Descartes made a sharp distinction between matter and mind. But he also thought that the two interact with one another. Is such interaction possible, however, without either a materialist reduction of mind to matter or an idealist (phenomenalist) reduction of matter to mind? These questions overshadow the Western tradition in metaphysics from the time of Descartes to present times. The book makes an effort to stay clear of reductivist views of the two Cartesian substances. It defends a dualistic psycho-physical parallel theory which reconciles freedom of action with determinism in nature. Basic problems in perception theory are also discussed, with special emphasis on hearing and sound. Because of the intrinsic interest of the subject and the author's non-technical presentation of it, the book should appeal to all readers with a serious interest in philosophy and psychology.

The Entretiens of the Institut International de Philosophie for 1978 were held in connection with the World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, from August 27 to September 1. The theme of the Entretiens was Logic and Philosophy (Logique et philosophie). The undersigned, then President of LI.P., was responsible for the planning of the programme. The programme was designed to consist of four sections with the headings Classical and Intuitionist Logic, Modal Logic and its Applications, Inductive Logic and its Applications, and Logic and Epistemology. The aim was also to convey to philosophers who are not experts in logic an informative and representative impression of some of the main sectors of the vast and rapidly expanding field of philosophical logic. At the same time it was thought that this impression should not be conveyed in the form of a series of survey papers but through presentations and discussions of specific topics falling under the main headings men tioned above. For each section a rapporteur was nominated to read a paper and an interlocuteur to comment on it. The programme chairman is grateful that he was able to engage a representative selection of front rank philosophi cal logicians to perform the various tasks. The papers and the comments are printed in this volume in the order in which they appeared in the Programme of the Entretiens."

The Entretiens of the Institut International de Philosophie for 1978 were held in connection with the World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, from August 27 to September 1. The theme of the Entretiens was Logic and Philosophy (Logique et philosophie). The undersigned, then President of LI.P., was responsible for the planning of the programme. The programme was designed to consist of four sections with the headings Classical and Intuitionist Logic, Modal Logic and its Applications, Inductive Logic and its Applications, and Logic and Epistemology. The aim was also to convey to philosophers who are not experts in logic an informative and representative impression of some of the main sectors of the vast and rapidly expanding field of philosophical logic. At the same time it was thought that this impression should not be conveyed in the form of a series of survey papers but through presentations and discussions of specific topics falling under the main headings men tioned above. For each section a rapporteur was nominated to read a paper and an interlocuteur to comment on it. The programme chairman is grateful that he was able to engage a representative selection of front rank philosophi cal logicians to perform the various tasks. The papers and the comments are printed in this volume in the order in which they appeared in the Programme of the Entretiens.

Descartes made a sharp distinction between matter and mind. But he also thought that the two interact with one another. Is such interaction possible, however, without either a materialist reduction of mind to matter or an idealist (phenomenalist) reduction of matter to mind? These questions overshadow the Western tradition in metaphysics from the time of Descartes to present times. The book makes an effort to stay clear of reductivist views of the two Cartesian substances. It defends a dualistic psycho-physical parallel theory which reconciles freedom of action with determinism in nature. Basic problems in perception theory are also discussed, with special emphasis on hearing and sound. Because of the intrinsic interest of the subject and the author's non-technical presentation of it, the book should appeal to all readers with a serious interest in philosophy and psychology.

The present publication is a continuation of two earlier series of chronicles, Philosophy in the Mid-Century (Firenze 1958/59) and Contemporary Philosophy (Firenze 1968), edited by Raymond KJibansky. As with the earlier series the present chronicles purport to give a survey of significant trends in contemporary philosophi cal discussion. The time space covered by the present series is (approximately) 1966-1978. The need for such surveys has, I believe, increased rather than decreased over the last years. The philosophical scene appears, for various reasons, more complex than ever before. The continuing process of specialization in most branches, the emergence of new schools of thought, particularly in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language, the convergence of interest (though not necessarily of opinion) of different traditions upon certain prob lems, and the increasing attention being paid to the history of philosophy in discussions of contemporary problems are the most important contributory factors. Surveys of the present kind are a valuable source of knowledge of this complexity and may as such be an assistance in renewing the understanding of one's own philosophical problems. The surveys, it is to be hoped, may also help to strengthen the Socratic element of modem philosophy, the dialogue or Kommu nikationsgemeinschajt. So far, four volumes have been prepared for the new series. The present chronicles in the Philosophy of Language and Philosophi cal Logic (Vol. I), are followed by chronicles in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. II), and Philosophy of Action (Vol."

B. A. O. Williams: KNOWLEDGE AND REASONS r A. ]. Ayer: COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR WILLIAMS' "KNOW- LEDGE AND REASONS" 12 E. ]. Furlong: MEMORY RE-CHAINED 17 Eduardo Nicol: CONNAISSANCE ET RECONNAISSANCE 23 Andre Mercier: DE L'EvIDENCE 2 3 G. H. von Wright: WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY 47 B. F. McGuinness: COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR VON WRIGHT'S "WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY" 6r ]. N. Theodoracopoulos: KANT ET LA CONNAISSANCE DE SOl 66 PREFACE At its meeting at Heidelberg in September 1969 the Institut Inter national de Philosophie decided to hold its next Entretiens in Helsinki. The theme selected for the meeting in Finland was Problems in the Theory of Knowledge (Probtemes de la tMorie de la connaissance). The Entretiens de Helsinki took place from 24th to 27th August 1970. As local host organization, the Philosophical Society of Finland was responsible for the external and social arrangements of the Entretiens. A grant from the Finnish Ministry of Education and the Oskar Oflund Foundation had been obtained for the purpose. 40 members of the Institut participated in the Entretiens. The various sessions, which were also open to members of the Philosophical Society of Finland, were attended by on average 100 people."

For the last 25 years, since publication of his Logical Studies, Professor Von Wright has steadily explored the field of philosophical logic. The concept of negation, logical paradoxes, the puzzles connected with evidence and probability in confirmation theory, the interrelatedness of the ideas of time and change, and the clarification of the structure of temporal and spatial orderings are among the many areas he has profitably investigated.

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that of one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations. The Remarks analyzes in depth such topics as logical compulsion (the "must") and mathematical conviction; calculation as experiment; mathematical surprise, discovery, and invention; Russell's logic, Goedel's theorem, Cantor's diagonal procedure, Dedekind's cuts; the nature of proof and contradiction; and the role of mathematical propositions in the forming of concepts. Wittgenstein's later philosophy was much involved with the concept of "language-games," of which mathematics was one. It was his feeling that a proper analysis of the use of language would clarify concepts and lead to the solution of (what seem to be) philosophical problems. Sometimes, Wittgenstein's expository method is pre-Socratic: a flow of disconnected statements, not unlike Heraclitean fragments, that range from clear aphorisms to cryptic oracles. Elsewhere, there are brief Socratic dialogues with imaginary persons, opponents of equally severe seriousness, representatives of the other half of Wittgenstein strove for total clarity of language as a means of solving philosophical problems, but some of his most meaningful statements here are expressed suggestively, subjectively, poetically.