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For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of
objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more
important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of
such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck,
Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain
respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the
grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change,
which men of science and philosophy have advocated in various forms
in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that
one's conception of science can be based on an identification of
its theories with languages in which they may be, my own
alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book
(1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other,
quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the
objec tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks
of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their
growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here,
therefore, much impor tance. It must be recognized that the
problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo,
are not just problems concerning language change."
Professor Pandit, working among the admirable group of philosophers
at the University of Delhi, has written a fundamental criticism and
a constructive re-interpretation of all that has been preserved as
serious epistemological and methodological reflections on the
sciences in modern Western philosoph- from the times of Galileo,
Newton, Descartes and Leibniz to those of Russell and Wittgenstein,
Carnap and Popper, and, we need hardly add, onward to the troubling
relativisms and reconstructions of historical epistemologies in the
works of Hanson, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. His themes are
intrigu ing, set forth as they are with masterly case studies of
physics and the life sciences, and within an original conceptual
framework for philosophical analysis of the processes, functions,
and structures of scientific knowing. Pandit's contributions
deserve thoughtful examination. For our part, we wish to point to
some among them: (1) an interactive articulation of subjective and
objective factors of both problems and theories in the course of
scientific development; (2) a striking contrast between the
explanatory power of a scientific theory and its 'resolving power',
i. e."
For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of
objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more
important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of
such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck,
Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain
respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the
grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change,
which men of science and philosophy have advocated in various forms
in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that
one's conception of science can be based on an identification of
its theories with languages in which they may be, my own
alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book
(1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other,
quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the
objec tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks
of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their
growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here,
therefore, much impor tance. It must be recognized that the
problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo,
are not just problems concerning language change."
Professor Pandit, working among the admirable group of philosophers
at the University of Delhi, has written a fundamental criticism and
a constructive re-interpretation of all that has been preserved as
serious epistemological and methodological reflections on the
sciences in modern Western philosoph- from the times of Galileo,
Newton, Descartes and Leibniz to those of Russell and Wittgenstein,
Carnap and Popper, and, we need hardly add, onward to the troubling
relativisms and reconstructions of historical epistemologies in the
works of Hanson, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. His themes are
intrigu ing, set forth as they are with masterly case studies of
physics and the life sciences, and within an original conceptual
framework for philosophical analysis of the processes, functions,
and structures of scientific knowing. Pandit's contributions
deserve thoughtful examination. For our part, we wish to point to
some among them: (1) an interactive articulation of subjective and
objective factors of both problems and theories in the course of
scientific development; (2) a striking contrast between the
explanatory power of a scientific theory and its 'resolving power',
i. e."
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