This book analyses Germany's role in the euro crisis. Based on the perception of Berlin as the emerging capital of the European Union, the author investigates three interrelated issues: Did the German policy approach of imposing austerity programs on countries in the middle of a deep recession contribute to the successful management of the euro crisis? Does Germany extend its sway over its European partners by forcing them to surrender to the German diktat of fiscal Disziplin and economic efficiency? Is the stubborn insistence on rigid fiscal adjustment another ominous sign of the Berlin Republic moving away from the country's traditional European vocation toward an imperial leadership role? The book's main argument is that Germany's role in and responses to the euro crisis can best be explained by different concepts of self, historical memory, and institutional practices.

This book analyses Germany's role in the euro crisis. Based on the perception of Berlin as the emerging capital of the European Union, the author investigates three interrelated issues: Did the German policy approach of imposing austerity programs on countries in the middle of a deep recession contribute to the successful management of the euro crisis? Does Germany extend its sway over its European partners by forcing them to surrender to the German diktat of fiscal Disziplin and economic efficiency? Is the stubborn insistence on rigid fiscal adjustment another ominous sign of the Berlin Republic moving away from the country's traditional European vocation toward an imperial leadership role? The book's main argument is that Germany's role in and responses to the euro crisis can best be explained by different concepts of self, historical memory, and institutional practices.

In der vorliegenden Analyse wird der Ist-Zustand der Bundeswehr unter der Fragestellung untersucht, ob die drei von der Verteidigungsministerin identifizierten "Leerstellen" bei Personal, Material und Finanzen im Hinblick auf die aktuellen Bedrohungen nachhaltig und substanziell beseitigt werden koennen. Im zweiten Teil wird uberpruft, wo und wie sich die deutsche Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik bei der Bewaltigung vielfaltiger Krisen und Konflikte in den letzten drei Jahren eingesetzt hat. Folgt sie der Forderung Gaucks, Steinmeiers und von der Leyens und ubernimmt mehr Verantwortung im internationalen Krisenmanagement mit Ruckgriff, wenn geboten, auf deutsche Streitkrafte? Spiegelt sich in einer aktiveren deutschen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik die Haltung der deutschen OEffentlichkeit wider?