Iraq still hangs in the balance. The dramatic improvements in Iraqi security between 2007 and 2009 have produced important, but incomplete changes in the nation's politics. These changes make it possible to imagine Iraq slowly muddling upward, building gradually toward a better future. But we must be constantly on guard against the considerable potential for Iraq to slip into all-out civil war. There are dozens of scenarios --from military coups, to official misconduct, to the assassination of one or two key leaders -- that could spark such violence.

In "Unfinished Business," a team of five experts from across the political spectrum analyze the situation in Iraq. They present a well-reasoned and feasible path for U.S. policy toward Baghdad --one that would give priority to preventing Iraq from slipping into civil war or becoming an aggressive state but that would also lead to a clear American goal: a new, strong, and prosperous ally in the Middle East.

Ultimately, the United States must condition the continuation of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship on the willingness of Iraqi political leaders to guide their country in the direction of greater stability, inclusivity, and effective governance.

Leaders in War present unique first-person perspectives across the spectrum of American combat operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. From division commanders to platoon leaders, the authors deliver an insider's view of tough leadership challenges, tragic failures, and triumphant victories. Leaders in War captures the essence of the post-Cold War US Army: how an all-volunteer army, equipped with new weapons systems and adjusting to new battle doctrine, mounted one of history's most successful military campaigns. Described here are the details of the tremendous logistical challenges, innovations in intelligence, ground combat operations from platoon to division, and a wide range of combat support operations. Leaders in War focuses not just on the successes, but on the failures as well, in operations ranging from violent tank battles against the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard to train-and-fill operations thousands of miles away. Leaders in War illustrates how US Army leaders adapted to the psychological strains of combat, the fog of war, unforeseeable challenges, and the fury of tank warfare during the Persian Gulf War.

"Leaders in War" provides first-person perspectives across the spectrum of American combat operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. From division commanders to platoon leaders, the authors offer an insider's view of tough leadership challenges, tragic failures, and triumphant victories. "Leaders in War" captures the essence of the post-Cold War US Army: how an all-volunteer army, equipped with new weapons systems and adjusting to new battle doctrine, mounted one of history's most successful military campaigns. Described here are the details of the tremendous logistical challenges, innovations in intelligence, ground combat operations from platoon to division, and a wide range of combat support operations." Leaders in War" focuses not just on the successes, but on the failures as well, in operations ranging from violent tank battles against the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard to train-and-fill operations thousands of miles away. "Leaders in War "illustrates how US Army leaders adapted to the psychological strains of combat, the fog of war, unforeseeable challenges, and the fury of tank warfare during the Persian Gulf War.

Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China, and Iran is a five-essay volume, edited by the American Enterprise Institute’s Gary J. Schmitt, that examines the three rising powers as they challenge the US and the global order in three critical regions of the world. Essays by the American Enterprise Institute’s Frederick W. Kagan on Russia and Dan Blumenthal on China and by Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Senior Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht on Iran analyze the historical roots of each country’s ambitions, their strategic goals, and possible US policies for meeting the challenges and threats posed by each. Those essays are framed by an introduction by Gary Schmitt that places the tests facing the US foreign policy in a broader strategic framework and by a concluding essay by Hudson Institute Scholar Walter Russell Mead that looks to the Father of History, Thucydides, to provide insight into the complex set of domestic and foreign realities that shape American statecraft in this most challenging time.

Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China, and Iran is a five-essay volume, edited by the American Enterprise Institute’s Gary J. Schmitt, that examines the three rising powers as they challenge the US and the global order in three critical regions of the world. Essays by the American Enterprise Institute’s Frederick W. Kagan on Russia and Dan Blumenthal on China and by Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Senior Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht on Iran analyze the historical roots of each country’s ambitions, their strategic goals, and possible US policies for meeting the challenges and threats posed by each. Those essays are framed by an introduction by Gary Schmitt that places the tests facing the US foreign policy in a broader strategic framework and by a concluding essay by Hudson Institute Scholar Walter Russell Mead that looks to the Father of History, Thucydides, to provide insight into the complex set of domestic and foreign realities that shape American statecraft in this most challenging time.

As the guarantor of international security, the United States must commit to a long-term military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. But what are the tools necessary to succeed on the new battlefields of the Long War? In this volume, a group of the foremost U.S. military officials and national security experts analyze the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far in order to map a way forward not only for the military, but for diplomats, elected officials, and the American public. Thomas Donnelly, Frederick W. Kagan, and their coauthors offer several core lessons for success in The Long War. They argue that decentralizing command is the key to efficient operations on an ever-changing battlefield; that air power is the unsung hero of counterinsurgency warfare; that public opinion can influence crucial military decisions; and that the military should minimize its role in domestic affairs. Finally, although the battlefields have changed over the last fifty years, the authors contend that America's long-held counterinsurgency strategy to foster political support at home, employ diplomacy overseas, and extend military assistance to allies remains effective. The Long War will not soon be over. But, in the words of retired Army special forces officer Colonel Robert Killebrew, the United States already has "the tools it needs in order to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century."