contrast to its continuing irrelevance in West Germany. While its earlier exclusion was justified by portraying the PDS as crypto-communist, the integration strategies of the late 1990s were supported by modernization theorists recognizing the party's contribution to the integration of post-unification Germany.

An executive summary of the first decade of post-unification German politics, Oswald's book offers a precise interpretation of the learning processes within the PDS. It also provides a close analysis of the disputes within the PDS characterizing the party as a political subculture in which East Germans could come to terms with the ruptures of their history and their biographies while at the same time finding a role in the politics and society of united Germany.