The limitations of America's land forces remain a fundamental constraint on U.S. military strategy. The cutbacks of the Clinton years and the Bush administration's failure to foresee the need for larger ground forces in the wake of 9/11 have undercut America's ability to fight the Long War. Resolving the stark divergence between America's military ends and means in terms of force size, training, and modernization will be a crucial challenge for the next administration. In Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power, Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan pose five urgent questions for policymakers: What is the strategic role of American ground forces? What missions will these forces undertake in the future? What is the nature of land warfare in the twenty-first century? What qualities are necessary to succeed on the battlefields of the Long War? What is the ideal size and configuration of the force and how much will it cost? Answers to such questions are long overdue. The stresses of prolonged operations in the Middle East have strained the U.S. Army and Marine Corps; if the United States is to maintain its status as the sole superpower, American land power must be restructured to confront unprecedented challenges. Only a dedicated, bipartisan effort can create a ground force that is not only larger and more flexible, but retrained and reequipped. Donnelly and Kagan provide a plan of action for policymakers to begin that vital rebuilding.

An argument for a dramatically different approach to counterinsurgency, based on a reinterpretation of the nature of counterinsurgency warfare. According to the prevailing view of counterinsurgency, the key to defeating insurgents is selecting methods that will win the people's hearts and minds. The hearts-and-minds theory permeates not only most counterinsurgency books of the twenty-first century but the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the U.S. military's foremost text on counterinsurgency. Mark Moyar assails this conventional wisdom, asserting that the key to counterinsurgency is selecting commanders who have superior leadership abilities. Whereas the hearts-and-minds school recommends allocating much labor and treasure to economic, social, and political reforms, Moyar advocates concentrating resources on security, civil administration, and leadership development. Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency, from the Civil War and Reconstruction to Afghanistan and Iraq, that draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans, including top leaders in today's armed forces. Through a series of case studies, Moyar identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been much more prevalent in some organizations than others. He explains how the U.S. military and America's allies in Afghanistan and Iraq should revamp their personnel systems in order to elevate more individuals with those attributes. A Question of Command will reshape the study and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. With counterinsurgency now one of the most pressing issues facing the United States, this book is a must-read for policymakers, military officers, and citizens.